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ABSTRACT
Physical facilities are essential for Idaho public school districts to fulfill their
constitutional mandate “to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system
of public, free common schools.”1 Because these physical facilities cost millions of
dollars to construct, a common and prudent means of financing them is to borrow through
the municipal bond market. Accessing the bond market to obtain these needed funds is an
infrequent and complex process for most Idaho school districts and the administrators
who are charged with carrying out these financings. For this purpose, school
administrators look to the guidance of financial professionals to assist them. Prior to
2001, administrators were required to use a competitive sale (selection of an underwriter
is done through an open bidding process) to issue their school district’s bonds. Following
a 2001 policy change that made it permissible to use a negotiated sale (bonds are sold to a
pre-selected underwriter), 73 bonds were issued using a negotiated sale using only an
underwriter (financial professional acting as the broker who buys all the bonds and
resales them to investors) and with no municipal advisor (financial professional who has
a fiduciary duty to their municipal client). On August 2, 2006, the McCall-Donnelly
School District used a request for proposal (RFP) to select a municipal advisor (MA) and
at that MA’s recommendation the District used a competitive sale to issue its bonds. This
was the first competitive sale since the policy change. Since then through 2016, there

1

Constitution of the State of Idaho; Article IX: Education and School Lands; Section 1.
Legislature to Establish System of Free Schools.
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were 109 bonds issued with a mix of 75 negotiated and 34 competitive sales. First, this
dissertation examines, with the aid of industry best practice and past scholarly research,
whether there is a fiscal impact of competitive sales compared to negotiated sales using a
dataset of all 194 Idaho school district bonds sales from 2001 through 2016. Second, this
research seeks to understand the decision-making process school administrators
undertake to issue their bonds. This is accomplished using an original survey that was
sent to the entire population of Idaho school district administrators. Ultimately, this
dissertation provides insight into the effects of Idaho’s shift to more negotiated sales and
why administrators choose the financing methods they do.

x

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................v
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF AUTHOR ........................................................ viii
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... ix
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... xvii
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... xviii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................... xix
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................1
I. Introduction ..........................................................................................................1
a. The Paradigm shifts from Competitive Sales to Negotiated Sales ..........3
b. The McCall-Donnelly School District Uses a Competitive Sale .............4
c. Idaho School District Bond Finance from 2001 to 2016 .........................5
d. Education Funding Remains a Priority and Purpose of this Dissertation 5
e. Introduction to GFOA and Public Finance Literature..............................6
f. Primary Research Goals ...........................................................................6
g. Secondary Research Goals .......................................................................7
h. Public Administration Impacts ................................................................7
i. Contributions to Literature........................................................................8
II. Background .........................................................................................................9

xi

a. Idaho Funding Options .............................................................................9
b. Definition of Idaho School District Administrators.................................9
c. Financial Professionals Defined .............................................................10
d. Bond Sale Process ..................................................................................10
e. Methods of Selling Bonds ......................................................................12
f. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Methods of Selling Bonds .........13
g. GFOA Recommendations for Choosing a Method of Sale ...................18
III. Conclusion .......................................................................................................20
CHAPTER 2: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,
PUBLIC FINANCE, AND ADMINISTRATOR CHOICE ..............................................21
I. Literature Review ...............................................................................................21
a. Philosophical and Psychological Framework ........................................22
b. Foundations of Public Administration Theory ......................................25
c. Simon and Administrative Behavior ......................................................25
d. Simon’s Satisficing and Administrator Choice......................................27
e. Decision Theory and Behavioral Economics .........................................27
f. Principal-Agent Theory in the Public Sector and Administrator
Choice ........................................................................................................30
g. Principal-Agent Theory, Administrator Choice and Municipal Bonds .35
h. Information Asymmetry and Municipal Bonds .....................................38
i. Contemporary Debt Management and Municipal Finance Literature ....42
II. Policy Process Theories ....................................................................................43
a. Introduction ............................................................................................43
b. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory .............................................................45

xii

c. Innovation and Diffusion Theory ...........................................................46
d. Multiple Streams Theory .......................................................................51
III. Policy Process and ISDA Method of Sale History ..........................................53
a. Punctuating Event 1: Negotiation Becomes Permissible .......................53
b. Punctuating Event 2: McCall SD Hires a MA and Uses a Competitive
Sale.............................................................................................................53
c. Punctuating Event 3: Municipal Advisors Regulatory Rules ................55
IV. Conclusion .......................................................................................................59
CHAPTER 3: METHODS OF ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF COMPETITIVE VS.
NEGOIATED SALES IN IDAHO SCHOOL DISTRICT BONDS .................................63
I. Bond Yield Compared to MMD Introduction ....................................................63
II. Bond Yield Compared to MMD Methodology .................................................64
a. Unit of Analysis .....................................................................................65
b. Comparing Bonds to a Market Benchmark ...........................................66
c. The History of the MMD .......................................................................67
d. Individual Bonds and a Higher Degree of Accuracy .............................69
e. Dependent Variable ................................................................................69
f. Structural Independent Variables ...........................................................69
g. Levels of Measurement ..........................................................................70
h. Research Hypotheses .............................................................................70
i. Structural Hypothesis H1 ........................................................................70
j. Data Collection and Security ..................................................................71
k. Research Design and Methods ...............................................................71
l. Statistical Procedures ..............................................................................72

xiii

m. Potential Threats to Validity and Reliability ........................................72
III. Bond Characteristics Introduction ...................................................................73
IV. Bond Characteristics Methodology .................................................................74
a. Unit of Analysis .....................................................................................74
b. Dependent Variable ...............................................................................74
c. Structural Independent Variables ...........................................................74
d. Levels of Measurement ..........................................................................76
e. Research Hypotheses .............................................................................76
f. Structural Hypotheses H2 .......................................................................77
g. Data Collection and Security .................................................................77
h. Research Design and Methods ...............................................................78
i. Statistical Procedures ..............................................................................78
j. Potential Threats to Validity and Reliability ..........................................79
V. Administrator Survey Introduction ...................................................................79
VI. Administrator Survey Methodology ................................................................79
a. Unit of Analysis .....................................................................................81
b. Dependent Variable ...............................................................................81
c. Individual Independent Variables ..........................................................81
d. Levels of Measurement ..........................................................................86
e. Research Hypotheses .............................................................................86
f. Individual Hypotheses H2 ......................................................................87
g. Data Collection and Security .................................................................87
h. Administrator Survey .............................................................................87

xiv

i. Research Design and Methods ................................................................88
j. Statistical Procedures ..............................................................................89
k. Potential Threats to Validity and Reliability .........................................89
CHAPTER 4: BOND YIELD COMPARED TO MMD, BOND CHARACTERISTICS,
AND ADMINISTRATOR SURVERY RESULTS ...........................................................90
I. Introduction ........................................................................................................90
a. High-Level Observations of Structural Variables and Bond Data .........91
b. High-Level Observations of Administrator Survey ...............................99
c. Screening Questions (S1 & S2)............................................................100
d. Assessment Questions (Q1, Q2, Q3) ...................................................100
e. Training Question Q4, Q5, Q6, Q7, Q8 ...............................................102
f. Competency Questions (Q11, Q12): ....................................................113
g. SEC Municipal Advisor Rule Question (Q13): ...................................113
h. Lowest Cost of Borrowing Question (Q14): ........................................113
i. Underwriter Questions (Q15, Q16): .....................................................113
j. Municipal Advisor Questions (Q17, Q18, Q19, Q20): .........................114
k. Negotiated Sale Questions (Q21, Q22) ................................................115
l. Competitive Sale Questions (Q23, Q24, Q25, Q26).............................116
m. Super Majority Question (27) .............................................................117
n. Demographic Questions (D1, D2, D3, D4)..........................................118
o. Method of Sale Questions (MS) ..........................................................119
II. Bond Yield Compared to MMD Results .........................................................119
a. Idaho Competitive Bond Yields ...........................................................119
b. Idaho Negotiated Bond Yields .............................................................121

xv

c. Comparing Idaho Competitive Bonds to Negotiated Bonds ................122
III. Bond Characteristics Results .........................................................................124
a. Observations of Bond Characteristics Results .....................................124
b. LOGIT Regression Results of Structural Bond Characteristics H2.....125
IV. Administrator Survey Results ........................................................................127
a. LOGIT Regression Results of Individual Administrative Survey H2 .127
V. Discussion .......................................................................................................131
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION ........................................................................................132
I. Introduction ......................................................................................................132
II. Findings ...........................................................................................................136
a. Bond Yields Compared to Benchmark Findings .................................136
b. Bond Characteristic Findings ...............................................................137
c. Administrator Survey Findings ............................................................138
III. Future Research .............................................................................................140
IV. Conclusion .....................................................................................................144
a. Recommendations ................................................................................145
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................148
APPENDIX A ..................................................................................................................156
Administration Survey Recruitment Letter ........................................................1567
APPENDIX B ..................................................................................................................158
Administrator Survey Questionnaire .................................................................1589
APPENDIX C ..................................................................................................................166
Administrator Survey Results ............................................................................1667

xvi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1:

Bond Yield Variables, Measures, and Sources of Data ............................ 70

Table 3.2:

Bond Characteristics Variables, Measures, and Sources of Data ............. 76

Table 3.3:

Administrator Survey Variables, Measures, and Sources of Data ............ 83

Table 3.4:

Knowledge Index ...................................................................................... 85

Table 3.5:

Best Practice Index ................................................................................... 86

Table 4.1:

One-sample t-test of Competitive yields compared to the MMD vs
negotiated yields compared to the MMD................................................ 123

Table 4.2:

Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Structural Bond
Characteristic Variables Predicting Administrator Choice of Method of
Sale.......................................................................................................... 126

Table 4.3:

Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Individual Knowledge
Variables Predicting Administrator Choice of Method of Sale .............. 129

Table 4.4:

Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Individual Best Practice
Variables Predicting Administrator Choice of Method of Sale .............. 130

xvii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1:

S. 1158 Daily Bill Tracking History ........................................................... 3

Figure 1.2:

Timeline of Idaho School District Finance Policy from 2001 to 2016 ....... 5

Figure 1.3:

Debt Issuance Process ............................................................................... 12

Figure 2.1:

Literature Review Diagram....................................................................... 22

Figure 2.2:

Maslow’s Hierarchy of Human Needs ...................................................... 23

Figure 2.3:

Fay’s Circles of Knowing ......................................................................... 24

Figure 2.4

Principal-Agent Relationships in Municipal Finance .............................. 38

Figure 2.5:

Administrator Theoretical Decision-Making Process ............................... 42

Figure 2.6:

Idaho Method of Sale Frequency from 1999 to 2016 ............................... 46

Figure 2.7:

Policy Diffusion Model............................................................................. 48

Figure 2.8:

Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework.................................................. 52

Figure 4.1:

Idaho School District Issuance Frequency from 2001 to 2016 ................. 93

Figure 4.2:

Competitive & Negotiated Sale Frequency from 2001 to 2016 ............... 94

Figure 4.3:

Underwriter Frequency from 2001 to 2016 .............................................. 95

Figure 4.4:

Municipal Advisor Frequency from 2001 to 2016 ................................... 96

Figure 4.5:

Use of Municipal advisor and Negotiated Sale from 2001 to 2016 .......... 97

Figure 4.6:

Use of Municipal advisor and Competitive Sale from 2001 to 2016 ....... 98

Figure 5.1:

Competitive Bond Concentration Compared to the Benchmark ............ 120

Figure 5.2:

Negotiated Bond Concentration Compared to the Benchmark............... 121

xviii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BSU

Boise State University

CSG

Council of State Governments

CUSIP

Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures

DV

Dependent Variable

EFIB

Endowment Fund Investment Board

EMMA

Electronic Municipal Market Access

GC

Graduate College

GFOA

Government Financial Officer’s Association

GO

General Obligation

H

Hypothesis

IASA

Idaho Association of School Administrators

IASBO

Idaho Association of School Business Officers

ISBG

Idaho School Bond Guaranty

ISSA

Idaho School Superintendents Association

IV

Independent Variable

LOGIT

Logistical Regression

MA

Municipal Advisor

MIG

Municipal Investment Grade

MMD

Municipal Market Data AAA Curve

MSRB

Municipal Securities Rule-Making Board

xix

NCSL

National Conference of State Legislatures

NGA

National Governors Association

NSBA

National School Boards Association

RFP

Request for Proposals

S. 1158

Senate Bill 1158

SQ

Screener Questions

SEC

Securities and Exchange Commission

SPSS

Statistical Package for Social Sciences

TDC

Thesis and Dissertation Coordinator

TIC

True Interest Cost

TM3

The Municipal Market Monitor

xx

1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
I. Introduction
Prior to 2001, Idaho school district bonds were required to be sold using a
competitive bond sale, a transparent bidding process used to select an underwriting firm
that buys all the district’s bonds and then resells them to investors (MSRB, 2018). During
the 2001 legislative session, the Senate Local Government and Taxation Committee
debated Senate Bill No. 1158, which was a significant overhaul of the municipal bonding
statues. The most significant change the legislation made was that it allowed school
districts the option of issuing bonds through a negotiated bond sale, described as a
private sale of bonds, notes or other obligations pursuant to a written
contract, and not to the award of sealed or electronic bids submitted at public sale.
(A) Written contract means a written contract between the issuer of the bonds,
notes or other obligations, as seller, and the purchaser, which contract shall
specify the principal amounts, maturities, interest rates, redemption provisions, if
any, and other relevant terms of the sale (S. 1158, 2001).
According to the bills’ main supporters, Floyd Ayers of Seattle Northwest
Securities and the Idaho Bankers Association Executive Director Barbara Strickfaden,
who were “testifying on behalf of the public finance companies in Idaho,”:
Idaho Law currently requires that all school district general obligation
bonds be sold at competitive (bid) sale. Cities and some other local government
entities may sell revenue bonds at negotiated sale, and State agencies such as the
State Treasurer, the Student Loan Fund, Housing Agency, Water Resource
(Board), are permitted to negotiate their bond issues.
The purpose of the proposed legislation is to add a marketing option to
school districts. School districts are currently compelled to offer their bonds at
public auction. In today’s marketplace of volatile interest rates, picking a date to
hold an auction of bonds can arbitrarily subject the entity to market swings of 50
basis points or more (100 basis points equals one percent). The only recourse

2
currently available to the unity of local government is to reject all bids and, in
some cases, negotiate. Or re-advertise for bids with the same delay and the same
risk in arbitrarily picking another date (S. 1158, 2001).
The bill received some minor criticism from the Idaho Newspaper Association
Executive Director Bob Hall who stated, “This is a radical, historic making decision,
and…the public should have the opportunity to view private sale options.” The
committee held the bill and asked that Mr. Ayers and Mr. Hall meet to come up with
some amicable solutions. The bill was brought back to the Committee with minor
amendments like,
If bonds are sold at private sale, notice of the intention to sell such bonds
at private sale shall be published once in the name of such issuer in a newspaper
of general circulation within the issuer’s boundaries at least (3) three days prior to
the time scheduled by the issuer for approving the private sale of such bonds.
Failure to comply with this requirement shall not invalidate the sale of the bonds,
so long as the issuer has made a good-faith effort to comply (S. 1158, 2001).
The bill was then passed out of committee and the full Senate on a 32-1 vote. In
the House Revenue and Taxation Committee, Steve Purvis, City of Boise Finance
Manager, and Phil Homer, lobbyist for the Idaho Association of School Administrators,
testified in support of the legislation. It was then approved out of committee and the full
House on a 64-0 vote. The governor signed the legislation into law on March 31st, 2001.

3
S1158aa....................................by LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND TAXATION
BONDS - NOTES - ELECTRONIC BIDDING - Amends and adds to existing law to
authorize the sale of bonds, notes and other obligations of public entities
at public or private sale; to authorize sale by electronic bidding; to
require a deposit in such amount as the government body deems necessary;
and to authorize the use of a surety bond as bid security.
02/12 Senate intro - 1st rdg - to printing
02/13 Rpt prt - to Loc Gov
03/02 Rpt out - to 14th Ord
03/08 Rpt out amen - to engros
03/09 Rpt engros - 1st rdg - to 2nd rdg as amen
03/12 2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg as amen
03/13 3rd rdg as amen - PASSED - 32-1-2
AYES -- Andreason, Boatright, Branch(Bartlett), Bunderson,
Burtenshaw, Cameron, Danielson, Darrington, Davis, Deide, Dunklin,
Frasure, Geddes, Goedde, Hawkins, Ingram, Ipsen, Keough,
King-Barrutia, Lee, Lodge, Noh, Richardson, Risch, Sandy, Schroeder,
Sorensen, Stegner, Stennett, Thorne, Wheeler, Whitworth
NAYS -- Williams
Absent and excused -- Brandt, Sims
Floor Sponsor -- Thorne
Title apvd - to House
03/14 House intro - 1st rdg - to Rev/Tax
03/20 Rpt out - rec d/p - to 2nd rdg as amen
03/21 2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg as amen
03/26 3rd rdg as amen - PASSED - 65-0-5
AYES -- Barraclough, Barrett, Bedke, Bell, Bieter, Black, Boe, Bolz,
Bruneel, Callister, Campbell, Chase, Clark, Collins, Crow, Cuddy,
Deal, Denney, Ellis, Ellsworth, Eskridge, Field(13), Gagner, Gould,
Hadley, Hammond, Hansen, Harwood, Henbest(Farley), Higgins, Hornbeck,
Jaquet, Jones, Kellogg, Kendell, Kunz, Lake, Langford, Loertscher,
Mader, Marley, McKague, Meyer, Montgomery, Mortensen, Moss, Pearce,
Pomeroy, Raybould, Ridinger, Roberts, Robison, Sali, Schaefer,
Sellman, Shepherd, Smith, Smylie, Stevenson, Stone, Tilman, Trail,
Wood, Young, Mr. Speaker
NAYS -- None
Absent and excused -- Bradford, Field(20), Moyle, Pischner, Wheeler
Floor Sponsor -- Kellogg
Title apvd - to Senate
03/28 To enrol - rpt enrol - Pres signed
03/29 Sp signed - to Governor
03/31 Governor signed
Session Law Chapter 264
Effective: 03/31/01

Figure 1.1:

S. 1158 Daily Bill Tracking History

Source: S. 1158, 2001
a. The Paradigm shifts from Competitive Sales to Negotiated Sales
This paradigm shift in policy, from all competitive sales to then allowing
negotiated sales, was a logical change and did provide method of sale options that Idaho
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municipalities did not have before. School districts and other municipalities now had the
option of choosing the method of sale that best fit their individual district’s needs.
Curiously, all 73 school district bonds that were issued after S. 1153 passed until
2006 was done through the new method of negotiation2. Even though school districts still
had the option to issue bonds using a competitive sale, none of them chose to do so. It is
worth noting that the only public finance company that had a physical presence in Idaho
and that conducted all but one of the negotiated sales was Seattle Northwest Securities.
b. The McCall-Donnelly School District Uses a Competitive Sale
In 2006, the McCall-Donnelly School District #421 was the first school district in
five years to again use a competitive sale to issue bonds. Bloomberg News captured the
significance of this public finance policy change back to competitive sales as follows:
An Idaho school district will take bids from investment banks today for
$28.5 million of bonds, seeking to lower debt costs by bringing competition back
to the way (Idaho) borrows. In Idaho, all new school bonds had to be sold through
competitive bidding until the legislature changed the law in 2001 to allow
negotiation. Since then, all 73 school bond issues, worth $832 million, have been
sold by negotiating exclusive agreements with underwriters (Preston, 2006).
Bloomberg News went on to call this pivotal point in Idaho’s school district
finance history a “complete revival” (Preston, 2006).

2

In 2002, the Blackfoot School District 55 competitively sold a bond using a municipal advisor,
but the advisor actually won the financing. How competitive the sale was is difficult to determine.
Regulation at the time allowed for an advisor to set-up the financing and then bid on it. There were also 4
short-term notes issued by the Blaine School District 61 rated using Moody’s Investment Grade (MIG)
criteria. These and other taxable and federally subsidized bonds such as Build America Bonds (BABs),
Qualified School Construction Bonds (QSCBs) and Qualified Zone Academy Bonds (QZABs) were
excluded from the analysis. More detail is provided in Chapter 2, but suffice it to say that these were nonuniform outlier bonds and the intent of the sample was to identify a pool of homogeneous bonds.
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c. Idaho School District Bond Finance from 2001 to 2016
From McCall-Donnelly School District #421’s 2006 competitive sale until the end
of 2013, eighty-two school districts issued bonds. Twenty-six, or 32 percent, were
assisted by a municipal advisor. All twenty-six used a competitive sale. The remaining
fifty-two issues, or 68 percent, used only an underwriter and no municipal advisor. All
fifty-two sold bonds through a negotiated sale. From 2013 through 2016, there have been
6 instances of districts using a municipal advisor and a negotiated sale. Figure 1.2
provides a good illustration of the history of Idaho school district bond issuances.

Figure 1.2:

Timeline of Idaho School District Finance Policy from 2001 to 2016

d. Education Funding Remains a Priority and Purpose of this Dissertation
Education funding is a top priority of Idahoans as consistently found in recent
polls (Albertson’s, 2014 and 2015; Boise State, January 2016 and September 2016; Idaho
2020, 2015 and 2016; Idaho Politics Weekly, 2015). This dissertation seeks to lend
significant insight into Idaho school district bond financing by understanding 1) is there a
quantitative difference between competitive and negotiated sales, and 2) why do Idaho’s
public school districts and their administrators, who carry-out their respective district’s
bond financing policies, choose the method of selling bonds they do. Exploring this
research question has theoretical and practical significance.

6
The remainder of this introductory chapter will provide valuable context into 1)
understanding the bond sale process, 2) describing the advantages and disadvantages to
each type of sale, 3) review the Government Financial Officer’s Association (GFOA)
established criteria and recommendations for choosing a method of sale, 4) Conclude
with some observations that further support the two research questions mentioned above.
e. Introduction to GFOA and Public Finance Literature
According to the GFOA, there are best practices for selecting financial
professionals, selecting a method of sale (GFOA, Method of Sale, 2007; GFOA,
Municipal Advisor, 2014; GFOA, Underwriter, 2014). Since the late 1970s, public
finance scholarship has debated both the pros and cons of methods of sale. Many suggest
that governments make bond finance decisions that are not efficient when selecting
professionals and processes. As a result, these governments are likely to pay more than is
necessary3 (Forbes & Peterson, 1979; Guzman & Moldogaziev, 2012; Justice & Miller,
2011; Leigland & Lamb, 1986; Liu, 2018; Luby & Moldogaziev, 2013; Miller, 1993;

Marlowe, 2009; Robbins & Simonsen, 2007; Robbins & Simonsen, 2008; Simonsen,
Robbins & Helgerson, 2001; Vijayakumar & Daniels, 2006).
f. Primary Research Goals
This dissertation seeks to further explore this method of sale debate with a logical
subset of Idaho school district bond data. It also seeks to discover why public officials
make the method of sale choices they do using a survey of all Idaho school district
administrators. This research may lead to policy recommendations that could reduce the

3

There is research that has discovered alternative results (Johnson & Kriz, 2005; Kriz, 2003;
Leonard, 1996).
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costs associated with bond financing for schools. Therefore, reducing the tax burden on
Idaho taxpayers and/or allowing Idaho’s school districts to spend scarce resources on
other programs. Districts’ uses of potential savings is a political decision that is
independent of the finance questions discussed in this dissertation, but that are certainly
worthy of addition research.
g. Secondary Research Goals
Secondary effects of the study address the concepts of increased government
transparency and administrator accountability, possibly opening competitive forces and
innovations to this segment of the Idaho public finance market, and increased
administrator competency and professionalism. In the public sphere, these benefits
translate into increased public trust and increased government efficiency, theoretically
helping address Idahoans’ education funding concerns.
h. Public Administration Impacts
This dissertation strikes at several core tenants of public administration and is rich
with opportunities to expand the field of public finance scholarship. The public finance
literature focuses primarily on the policy outcomes of bonding methods (Liu, 2018), the
impacts of market professionals on bonding results (Luby & Moldogaziev, 2013), and the
consequences of using the same methods repeatedly over time (Robbins & Simonsen,
2008). There is some empirical research in the broader public administration literature
regarding administrator decision making (Hildreth, 1993 & 1996), but virtually no
research focused on public finance administrative decision-making. This gap in the public
finance research is an important one that this dissertation attempts to fill.
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i. Contributions to Literature
This research will significantly contribute to the field of public finance research
by: (1) providing insight into broader national and global financial concerns that
continually trouble the capital markets and their interaction with responsible government;
(2) analyzing existing Idaho bond results to understand if there is a quantifiable
difference between method of sale types; (3) using a well-planned and administered
survey of the entire Idaho school district administrator population to better understand
individual administrators choices of sale methods; and (4) using quantitative statistical
techniques to analyze the data collected from the survey and using the results of that
analysis to formulate policy recommendations, which can institute preferred outcomes.
The results could be applied across multiple disciplines, such as economics,
sociology, education, and finance. Examples of this may include competitive bidding
practices for school district procurement or financing advice to corporations when they
sale corporate bonds.
Beyond testing weather or not competitive bond sales are less expensive than
negotiated sales as applied to Idaho school district bonds, the main gap in the literature
this study seeks to fill is to answer why administrators choose the methods of sale they
do? The main literary concepts it seeks to test are information asymmetry, anchoring,
principal/agent dilemmas and decision theory. These concepts are described in greater
detail in Chapter 2.
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II. Background
a. Idaho Funding Options
Idaho’s 115 public school districts have a variety of infrastructure needs that
originate from growing populations, technology needs, and aging facilities (IASA, 2013).
Districts have four basic ways of meeting these needs: save and pay, pay as you go,
grants, and bonds. It is impractical for districts to save up funds to build needed facilities
(save and pay) because taxpayers and the State Legislature do not favor the hoarding of
public funds. This practice was seen in several districts I reviewed, particularly those
districts that carried an ongoing fund balance. Also, teachers’ unions tend to demand
higher salaries when districts carry significant fund balances. Paying for facilities over
time through an annual budget line-item (pay as you go) is also impractical because it
may take years to construct a needed facility. Grants—if secured and administered
properly—are helpful but are often insufficient to fund an entire project and often have
prohibitive red tape associated with them.
Prudent districts use a combination of these methods, but to finance costly
facilities, districts primarily issue general obligation bonds that require a public vote in
Idaho and an approval threshold of 66.66%. This threshold is extremely difficult to obtain
and Idaho is one of only two states that require such a threshold.
b. Definition of Idaho School District Administrators
Idaho school districts rely on the superintendent and the business officer to be
responsible for setting a district’s finance policies. In principal/agent theory, these
administrators are the principals (Downs, 1957). They have the responsibility of
conducting bond election campaigns, selecting a method for issuing the bonds, and
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administering the ongoing finance policies of their districts. Due to the complex and
specialized nature of the bond finance process, and because Idaho school districts issue
bonds infrequently in general, these administrators are charged with selecting agents or
other financial/legal professionals to assist them. Therefore, there seems to be a
relationship worth exploring between district administrators and the expertise necessary
to navigate the public bonding process.
c. Financial Professionals Defined
Administrators turn to financial professionals to assist them with their bond
financing needs. In principal/agent theory, these financial professionals are the agents
(Downs, 1957). The two types of financial professionals are a municipal advisor who has
a fiduciary responsibility to the district and an underwriter who has no fiduciary
responsibility and who ultimately buys the district’s bonds and resells them to bond
investors. It is important to note that an underwriter is necessary in both methods of sale
as they are the ones who provide the funds to the districts in exchange for the bonds. The
method, competitive or negotiated, simply determines how the underwriter is selected.
The Idaho data suggests that both municipal advisors and underwriters are largely
selected without using a bidding process.
d. Bond Sale Process
Figure 1.3 below is an illustration of the bond issuance process. This study
focuses on understanding the method of sale section of the process. The overwhelmingly
used methods of sale of Idaho school district bonds are negotiated and competitive sales.
The private placement method is infrequent and unique in that it does not use the market
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to sale the bonds but relies on a sole investor or a select few investors. For these reasons
this method is excluded from this study4.

4
Though a private placement is a reasonable method of sale, there are only two known instances
of a private placement being used during the sample period. Also, these financings had unique credit
qualities, were unrated, or had limited disclosure associated with them making them incompatible with the
sample. A private placement is defined as a capital raising event that involves the sale of securities to a
relatively small number of select investors. ... A private placement is different from a public issue in which
securities are made available for sale on the open market to any type of investor (Investopedia, 2018).
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Figure 1.3:

Debt Issuance Process

e. Methods of Selling Bonds
Administrators typically choose one of two methods to issue bonds. The first
method is a competitive sale, where the entire market of underwriters can bid on the
district’s bonds in a transparent process where the underwriter with the lowest interest
rate wins and purchases all of the bonds. Underwriters bid electronically now to purchase
the bonds, and the bid with the lowest interest cost wins the bonds. In a competitive sale,
the government structures the sale itself, usually with the assistance and advice of an
expert financial advisor, also called a municipal advisor (MA). The issuer and the
municipal advisor decide on the timing of the sale, the amount, the maturity schedule,
bidding specifications, and all other particulars of the sale. When the bids are opened, the
underwriter bidding the lowest interest rate wins the bonds. After the bonds are purchased
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by the underwriter, they are typically resold to investors. The difference between what
the underwriter pays to the issuer and the selling price to investors is called the gross
underwriter spread or simply the spread. The underwriter's expenses, commissions, and
profit are paid out of the spread (Simonsen & Hill, 1998).
For a negotiated sale the underwriter is chosen beforehand by the issuer. The
interest costs and the particulars of the offering for a negotiated sale are determined by
the terms of the agreement between the underwriter and the issuer. If the sale is large
enough several underwriters may get together and form a syndicate and collectively
purchase the bonds. Syndicates are formed to raise sufficient resources to purchase the
bonds and share the risks of underwriting the issue. One or two of the underwriter firms
will be the lead manager(s), or senior manager(s) that administer the operations of the
syndicate (Simonsen & Hill, 1998).
Simonsen & Hill (1998) found that “the vast majority of the evidence suggests
that competitive sales result in lower interest costs on average compared to negotiated
sales, and the magnitude of this difference gets larger as the number of bids increase”
(Simonsen & Hill, 1998).
f. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Methods of Selling Bonds
Each finance method has advantages and disadvantages. The literature (Simonsen
& Robbins, 1996) suggests that competitive sales will generally produce the following
advantages and disadvantages:
Advantages of a Competitive Sale
● Market competition is advantageous for the protection of the public interest
● Achieves an effective interest cost that is as low as possible
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● Lower gross underwriting spreads, which means the margin between what the
underwriter purchases the bonds and what they resale the bonds for to investors.
● Avoids allegations of unfairness or impropriety through open process.
Disadvantages of a Competitive Sale
● Limited ability to adjust the timing and structure of the bond issue
● Limited influence over choice of winning underwriting firm
● Limited influence on which firms will compose the underwriting syndicate
● Least flexibility in structuring the bonds for underwriter, since the issuer
determines most of the terms of the offering (Simonsen & Robbins, 1996)
With a negotiated sale in which the district works directly with an underwriter
who buys all the district’s bonds and resells them at a profit, the underwriter selection is
done without public bidding. Negotiated sale is a variable method of issuing bonds that
should be tested in greater detail. Advantages and disadvantages of this method of sale
are as follows:
Advantages of a Negotiated Sale
● Enables an issuer greater influence over the selection of the underwriter
● Enables an issuer greater influence on the distribution of the bonds
● Allows greater flexibility in the timing and structuring of the issue
● Issuers can more easily respond to changes in the market
● Underwriter can conduct greater pre-sale marketing, and by reducing its potential
inventory risk, may be able to reduce cost
Disadvantages of a Negotiated Sale
● Lack of competition
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● Underwriter may structure the offering to maximize its own profits
● Underwriters may be chosen based on favoritism
● Issuers must stand ready to defend the qualitative and quantitative factors used in
its selection of the underwriter and resulting negotiated sale
● Exclusive relationship between the underwriter and issuer may cost the district
more than if it used a competitive bond sale
● Issuers may receive services that are unneeded, and priced accordingly
● Requires issuer to apply additional scrutiny to the total costs of the underwriting,
which they may not have access to or fully understand (Mysak, 2005)
There are several factors that should be considered when determining which
method of sale is most appropriate for a given issue. These factors relate to the type of
issuer and the type of issue. When looking at the issuer, it is important to consider (1) the
issuer’s market understanding as well as (2) its creditworthiness and (3) the issuer’s
financial goals. As for the bond issue itself, it is important to consider (1) the type of
security being offered, (2) the market conditions, and (3) the size and complexity of the
issue. Many government finance officers use a list of criteria when selecting either a
competitive sale or a negotiated sale. Although each bond sale should be viewed on a
case-by-case basis, the following factors would favor a competitive sale:
Factors Favoring the Use of a Competitive Sale
● The rating of the bonds is investment-grade (Moodys – Bbb3 or S&P – BBB- or
higher) either with or without credit enhancement.
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● The bonds are general obligation bonds or full faith and credit obligations of the
issuer, or revenue bonds that are secured by a strong, known, and long-standing
revenue stream.
● The bonds being offered are structured without innovative or new financing
features that require an extensive explanation to the bond market.
● The issuer raises capital often and is well-known in the market.
● The municipal bond market has relatively stable market conditions.
"As the number of bids increase, so do the estimated savings associated with
competitive sale" (Simonsen & Robbins, 1996).
The following factors would favor a negotiated sale:
Factors Favoring the Use of a Negotiated Sale
● The rating of the bonds is not investment-grade (Moodys – Bb1 or S&P – BB+ or
lower) either with or without credit enhancement.
● Bond insurance or other credit enhancement is unavailable, or not cost-effective.
● The issuer is new to the market or has limited public borrowing experience.
● The structure of the bonds has innovative or new financing features that require
extensive explanation to the bond market.
● The issuer, after consulting with its municipal advisor, believes the use of a
negotiated sale process will be advantageous
● The amount of the debt being issued is very large or very small (Simonsen &
Robbins, 1996).
In general, if the issuer is a smaller municipality that is relatively unknown to the
market, and/or has a low level of credit strength, a negotiated sale may be more
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appropriate. This would enable the underwriter to conduct pre-sale marketing to inform
the market of the issue and determine optimal pricing. In addition, issuers who wish to
involve smaller firms would typically choose negotiated sales, as these provide the issuer
with greater control of the distribution of the bonds. Smaller municipalities should be
cautious when considering a negotiated sale as it has been found that the size of the
municipality using a negotiated sale can increase borrowing rates (Simonsen, Robbins, &
Helgerson, 2001).
Two recent examples of the value of a negotiated sale are related to the ability to
time a market and extended pre-sale marketing. The first example of the need for timing a
market is evident with the Madison School District 321 who had a refunding bond issue
that was just short of their interest savings requirement. The district’s ability to sale the
bonds when the market was known to be favorable was accomplished using a negotiated
sale.
The second example of extended pre-sale efforts is evident with the Dietrich
School District 314, who had some negative media related to the abuse and bullying of a
student that made national press. The underwriter’s ability to explain these “story bonds”
to investors, or that these events were not related to the credit of the bonds, enabled the
bonds to be sold at reasonable yields.
Traditional debt instruments such as general obligation bonds offered by large,
well known issuers are typically better off using a competitive sale. Smaller issues or
ones that incorporate non-traditional features such as variable interest rates, put options,
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or swaps5 may be more suited to a negotiated sale by an underwriter who is experienced
in structuring and marketing such offerings. Negotiated sales are also advisable when
dealing with a so-called story bond6, which requires considerable marketing to explain
features of the bonds that may otherwise be difficult for investors to understand.
Market timing is also an important factor in deciding between bond sale types.
Given a stable interest rate environment, a competitive sale may be preferred. However,
in volatile markets7, the flexibility of a negotiated sale may be the better choice.
g. GFOA Recommendations for Choosing a Method of Sale
Established in 1906, the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) is the
national trade organization for Idaho municipal government finance officers and is made
up of public officials in the United States and Canada. The goal of the GFOA is to
promote positive change in public finance administration. The 18-member executive
board and several standing committees produce a host of best practices and advisories to
assist public administrators on finance-related topics. These best practices are carefully
formulated using the collective wisdom of more than 50 people with extensive and
diverse experience in finance administration (GFOA, 2014).

5

A variable interest rate is an interest rate on a loan or security that fluctuates over time, because it
is based on an underlying benchmark interest rate or index that changes periodically. A put option is an
option contract giving the owner the right, but not the obligation, to sell a specified amount of an
underlying security at a specified price within a specified time frame. A swap is a derivative contract
through which two parties exchange financial instruments. These instruments can be almost anything, but
most swaps involve cash flows based on a notional principal amount that both parties agree to. Each cash
flow comprises one leg of the swap. One cash flow is generally fixed while the other is variable, which is
based on a benchmark interest rate, floating currency exchange rate, or index price (Investopedia, 2018).
6
A bond so unusual or having such complicated features that salespeople are frequently called on
to explain its intricacies to customers. Story bonds sometimes offer slightly higher yields than ordinary
bonds as a way of convincing investors that they are worth holding (Investopedia, 2018).
7
Volatile markets are usually characterized by wide price fluctuations and heavy trading. They
often result from an imbalance of trade orders (Investopedia, 2018). Volatility in the municipal bond
market may be caused by geopolitical events, Federal Reserve actions, legislative and regulatory actions,
municipal news coverage, and credit rating actions to name a few.
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On the topic of bond financing, the GFOA states that the number one goal of any
financing is to “achieve the lowest cost of borrowing” (GFOA, Method of Sale, 2007).
With that overarching goal in mind, the GFOA also cites two areas of concern with
achieving this goal. First, they state:
There is a lack of understanding among many debt issuers about the
appropriate roles of underwriters and financial advisors. The relationship between
issuer and financial advisor is one of ‘trust and confidence’ which is in the ‘nature
of a fiduciary relationship.’ This is in contrast to the relationship between the
issuer and underwriter where the relationship is one of some common purposes
but also some competing objectives, especially at the time of bond pricing
(GFOA, Method of Sale, 2007).
The second concern is:
A lack of a competitive Request for Proposals (RFP) process in the
selection of underwriters in a negotiated sale and the possibility of higher
borrowing costs when underwriters are appointed based on factors other than
merit. As a result, issuers have been forced to defend their selection of
underwriters for negotiated sales in the absence of a documented, open selection
process (GFOA, Underwriter, 2014).
The GFOA provides two recommendations to address these concerns. First, they
recommend administrators hire a municipal advisor to assist with the bond issuance
process and represent the interests of the government in a fiduciary capacity (GFOA,
Method of Sale, 2007). Second, they recommend a transparent competitive sale in the
following cases: if the bonds have a rating of A or higher, if the bonds are general
obligation bonds, and if the structure of the bonds does not require extensive explanation
to investors (GFOA, Method of Sale, 2007). It is noteworthy that all known Idaho school
district bonds considered in this study meet the criteria for competitive bond sale.
In summary, the public finance literature and GFOA suggest that the use of a
competitive bond sale and a municipal advisor will result in lower financing costs.
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III. Conclusion
Idaho school districts have many facilities needs with a limited number of funding
methods to address them. School District administrators typically and practically turn to
the bond market to fund them. Issuing bonds can be a complex process and
administrators turn to financial professionals for assistance in accessing the bond market.
The financial professionals’ advice on which methods of sale to use, competitive or
negotiated, has evolved over time because of legislative constraints as well as other
factors that are sought to be understood in more depth in this dissertation.
Based on this background and context a thorough review of the literature is
necessary in order to give this research a firm basis on which to understand and
contribute to the literature. The next chapter focuses on the theoretical foundations of the
public administration literature and provides a framework by which the research
questions of this dissertation can be explored.
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CHAPTER 2: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,
PUBLIC FINANCE, AND ADMINISTRATOR CHOICE
I. Literature Review
This literature review begins with Maslow’s (1943) psychological lens and Fay’s
(1996) philosophical lens to set a framework for understanding the individual decisions
of Idaho school district administrators. This base is broadened with the historical and
bedrock theories of public administration to provide further context, refinement, and
bounding of the study. This logically funnels the discussion to Simon (1976) and is
further refined by Downs (1967) and their work with the individual administrator and
administrator rationale for decision-making. Frederickson’s and a host of others
refinement of decision theory is also used to further define the theoretical framework.
Principal agent theory and information asymmetry literature is also used to bound the
idea of administrator choice and factors that shape those choices. Finally, the literature
review concludes with a testing model using related contemporary works in the municipal
finance literature to accomplish the research agenda. A visual of this review is provided
below:
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Figure 2.1:

Literature Review Diagram

a. Philosophical and Psychological Framework
Maslow’s hierarchy provides foundational insight into the decision-making of
Idaho school district administrators. Briefly, Maslow’s seminal work on the
psychological motivations of individuals begins with the basic physiological needs of
individuals needing to be met to proceed to the highest level of self-actualization
(Maslow, 1943).
When applied to Idaho school district administrators it is worth studying at what
level on the hierarchy of needs administrators are making their financial decisions.
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Figure 2.2:

Maslow’s Hierarchy of Human Needs

Source: Maslow, 1970
Fay’s (1996) philosophical and social science lens coupled with Maslow’s (1943)
hierarchy of needs provide an excellent framework with which to analyze Idaho school
district administrators’ decision-making processes. Fay provides an analysis of knowing
at the individual level and a theory on how the self interacts with other levels, such as
groups, society, and a global perspective. From the beginning of this discussion it is
important to insert Fay’s (1996) assertion that an individual’s self is “essentially
permeable.” He continues, “Indeed, so permeable is it that not only are you not separate
from others but rather others are part of you” (p.39-40). Fay also describes the self as
“essentially social” (p. 39-40). This transference of self to the external world and back
assumes that administrators simultaneously influence and are influenced by themselves,
their peers, society, and global perspectives, or what Fay describes as a “multi-cultural
perspective” (p. 40). This key concept of the permeability of the self and how it is shaped
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and influenced by internal and external factors is useful as it relates to administrator
finance decisions and is discussed in greater detail in the Frederickson decision theory
discussion, particularly when referring to information asymmetries and irrational choice.
The Idaho Association of School Administrators (IASA) is the peer group for
individual school district administrators. Within the IASA is the Idaho School
Superintendents Association (ISSA) and the Idaho Association of School Business
Officers (IASBO), which also serves as the Idaho chapter of the GFOA. This peer group
provides training and education, social enculturation, and peer support for Idaho’s school
district administrators. Municipal advisors and underwriters are often sponsoring these
association’s events and are invited to present finance related trainings (IASA). The
influence of this peer group on individual administrators is undeniable.
Figure 2.3 shows Fay’s general approach to knowledge, how the individual gains
knowledge, how they are influenced and how they interact with external inputs:

Figure 2.3:

Fay’s Circles of Knowing
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Source: Fay, 1998
With Maslow and Fay serving as the psychological philosophical basis of the
decision-making process of administrators, we now turn to the public administration
literature to provide bureaucratic and further structure to the theory of this dissertation.
b. Foundations of Public Administration Theory
Woodrow Wilson (1887) is the intellectual starting point for the Study of Public
Administration. Wilson endeavored to promote efficiency and to encourage public
administrators not to engage in the enterprise of politics. This separation of politics and
administration is known as the politics/administration dichotomy, which continues to be
refined and debated today in the field of public administration (Riccucci, 2010, p. 6-7).
Wilson also purposely placed the field of public administration in an applied context and
established the individual administrator as the unit of analysis (Wilson, 1887).
One of the original theories taken from private industry used in the fledgling field
of public administration was Frederick Taylor’s scientific management, which aimed at
the practical “one best way” of performing a job to ensure optimal efficiency (Taylor,
1914). Gulick & Urwick (1937) were instrumental in integrating this approach of
scientific management into the field of public administration with the intent of making
government agencies more efficient. Their work led to others seeking to understand the
application of these foundational business principles in the public administration sphere.
c. Simon and Administrative Behavior
In 1947, Simon originated a critique of Wilson’s politics/administration
dichotomy using a fact/value dichotomy. Simon’s positivist approach argued that the
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study of public administration should be fact-based: “empirically derived, measured, and
verified...Values, [Simon] claimed, had no place in the study” (Riccucci, 2010, p. 9).
Waldo, shortly after Simon’s first call for empiricism in the field, responded that
“there is much in scientific method which is nonempirical and nonexperimental” and that
the “treatment in the mode of natural science…administration is generally suffused with
questions of value” (Riccucci, 2010, p. 11).8
Broadly referred to as decision theory, rational choice theory as applied here can
be picked up from Simon’s 1976 positivist approach as outlined in Administrative
Behavior, where Simon states, “it is impossible for the behavior of a single, isolated
individual to reach any high degree of rationality” (p. 79). Simon provides three reasons
actual behavior falls short of pure rationality. First, complete information is impossible to
obtain. It is impossible for school district administrators to acquire all of the necessary
information when making bond financing decisions. Second, consequences lie in the
future. Therefore, administrators must make decisions regarding financial professionals
and methods of sale in advance, often years, before the results of those decisions are
manifested. Third, it is impossible to know all of the possible alternatives to a given
choice (p. 79-81). These limitations or gaps in knowledge are widely defined as
information asymmetries.
These three limitations on the rational decision-making of Idaho school district
administrators are evident in administrator behavior. Administrators have limited

8

It is understood that Waldo’s (1948, 1984) contrary views are valid, have an extensive
intellectual offspring, and “continue to be central to public administration theory and practice” (Harmon,
1989, p. 435), but this study focuses on Simon’s theoretical branch of the public administration literature.
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information regarding their bonding options because the bond financing process is
infrequent and complex; thus, the costs of an administrator’s choices are obscure. In other
words, it is difficult for administrators to know the costs and benefits associated with
their decisions. Therefore, they will employ various strategies to limit risk to obtain a
satisfactory outcome.
d. Simon’s Satisficing and Administrator Choice
Often administrators cannot accomplish all their goals with a single policy
decision; therefore, they may implement satisficing strategies or “find a ‘satisfactory’
solution for one or more subproblems” (Simon, 1976, p. 272). Simon’s bureaucratic
decision-making strategy “satisficing” could also be used to explain why administrators
use the same financial professionals and methods of selling bonds they have in the past.
Administrators are not paid more for a more efficient process, but where there is such a
high stakes game being played where the bond issue they are undertaking is likely the
largest single transaction they will undertake, it is good enough to engage the
professionals and use the process that will get it done at a satisfactory level, even if that
satisfactory level is suboptimal.
Finally, since purely rational decisions require knowledge of all the possible
alternatives, by choosing a negotiated sale, administrators cannot, by definition, be
making a rational choice. They are choosing to limit alternatives to one underwriter,
which does not maximize their utility (Robbins & Simonsen, 2008).
e. Decision Theory and Behavioral Economics
Frederickson et al. (2012) describe the purpose of decision theory as “to
determine the most efficient, or rational, decisions to achieve preferred objectives” (p.
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165). Decision theory seeks to clarify and prioritize organizational values and objectives,
consider alternatives that might achieve those objectives, and analyze these options in
order to determine which one or group of alternatives will most likely achieve the desired
objectives (Frederickson et al., 2012).
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) provide useful research into how humans are
perversely and consistently irrational. They empirically identify three predictable biases
that support this theory of irrationality. The first bias is that of anchoring, or when “past
decisions disproportionately affect future decisions.”9 The second bias is that of
availability, or “assess(ing) the pros of any decision on the basis of the most readily
available information.” The third bias they identify is that of representativeness, or the
“tendency to draw on existing stereotypes when attempting to discern patterns in others’
behavior” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, Italics added).
In situations involving uncertainty, individuals will take fewer risks if the gains
from the decision are perceived as being less than a potential loss. And, vice versa, the
potential gains from any decision must be more than offset (often at least double) the
potential loss; in short, the ration of gains to losses is not a 1:1 relationship as would be
predicted by a model of pure rationality. Kahneman and his colleagues have labeled these
tendencies “anomalies,” that is, persistent and predictable deviations from rational
decision-making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

9

Recent work by Dougal et. al. (2015) provides evidence that anchoring in financial markets
contributes to outcomes in credit spreads on corporate bonds. Additional work by Dr. Justin Marlowe at the
University of Washington has brought anchoring research to municipal bonds.
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The irrationality framework emerging from Tversky and Kahneman’s research
suggests that even with complete information, “decisions follow a predictable, irrational
pattern” (Fredrickson et. al., 2012, p. 174).
Ariely’s emerging work on the concept of “predictable irrationality”, a new
branch of decision theory further pushes this understanding. Ariely evaluates the sources
of illogical decisions and explores the reasons why irrational thought often overcomes
level-headed practices. Ariely further offers insight into the structural patterns that cause
people to make the same mistakes repeatedly. In many ways Ariely’s work refutes the
common assumption that humans behave in fundamentally rational ways (Ariely, 2009).
To this end, Fredrickson (2012) states, “In spite of their best efforts to be rational,
decision makers, individually and especially collectively, are constrained by limited
cognitive capacity, incomplete information, and unclear linkages between decisions and
outcomes” (et al., p. 166).
This suggests administrators would need to realize benefits from a municipal
advisor and competitive sale more than what they receive with an underwriter and
negotiated sale in order to change their current practice. This also suggests administrators
use anchoring strategies when making method of sale decisions. Anchoring is discussed
in great detail later in this chapter. As briefly described in Chapter 1, administrator
principals with limited information and expertise, seek an underwriter and/or municipal
advisor agent to assist with the issuance of bonds. This principal-agent model is further
defined and then utilized to frame the theory of this dissertation.
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f. Principal-Agent Theory in the Public Sector and Administrator Choice
Rationality is a basic idea on which principal-agent theory is founded. It is also
important to remember principal-agent theory simply describes contractual agreements
between two or more individuals or organizations. These relationships may occur
internally to an organization, or externally between individuals, firms or organizations
(Dees, 1992).
The principal wishes to acquire goods, expertise or services from the agent who
has the desired goods, expertise or services readily available. The agent who is acting on
behalf of the principal, provides the good or service under agreed upon terms set by the
market or by negotiation. The agent is paid by the principal according to the terms of the
agreement. Terms can vary according to the mutually defined agreement (Dees, 1992). In
the case of underwriters and municipal advisor agents, a municipal advisor has essential
duties of care, obedience, and loyalty to the principal when providing the goods, expertise
or services (SEC, 2014). Underwriters have no such obligation under the rule.
Dee (1992) suggests that the agent is obligated to act in the best interest of the
principal. Benefits that result from the agent's efforts on behalf of the principal must be
revealed to the principal. If the agent deviates from performing in the principal's
exclusive interest, with due care, obedience and loyalty, then a "principal-agent problem"
exists (Dees, 1992).
Because of this, two important assumptions result; first, it is assumed principal's
sole purpose is utility maximization.10 This can be defined as the maximization of utility

Downs’ approach to bureaucratic decision-making in the public administration classic Inside
Bureaucracy is one of the most cited works in public administration research. Downs (1967), citing
prominent works of economic and rational choice theorists (including Simon), describes administrators as
10
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of the good or service provided by the agent minus the principal's associated control
costs. Second, the agent is assumed to have a negative utility for effort and a positive
utility for compensation. Therefore, the agent is assumed to be capable of self-seeking or
outright opportunistic behavior, to the detriment of the principal's interests. Thus, the
main goal for both the principal and the agent becomes how to create an agreement with
appropriate and affordable controls and incentives. Both the principal and the agent have
control costs that are unavoidable in mutual contractual agreements (Simonsen & Hill,
1998).
Frequently seen controls may include: effective organization of effort, rewardsfor-performance, monitoring of outcomes, control over budgets, audits, specific oversight
bodies, or enforcement of professional and ethical standards, social norms or applicable
laws. Public organizations have additional control devices available, including limiting
enabling ordinances and statutes, formally adopted rules and policies, contributions and
expenditures reporting requirements, whistleblowing and "sunshine" laws, elections, and
general public and media scrutiny (Simonsen & Hill, 1998).
According to the theory, the principal's primary problem is to create a
compensation strategy that attracts a competent agent, and a control strategy to ensure
that the agent performs efficiently, solely with the best interest of the principal in mind.
An agent will agree to a compensation and control scheme if it equals or exceeds the
agent's reservation utility, as determined by the agent's best-known alternative. It is
important to note that the agent's costs must include those associated with compliance

“utility maximizers”, or those who seek to accomplish their self-interested goals “in the most efficient
manner possible, given their limited capacities and the cost of information” (p. 2).
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with control arrangements, and the principal's ultimate utility from the good or service
will be diminished by both the principal's costs of implementing control measures and the
agent's cost of compliance which must be covered in the compensation agreement
(Arrow, 1985).
The creation of reasonable compensation and control agreements can be
compromised if any of the following conditions exist: goal incongruity, uncertainty,
information asymmetry, agent risk aversion, and interdependence of effort. 1. Goal
incongruity speaks to the possibility that the principal and agent do not have matching
goal preferences. This encompasses conflicts of interest, goal ambiguity and differing
time horizons, among other incongruities. Policy differences are important incongruities
in the public sector. 2. Uncertainty describes the fact that the observable outcome of the
agent's work, does not necessarily describe the level of investment made by the agent;
factors beyond the agent's control may occur. 3. Information asymmetry describes the
fact that the agent may have far more information about their actual skills and abilities,
levels of effort and overall investment than the principal does. Also, policy may change
frequently in the public sector, increasing the possibility of information asymmetry. 4.
Risk aversion refers to the agent's preference to avoid compensation variance, as may be
the case if compensation is linked to observable outcomes which may be affected by
uncertainty. If the agent's risk is low, moral hazard11 may be the result. That is, if the

11
Moral hazard is the risk that a party to a transaction has not entered into the contract in good
faith, has provided misleading information about its assets, liabilities or credit capacity. In addition, moral
hazard may also mean a party has an incentive to take unusual risks in a desperate attempt to earn a profit
before the contract settles. Moral hazards can be present any time two parties come into agreement with
one another. Each party in a contract may have the opportunity to gain from acting contrary to the
principles laid out by the agreement (Investopedia, 2018).
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agent is to be compensated regardless of their effort, then their effort is more likely to be
reduced. 5. Interdependence among several agents makes it difficult for principals to
allocate awards and sanctions selectively depending on individual contributions. This is
particularly true in the public sector, where networks are found both within and between
organizations (Arrow, 1985; Dees, 1992 and Bendor, 1990).
A few researchers have researched the application of principal-agent theory in the
public sector. Knott (1993) has written on the similarities of private and public
hierarchical organizations in their concern for the problems of interdependence,
information asymmetry, conflict of interest and the uncertainty of external constraints.
Addressing the question of control methods useful for both public and private sectors, he
states:
If the nature of the task is more interdependent and the knowledge
necessary to carry out the task is inadequate, a comprehensive system of
bureaucratic rules is not appropriate. Organizations with these kinds of tasks must
rely instead on professional training and norms of behavior, socialization into the
organization's culture, motivation for employees, informal means of coordination,
and incentives for outcome performance (Knott, 1993).
Bendor (1990) notes that use of the theory in the public sector is in its infancy. He
predicts the theory's use will increase and offers four cautions regarding limitations of the
use of the formal principal-agency theory. First, Bendor notes that a formal principalagent model assigns a value to the level of utility obtained by the parties, but in the public
sector other variables, such as achievement or subversion of policy, have importance.
Second, the principal in the public sector may not be able to commit to a necessary
incentive and control scheme over a period of time, as required by the formal theory, due
to budget limitations and short political time horizons. Third, there may be multiple
principals in the public setting rather than only one principal. Fourth, formal principal-
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agent theory is based on classic rationality assumptions leading each party to be
hypersensitive to changes in terms of a relationship. This can lead to very complex fee
functions with poor detailed predictive value (Bendor, 1990).
Wood and Waterman (1994) define the principal-agent model as the hierarchical
relationship that exists between administrators (principals) and underwriters (agents). The
administrator-principals desire a service that the underwriter-agent can provide, so they
enter into an agreement with each other in order to obtain it. Information asymmetry
exists between the two. Typically, the agent possesses more information about the
service, such as its true cost or the best way to proceed. Consequently, this often leads to
two common concerns known as moral hazard and adverse selection12 (p. 24).
Because agents are rational, they benefit from their pursuit of their own selfinterest. This often comes at the expense of principals resulting in moral hazard
scenarios. This can lead to perverse incentives such as increased expense, substandard
work product, or other acts that are not in the interest of the principal. Principals can also
make decisions without complete information, sometimes withheld by the agent when
knowledge of that information may produce a different, undesirable response for the
agent. These scenarios are a result of adverse selection.
Moral hazard and adverse selection are limiting factors of the principal-agent
theory and can be used to explore administrator and financial professional relationships.
Waterman and Meier (1998) explore the model that perverse incentives exist in
principal-agent relationships and that information asymmetry exists in favor of the agent.

12

Adverse selection refers generally to a situation where sellers have information that buyers do
not have, or vice versa, about some aspect of product quality (Investopedia, 2018).

35
An important point they emphasize is that bureaucratic principal-agent relationships are
not dyadic, involving only two actors, but rather multifarious. They caution, however,
that, “the principal-agent model is not a generalizable explanation for the myriad
relationships that actually exist between principals and agents” (p. 197). Fortunately, in
the case of administrator-principals and underwriter-agents, this core principal-agent
relationship is near to a dyadic relationship. This reality makes the theory that much more
applicable.
At the heart of administrator choice in the context of principal-agent theory is the
question of information asymmetry. Underwriters that are employed by administrators
have a reasonable idea of the administrator’s policy preferences, ideology, and rational
self-interest. In most bond issuance scenarios, the administrator does not have the
industry knowledge and experience the underwriter has. Because the underwriter has that
information, it gives them the advantage in any principal-agent exchange.
To better understand the potential impacts of these real information asymmetries
in the administrator-principal and underwriter-agent relationship, it is necessary to review
the principal-agent model coupled with the public finance literature. By so doing, gaps in
the literature can be identified and clarity of the research model begins to take shape.
g. Principal-Agent Theory, Administrator Choice and Municipal Bonds
Principal-agent relationships exist across the economy. They can be seen in
almost all transactions. Principal-agent theory markedly addresses various conflicts of
interest between various actors in all types of transactions. It is a useful model to address
these conflicts in all organizations, including public ones. Principal-agent theory concepts
are employed and have been developed in various other fields, such as business
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administration, law, economics, accounting and insurance. However, less research of the
principal-agent model in the public sector has been conducted. Even less applications of
the model have been done regarding public finance.
The municipal bond sale process can have numerous actors, both private and
public depending on the complexity of the transaction. These actors take on the principal
role, the agent role, or sometimes both. Simonsen and Hill (1998) provide a clear
description of the various principal and agent relationships that can exist in municipal
finance transactions. They describe the issuer, or the public/citizens of the government,
selling the bonds; and the investors who buy the bonds, as purely principals in the bond
sale process. As a result, these two principals logically have some conflicting interests.
Most importantly, the public would like the lowest interest rates in order to limit their tax
impacts. The investor would prefer, of course, the highest interest rates possible to
maximize their return on investment, all else equal. Elected officials are the most direct
agent of the public/citizens. In most cases, the agents that manage the sale of the bonds
are the public administrators, in this case the superintendent and finance officer.
Therefore, the administrators act as agents to the elected officials (principals). In this way
the elected officials are both agents of the public and principals to the administrators. The
municipal advisors act as an agent for the issuer (they are paid by the issuers). So, while
the administrators are agents for the elected officials (and ultimately the public), the
administrators are also a principal to the many private sector consultants typically
involved in a bond sale.
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Various other private sector firms and individuals that assist with specific aspects
of the bond sale may include: bond insurance companies, rating agencies, and bond
counsels. These actors are exclusively acting as agent to the administrator principle.
Simonsen and Hill (1998) further argue that the underwriter is an agent for both
the issuer and the investor. The underwriter makes its money based on the difference
between the buying price and the selling price of the bonds. The underwriter is motivated
to ensure that the sale happens, but within this context, the underwriter's incentive is for
higher rather than lower interest rates. This is because with higher interest rates, all else
equal, the underwriter will have an easier time reselling the bonds to investors and
therefore, have less risk of needing to hold some of the bonds themselves. They describe
this interwoven web of actors as follows.
This complex network of interacting principal-agent relationships offers
many opportunities for conflicting goals and other problems described by
principal-agent theory. Like many governmental services, municipal bond sales
are characterized by both a fuzzy process and outcomes (interest rates) where the
quality is difficult to judge. These are preconditions that could lead to principalagent problems (Simonsen & Hill, 1998).
Figure 2.4 is their illustration of the various actors in the bonding process, is a
simplified yet thorough description, and will be used for purposes of this study. The
citizens of the municipality are the sole principals in the bonding scenario. Inside the
government, Elected Officials are the citizens’ representative agents. They are also play
the principal role in regards to relationships with the financial professionals they hire to
assist in the bonding process. This duel role of principal and agent is also true of public
administrators. Underwriters, municipal advisors, and other consultants are strictly agents
in the process. Municipal bond investors are solely principals.
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Figure 2.4

Principal-Agent Relationships in Municipal Finance

Source: Simonsen & Hill, 1998
h. Information Asymmetry and Municipal Bonds
One of these major principal-agent problems related to this study that needs
further attention is the theoretical notion of information asymmetries. Information
asymmetry exists when administrators are confronted with choices. In addition to
Simon’s (1976, p. 79-81) reasons for information asymmetries, Fredrickson et al. (2012)
identifies four additional reasons. First, an administrator’s “capacity to summarize,
comprehend, and use information is limited.” Second, “individual and institutional
memories are often faulty, compartmentalized, difficult to retrieve, and hard to connect to
the problems at hand.” Third, “attention, in both time and capabilities, is limited.” Fourth,
“communication problems arise from compartmentalization, professional subculture,
language, and information overload” (Fredrickson et al., 2012, p. 174-175).
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Administrators’ method of coping with information asymmetries is an example of
Simon’s bounded rationality and satisficing (Simon, 1976).
Given these real information asymmetries that result from the complexity of bond
financings, administrators may feel overwhelmed when they consider all the other
responsibilities they have within their districts. It is logical administrators would rely on
the expertise of others to assist them. It is also understandable that a for-profit
underwriter, who does not have a fiduciary responsibility to look out for a school
district’s best interest, will seek to maximize its own self-interest. An administrator may
also be new to their position and may not be able to find the information needed to
accomplish the district’s finance needs in a timely manner. Thus, in an effort to reduce
the information asymmetric gap an administrator may turn to an underwriter previously
used by the district or referred to them by a fellow administrator. These satisficing efforts
may in fact not be in the best interest of the administrators that employ them. This point
is observable in the complex and opaque municipal bond market.
Peng and Brucato (2004) argue that issuers of municipal bonds and the
administrators they employ can each suffer from various degrees of information
asymmetry. Information asymmetry exists in the capital market when investors and
issuers of financial securities do not share the same amount of information about the
value of the securities. There are several reasons why information asymmetry happens in
the primary municipal bond market. Many of the municipal bonds are sold by first-time
and small issuers, who are usually not well known among the investment community.
Peng and Brucato (2004) go on to describe information asymmetry as a concern
…since doing credit analysis of a debt security is a more
demanding task for individual investors than for financial institutions. The
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most critical consequence of the information asymmetry problem is that
issuers pay a higher borrowing cost than they should since investors will
demand a higher risk premium to compensate them for the informational
disadvantage. To alleviate such information asymmetry between the
issuers and investors as well as the resulting higher capital cost for the
issuers in the municipal bond market, several market and institutional
mechanisms have been set in place over the past several decades. These
certification mechanisms include, among others, method of sale
(competitive versus negotiated), underwriter certification, and underlying
credit rating for insured bonds (Peng & Brucato, 2004).
Peng and Brucato (2004) further describe bond issues as being characterized on a
continuum from no information asymmetry to acute information asymmetry. Those
issues that suffer from acute information asymmetry would beneﬁt from the certiﬁcation
of underwriters through the underwriter’s due diligence before underwriting the bonds.
Additional certiﬁcation occurs because the underwriter is involved directly with the
origination of a negotiated issue, leading to a more intimate relationship with the issuer
and consequently a better understanding of that issuer than would be the case for a
competitive sale. The notion is that this certiﬁcation provides comfort to the investor.
Therefore, assuming issuers rationally choose the sale type based on interest rate
expectations, those issuers with the most information asymmetry will choose a negotiated
sale to obtain the underwriter certiﬁcation. This introduces a selection bias because the
worse the information asymmetry, the riskier the bond, and increased riskiness is
associated with higher interest rates.
Peng and Brucato (2004) further argue that as information asymmetry is not
directly observable, certain characteristics can be used as proxies, including (1) type of
security, (2) credit rating, (3) issue purpose, (4) issue frequency, and (5) issue size. These
same criteria are used in Chapter 4 to determine the meaningful bond characteristics and
then are tested to examine their impact on administrator choice of sale methods.
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A third study finds that governmental and demographic factors are important in
the choice of sale type. Since factors other than those expected to determine sale type
were important, including such characteristics as education, training, and form of
government, an agency problem could exist. This research also is the only other found
that uses a survey to test their hypothesis (Simonsen & Kittredge, 1998). Some of this
structure is used in Chapter 5 to frame the administrator choice survey and analysis.
As Idaho school district administrators consider method of sale decisions, several
adverse conditions can arise from the impact of information asymmetries. Decisionmakers tend to make decisions shaped by cognitive biases, the behavior of others, and by
incremental adjustments. Furthermore, an administrator feels an obligation to past
decisions and professionals with whom he/she has relationships (Fredrickson et. al.,
2012, p. 175-176). For example, a school district administrator may continue using the
same underwriter because their peers use that underwriter or the administrator feels an
obligation to a relationship he/she has developed over several years.
Based on this literature review and using Fay’s Circles of Knowing as a model,
below is a visual illustrating Idaho school district administrators’ theoretical decisionmaking process.
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Figure 2.5:

Administrator Theoretical Decision-Making Process

i. Contemporary Debt Management and Municipal Finance Literature
The literature relating to debt management and municipal finance methods is
revealing. Of the literature identified, seven out of nine found that competitive sales
result in lower interest costs than negotiated sales. The two studies that did not conclude
this argued that there is no difference between these methods of sale (Simonsen, Robbins,
& Kittredge, 2001; Miller, 1993; Robbins & Simonsen, 2008; Forbes & Peterson, 1979;
Leigland & Lamb, 1986; Hildreth, 1993; Kioko, Marlowe, Matkin, Moody, Smith, &
Zhao, 2011; Marlowe, 2009; Simonsen & Kittredge, 1998; Guzman & Moldogaziev,
2012). Peng & Brucato, 2004). These studies used varying methods, both qualitative and
quantitative, to reach their conclusions.
Since the late 1970s, debt management scholarship has demonstrated that some
government administrators consistently make irrational decisions when selecting
professionals and processes to issue their bonds. As a result, governments are likely to
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pay more than is necessary, thus adversely impacting taxpayers (Miller, 1993; Robbins &
Simonsen, 2008; Forbes & Peterson, 1979; Leigland & Lamb, 1986). This study will
investigate whether these findings hold true with Idaho school district bond issuances.
Idaho school district administrators rely heavily on financial professionals to
assist them in the complex bond issuance process. Knowingly or unknowingly,
administrators are influenced by federal and state statutory frameworks, federal
regulatory requirements, and national, state and regional peer groups when making
method of sale decisions. The policy processes that create these various policymaking
sideboards have not been sufficiently explored. To this end, further research into the link
between debt management scholarship and policy process theory will produce helpful
hypotheses development and research design. This will provide insight into why Idaho
school district administrators make the method of sale policy choices they do and the
impacts these choices have on taxpayers. This study will investigate whether these
findings hold true in Idaho.
II. Policy Process Theories
a. Introduction
Idaho school district method of sale policy has seen two significant punctuating
events in the last 13 years and is in the midst of a third. These three events originate from
independent policy processes. The first, in 2001, was a state legislative process driven
largely by a single underwriting firm. The second, in 2006, was an individual district
process that has interesting innovative and diffusionary impacts. The third, which went
into effect July 1, 2014, is a federal regulatory process that will largely define the future
of debt management in the United States. All three are unique processes and provide
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compelling insight into the decision-making of individual Idaho school district
administrators. These three policy processes and the resulting impacts on the method of
sale policy decisions of Idaho school district administrators are the focus of this section
of the literature review.
The purpose of this section is to examine these policy processes using
Baumgartner and Jones’ punctuated equilibrium theory (2010), innovation and diffusion
theory as described by Berry and Berry (2014), and Kingdon’s multiple streams theory
(2011) to answer the following question: What impact do these punctuating events have
on Idaho school district administrators’ choice of method of sale policies and
professionals?
The section is laid out in five subsections. The first section establishes a context
for Idaho school district financing practices coupled with definitions of key debt
management terms and major theoretical concepts. Second, the policy process theories
are described and serve as the foundation for the third section, which is an analysis of
these three policy processes as they relate to Idaho school district administrators’ method
of sale decisions. The fourth section analyzes data from 2001 to 2016 regarding the
method of sale policies of Idaho public administrators. The section ends with a
conclusion and hypotheses development. This leads to the research design section.
The process by which governments adopt policies is essential to understanding
the policymaking process. In the case of Idaho school district administrators, by
understanding the policymaking process one can also understand why administrators
make the method of sale decisions they do. Below is a brief discussion on the core
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policymaking theories that will be used to describe the history of Idaho school district
method of sale policymaking.
b. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
Punctuated equilibrium theory is used to define the time frames that this study
identifies. Baumgartner and Jones describe the policy process as “disjointed and episodic
where there are long periods of stability that are interrupted by bursts of frenetic policy
activity” (p. xvii, 2010).
Baumgartner and Jones state that models of policymaking are generally based on
the twin principles of incrementalism and negative feedback. Incrementalism can be the
result of a deliberate decision style as decisionmakers make limited, reversible changes
within the status quo because of bounds on their abilities to predict the impact of their
decisions (p. 9, 2010).
This describes the historical treads of Idaho school district method of sale policy
particularly well as shown in Figure 2 below.
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Figure 2.6:

Idaho Method of Sale Frequency from 1999 to 2016

Source: Bloomberg
As Figure 2.6 indicates, there have been two significant punctuating events in
Idaho school district method of sale policy from 1999 to 2016 and it is predicted that a
third event is under way since the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC)
municipal advisor rules took effect on July 1, 2014. The policy making process
surrounding these punctuating events are described in greater detail later.
c. Innovation and Diffusion Theory
After a policy is initially innovated in one government it is frequently diffused
and implemented by other governments. Policy innovation is somewhat rare, but
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diffusion at the state and local government level is common and observable13. Policy
diffusion, as described below by Berry and Berry and others, is used later to describe the
policymaking processes of Idaho school district administrators after the punctuating event
of McCall-Donnelly School District that occurred in 2006.
Although Berry and Berry (2014) use individual states as their unit of analysis,
innovation and diffusion can also be observed at the regional, local, and possibly even the
individual administrator level. They also describe a regional diffusion model where states
interact with neighboring states more frequently than states in other regions of the
country. In this model, policy adoption will be positively related to the number of
neighboring states that have adopted a similar policy (p. 229). The regional model also
can be applied to separate fixed-regions of the country, which may include some states
that are not technically neighbors but share some sort of common characteristic (p. 229).
Within the regional model, states often look at the other states in their region for policy
cues, especially with regards to economic policy where the failure to adopt a certain
policy may have negative economic consequences.
The regional model is easily translated to the local government level where some
school districts in the same region may look to certain districts for expertise and advice
related to policy best practices. Because there is little research on policy diffusion at the

13

Berry and Berry (2014) describe policy invention as the introduction of policy that is completely
new and that has never been implemented previously. They suggest policy process scholars are interested
in examining policy innovation or the process through which original policy ideas are conceived and
diffused, and less concerned with policy invention. Diffusion is the dissemination of public policy across
time and geographic jurisdiction (p. 223). Policy invention is different from policy innovation, is extremely
rare, and deals more with the process by which original ideas are put together to form public policy. The
study of policy diffusion differs in that it is the study of how and why policies that are initially
implemented by one government are adopted by other governments. Rogers (2010) defines diffusion as
“the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the
members of a social system” (p. 5).
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local and individual levels, this study will add to the body of knowledge and provide a
basis for understanding policy diffusion theory at the Idaho school district and possibly
even the individual administrator levels.
Berry and Berry provide a model that is shaped like an S-curve for describing the
diffusionary process across governments. The adoption of the policy is slow, rapidly
increases, and then levels off. The y-axis represents the cumulative proportion of states
that have adopted the specific policy. The x-axis represents the observed measures of
time. According to this model, in Idaho at the school district level a policy is adopted in a
few districts initially. As more districts observe the benefits of the policy, there is a rapid
diffusion of the policy by other districts over a short period of time. Finally, as the
remaining districts eventually catch on, another slow diffusionary period occurs (p. 227,
2014). Depending on the policy and circumstances, the time period could be a few years
or several decades.

Figure 2.7:

Policy Diffusion Model
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Source: Berry and Berry, p. 227, 2007
The authors assume that a communication network among governments exists
relating to policy innovation (Berry and Berry, p. 226, 2014). The reference groups like
the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the Council of State Governments
(CSG), and the National Governors Association (NGA) are the communication networks
that provide a venue for state officials to exchange ideas and learn from each other on a
national scale.
For purposes of this study, the Idaho local government equivalent of this network
is the Idaho Association of School Administrators (IASA), the state-wide peer group for
local school district administrators. Within the IASA there is the Idaho School
Superintendents Association (ISSA) and the Idaho Association of School Business
Officers (IASBO) that also serve as the Idaho chapter of the GFOA. This network
provides training, education, social enculturation, and peer support for Idaho’s school
district administrators. Municipal advisors and underwriters often sponsor these events
and are invited to present finance related trainings (IASA). Because these events may be
all the formal training administrators receive in a year, the influence of this peer group on
individual administrators is measurable.
Another common model of diffusion that Berry and Berry outline is the leaderlaggard model, where certain states are “pioneers in the adoption of a policy, and the
other states emulate these leaders” (p. 230). In this model, emulating states learn from
other states more willing to take the initial risk on implementing policy. Laggard states
often take a “wait and observe” approach to policy innovation, waiting to see how new
policies fair in other states before making the decision to implement the policy within
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their own state. Again, this model can easily be translated to the local school district -and possibly the individual administrator level -- where one district’s administrators lead
out in policy innovation and other administrators wait to make sure the policy is effective
before implementing it.
Shipan and Volden (2008) further elaborate on policy diffusion theory by
articulating the major mechanisms by which policies are adopted by states. These
mechanisms are learning, competition, imitation and coercion. These mechanisms
provide a description for the reasons of why and how policies are adopted or diffused.
Their research is particularly insightful to this study as they analyze the diffusionary
interactions of local governments (p. 841-843).
Shipan and Volden (2008) identify learning as the identification of a policy
successfully implemented and the implementation of that policy within another
jurisdiction. Therefore, the policy must be previously implemented somewhere else for
learning to take place (Shipan and Volden, p. 842, 2008). Policy learning is most
effective when several governments successfully implemented a policy. This allows a
government considering adopting a similar policy the opportunity to analyze the results
of the policy from multiple data points. This process of policy learning and completion is
observable in Idaho school district administrators and their bond issuance decisions.
Learning and completion are the most common processes for policy diffusion.
Economic completion is typically confined to a geographic region, as states within close
geographic proximity are those most in economic competition. Where economic
spillovers are a possibility of policy diffusion, states will often weigh whether
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implementing a policy their neighbor has implemented or considering implementing will
produce a positive or negative spillover (Shipan and Volden, p. 842, 2008).
The third mechanism of diffusion is imitation, also known as emulation, where
states essentially copy the actions of other states in order to appear like the origination
state of those policies (Shipan and Volden, p. 842, 2008). States are motivated to emulate
these other states because they are perceived to be adopting effective policies that in turn
will benefit them. The major distinction in this policy from Berry and Berry’s leaderlaggards model is that governments which engage in imitation are more concerned with
looking like a certain state as opposed to implementing a specific policy. Policy diffusion
becomes more about the actor and less about the policy (p. 230, 2007).
Coercion is the last mechanism of diffusion and can be observed within the
federalism structure of the United States when higher levels of government, like the
federal government, mandates lower levels of government to enact certain polices. This is
technically true of the SEC’s municipal advisor laws, which strongly encouraged states
and local governments comply with SEC rules (Shipan and Volden, p. 842, 2008).
Though Shipan and Volden’s work was not focuses on the municipal level of
government, it is applicable to local municipalities and in the case of this research Idaho
school districts.
d. Multiple Streams Theory
Punctuated equilibrium theory utilizes John Kingdon’s multiple streams theory as
well (Baumgartner and Jones, p. xxv & 5, 2009). Kingdon’s theory (2011) describes how
issues enter the policy agenda through a process called “coupling.” This process has three
distinct streams: the problem stream, the policy stream, and the politics stream. The
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problem stream represents various issues that groups want addressed by government. The
policy stream is a “primeval soup” of ideas that represents potential solutions to policy
problems. The politics stream represents the political elements that define the national
mood, interest group initiatives, and elections.
Kindgon describes a “policy entrepreneur” as an individual (or group) that acts to
broker the three streams at opportune times. These times are known as “policy windows”
and present opportunities for a particular policy to make its way to the policy agenda (p.
165-195, 2011).

Figure 2.8:

Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework

Source: Kingdon, 2011
Now that the main theoretical tenants of the policymaking process have been
provided, a discussion of the history of Idaho method of sale policy as it relates to these
theories is provided below.
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III. Policy Process and ISDA Method of Sale History
a. Punctuating Event 1: Negotiation Becomes Permissible
Prior to 2001, all Idaho school district bonds were statutorily required to be issued
through a competitive sale; the only method of sale issuance method administrators could
choose was a competitive sale. Therefore, Idaho school district bonds enjoyed an active
and competitive market when selling bonds.
In 2001, the Idaho legislature made it “permissible” to issue bonds through a
competitive or negotiated sale. From 2001 to 2006, there was a complete paradigm
change where no Idaho school district bonds were issued through a competitive sale, but
all were done through negotiation (Kuhn, 2012, p. 168).
The legislative process that enacted the policy change from mandated competitive
sales to allowing negotiated sales is described in Chapter 1. That said, there is little
known about the policy making motivations and process that formulated this change
other than a single underwriting firm initiated and strongly supported the legislation’s
passage. Through the punctuated equilibrium framework, the effects of this policy are
easily observed and described. Referring to Figure 2, we see that all school district bonds
were sold using a competitive sale, but once the legislation was passed, there was a major
tapering and eventual elimination of competitive sales until the McCall Donnelly School
District #421 sold their bonds through a competitive sale in 2006.
b. Punctuating Event 2: McCall SD Hires a MA and Uses a Competitive Sale
In 2006, the McCall-Donnelly School District #421 was the first school district in
four years to use a municipal advisor and competitive sale. Then Superintendent Terrell
Donnick was very active in the National School Boards Association (NSBA). Through
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this interaction at the national level, Terrell learned about the benefits of having a
municipal advisor and using a competitive bond sale from some of his peers from other
states. Terrell decided to apply some of these debt management policies within his own
district. On July 11, 2006, Bloomberg captured the significance of this innovative
approach to Idaho method of sale policy:
An Idaho school district will take bids from investment banks today for
$28.5 million of bonds, seeking to lower debt costs by bringing competition back
to the way (Idaho) borrows. In Idaho, all new school bonds had to be sold through
competitive bidding until the legislature changed the law in 2001 to allow
negotiation. Since then, all 73 school bond issues, worth $832 million, have been
sold by negotiating exclusive agreements with underwriters. (Preston, 2006)
Since McCall-Donnelly’s 2006 competitive sale, eighty-two school districts have
issued bonds. Twenty-six, or 32 percent, were assisted by a municipal advisor. All these
bond issues used a competitive sale. The remaining fifty-two issues, or 68 percent, used
an underwriter without a municipal advisor and sold bonds through a negotiated sale.
Bloomberg News called this pivotal point in Idaho’s method of sale history a
“complete revival” (Preston, 2006). According to Kuhn (2012), “if a paradigm is ever to
triumph it must gain some first supporters” (p. 157). Since 2006, those twenty-six school
districts who have seen the benefit of having a municipal advisor and who have
experienced the value of a competitive bond sale are becoming vocal about following the
GFOA and using this best practice. Although this represents a possible paradigm shift,
the question remains: Why are a majority of school districts still not hiring municipal
advisors and continuing to sell their bonds through negotiation?
This section of Idaho school district method of sale policy process is best
described using the innovation and diffusion model. From Superintendent Donnick’s
learning from others through the NSBA, to the District’s decision to hire a municipal
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advisor and use a competitive bond sale, this is an ideal example of the innovation and
diffusion model of the policy making process. As illustrated in Figure 2, since
Superintendent Donnick’s innovation in 2006, there has been a steady increase of Idaho
school district administrators hiring municipal advisors and using competitive sales. It is
predicted that on July 1, 2014, when the SEC’s municipal advisor rules take effect, that
there will be a rapid increase in the number of Idaho school districts that hire a municipal
advisor and use a competitive sale to issue their bonds. The SEC rules are described in
greater detail below.
c. Punctuating Event 3: Municipal Advisors Regulatory Rules
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(Dodd-Frank) authorized the SEC and the Municipal Securities Rule-Making Board
(MSRB) to adopt rules governing municipal advisors. This policy process resembles
Shipan and Volden’s (2008) description of coercion in the diffusion model, where the
federal government mandates lower levels of government to enact certain polices (p.
842). It also follows Kingdon’s multiple streams model, as the three streams aligned, a
policy window opened, and policy entrepreneurs, specifically municipal advisors,
provided the policy to address the problem of debt management abuse and costs.
On September 18, 2013, the SEC, which regulates the municipal securities
industry, approved final rules that define a municipal advisor and establish registration
rules for municipal advisors.
These rules prohibit underwriters from providing advice on investment strategies
and municipal derivatives, the method of selling the bonds, assistance with competitive
sales, and advice regarding selection of underwriters and other professionals.
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Underwriters also cannot give advice specific to a particular issuance on which the
underwriter is serving, financial feasibility analyses, budget planning, and overall rating
strategies that are not related to a particular issuance of municipal securities (Chapman &
Cutler, 2013). In essence, these rules legitimize through regulation the recommendations
of the GFOA and the emerging paradigm in Idaho school district method of sale policy of
using a municipal advisor.
According to the proposed rules, a municipal advisor is defined as any person
who provides “advice” to a municipal entity regarding a municipal financial product or
an issuance of municipal securities, or who undertakes a solicitation to do so. Advice is
defined as a recommendation that is specific or tailored to a particular client with respect
to the structure, timing, terms, or similar matters related to a municipal debt issue
(Chapman & Cutler, 2013).
Underwriters are prohibited from serving as both municipal advisor and as
underwriter on the same issue. This is illegal under MSRB Rule G-23. Underwriters are
prohibited from providing a municipality with “advice” unless under certain exemptions.
Underwriters are also prohibited from being the underwriter if they give “advice” outside
of the exemptions. An underwriter may give an issuer advice if an issuer states to them,
in writing, that they have retained a municipal advisor and that they are relying on that
municipal advisor to assist them (Chapman & Cutler, 2013).
The exemptions under which an underwriter may provide a municipal entity
advice are as follows:
1. In response to a legitimate RFP solicitation for underwriting services.
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2. After hired as underwriter, but that advice must be limited to “traditional
underwriting activities.”
“Traditional underwriting activities” do not include:
1. Advice on the method of bond sale.
2. Preparing and/or evaluating any RFP (bond counsel, underwriter,
municipal advisor, trustee).
3. Advice or assistance with bond elections.
4. Advice or assistance with budget planning, overall financing options, and
debt capacity.
5. Advice regarding whether an event notice needs to be filed for continuing
disclosure purposes.
6. How an issuer should invest bond proceeds.
7. Advice on the use of swaps.
8. How escrow funds should be structured and invested.
9. Advice regarding debt or financial policies or procedures.
10. How the current transaction may be coordinated with other debt issues.
11. Mode changes for variable rate debt.
For the above types of advice, government issuers are required by SEC rule for
Municipal Advisors 2013 to hire a municipal advisor. The GFOA (2014) provides the
following reason for this.
A municipal advisor represents the issuer in the sale of bonds, and unlike
other professionals involved in a bond sale, has an explicit fiduciary duty to the
issuer per the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Selecting and Managing the Engagement of Municipal Advisors).
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The GFOA continues to say: “The appropriate duties, roles and responsibilities of
municipal advisors and underwriters are often not well understood. Municipal advisors
are the only parties with a federal fiduciary duty to state and local government issuers.”
(GFOA, 2014).
The GFOA further recommends that issuers hire a municipal advisor prior to the
undertaking of a debt financing unless the issuer has sufficient in-house expertise and
access to current bond market information. The GFOA also recommends that if an issuer
is contemplating the possibility of selling bonds through a negotiated sale, the municipal
advisor should be retained prior to selecting the underwriter(s). This allows the issuer to
have professional services available to advise on the appropriate method of sale, and if a
negotiated sale is selected, to prepare the underwriter RFP and assist in the evaluation of
the underwriter responses. (GFOA, 2014).
One of the main reasons for hiring a municipal advisor is that municipal advisors
have a fiduciary duty to the issuer in the sale of bonds. The underwriter earns its fee by
buying the bonds and reselling them to investors at an increased price. This difference
from the purchase price to the resale price is called the underwriter’s discount or spread.
As the underwriter seeks to resell the bonds to potential investors, these investors want
the highest yield possible for their investment. The underwriter therefore has a difficult
time reselling the bonds at lower yields and will increase yields as necessary in order to
sell the bonds. Both this monetary and market incentive to increase yields is not aligned
with the issuer’s interest, which is in obtaining the lowest yields possible. Due to the
incentive of high returns from an increased spread and motivation to maintain good
relationships with their investors, underwriters have a potential conflict of interest.
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Mysak (2005) describes the underwriter’s potential conflict of interest by stating:
“The big idea here is that a financial adviser is supposed to act in the client’s best
interests. An underwriter acts in its own best interests…Underwriters will price bonds to
sell the easiest and fastest way possible.”
Again, the GFOA recommends that issuers keep in mind that the roles of the
underwriter and the municipal advisor are separate, adversarial roles and cannot be
provided by the same party. They also recommend the use of an RFP process when
selecting underwriters in order to promote fairness, objectivity, and transparency (GFOA,
2014).
Mysak (2007) said: “The real scandal…is that many unsophisticated issuers don’t
use financial advisers at all. They instead rely on their underwriters to help them put
together their transactions. The underwriters, many of them, consider municipal advisors
a waste of time and money. They also dislike having people looking over their
shoulders.”
IV. Conclusion
In summary, the sale of municipal bonds is a complex process that requires
extensive involvement of private sector organizations. There is an outstanding public
interest in efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the issuance of public debt. The focus of
this study is to explore whether principal-agent theory applied to the municipal bond sale
process helps our understanding of that process.
Idaho school district administrators who operate from a position of information
asymmetry, rely solely on the advice of underwriters, and issue bonds through
negotiation are increasingly required to defend their bond financing decision-making.
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Given the GFOA recommended best practices, SEC regulatory environment, and the
evident cost benefits of both hiring a municipal advisor and using a competitive bond
sale, the field of public finance research contains numerous opportunities for further
research. In the following chapters are a number of suggested testable hypotheses and
research opportunities.
The psychological base of Maslow and philosophical lens of Fay coupled with the
public administration foundational works leads to the rationality works of Simon, Downs,
and others that leads to the thorough examination of behavioral economics and decision
theory, which provide a strong theoretical framework to apply the contemporary works of
the current municipal finance and debt management field. This review generates a rich
research agenda of testable hypotheses.
It is observable that as local governments do not following best practices, the
federal government is taking action to force them to comply with best practices. This is
enforced via the Dodd-Frank Act and the subsequent SEC and MSRB municipal advisor
rules that took effect July 1, 2014.
Further study is required to analyze the perceived negative impacts of the 2000
Idaho legislative change, which allows the use of a negotiated sale, the positive impacts
of the 2006 local innovative and diffusionary method of sale policies of individual
administrators at the McCall-Donnelly School District, and the predicted positive impacts
of the SEC and MSRB municipal advisor rules on method of sale decisions throughout
the country.
The connection to these events is clear between Idaho school district
administrators’ method of sale policy decisions and the 2000 state legislative policy
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process making negotiated sales permissible, the influence of the 2006 McCall-Donnelly
School District policy innovation of hiring a municipal advisor and using a competitive
bond sale and the resulting diffusion to other school district administrators throughout
Idaho, and the federal legislative impact of the Dodd-Frank Act and the following SEC
and MSRB rule-making processes.
When viewed together, the public administration and debt management literatures
suggest that under normal circumstances Idaho school district administrators would select
professionals and methods of selling bonds that would produce the lowest costs. To what
extent remains unclear. With negotiated sales, administrators may wish for various
reasons to pay more for their bond sales, but that could be the very information that
administrators do not have or that confirms the existence of information asymmetries.
When these findings are applied to the complexity of bond sales and the relationship that
exists between administrator-principals and underwriter-agents, the potential impact
increases. The public administration literature suggests that the most likely effects of a
shift in policy would be felt in the form of satisficing strategies by administrators and
profit maximization by financial professionals. At the same time, the debt management
literature suggests that effects could be disproportionately felt by administrators, due to
the nature of their relationship with underwriters. This overlap provides an intriguing area
of study—the satisficing mentality effects felt by administrators-principals in their efforts
to accomplish a complex process, bond sales, compounded by the information gaps filled
by self-interested underwriter-agents.
Understanding and analyzing why administrators can make decisions contrary to
best practice and a robust debt management literature; especially, considering the cost
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implications, is an area of study that warrants further research. To do so in Idaho, one
must look first to identify if in fact competitive sales are less expensive than negotiated
sales as the debt management literature suggests. Second, if that is in fact the case, a deep
dive into the decision-making process of school district administrators should lead to
productive insights and possible policy changes that can assist Idaho school districts in
making cost saving decisions. It is to this task that this dissertation now turns, first by
identifying and analyzing the empirical impact of the policy shift in Idaho that allowed
negotiated sales, and then by exploring the views of school district administrators
themselves.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS OF ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF COMPETITIVE VS.
NEGOIATED SALES IN IDAHO SCHOOL DISTRICT BONDS
I. Bond Yield Compared to MMD Introduction
This study seeks first to understand if Idaho school district bond sales follow
similar studies where competitive sales are found to result in lower interest rates
compared to negotiated sales. This is accomplished by sampling 194 Idaho school district
bonds sales from 2001 to 2016. Second, this study then, based on the findings of the first
analysis, seeks to understand why numerous Idaho school district administrators, as
principals in their district’s method of sale policies, select agents and methods of selling
their district’s bonds contrary to GFOA’s recommended best practices and the public
finance literature that has generally found that competitive sales are less expensive than
negotiated sales and that the presence of a municipal advisor results in less expensive
more transparent bond financings. This leads to the following core testable hypothesis:
H1: Idaho school district competitive bond sales achieve lower interest rates and
are therefore, less expensive than negotiated bond sales.
H2: When administrators use best practices bond sales are less expensive.
To begin, I will look at a broad set of the financial research already conducted in
the study of competitive and negotiated sales and apply those methods to a
comprehensive data set of 194 Idaho bond sales from 2001 to 2016. This will be done in
an effort to test whether or not this research is applicable to Idaho school district bond
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sales; if in fact competitive sales achieve lower interest rates compared to negotiated
sales.
If this is in fact the case, that competitive sales achieve lower interest rates than
negotiated sales, I then seek to understand why a majority of Idaho school districts
choose negotiated sales (156 negotiated sales and 38 competitive sales). This is
accomplished by use of a comprehensive survey of Idaho school district finance
administrators that tests demographic data as well as reasoning data to better understand
the decision-making process of these administrators in choosing the financial
professionals and methods they do.
II. Bond Yield Compared to MMD Methodology
Primary data on Idaho school district bond sales provides the most direct method
of evaluating bond sale methodologies following the implementation of S. 1158 in 2001
that allowed for Idaho school district’s bonds to be sold through negotiated sales as well
as competitive sales. This is a necessary first step to properly understand the effect of the
shift in policy and if it had the intended effects, which was to provide flexibility in the
timing of bond sales in order to save “100 basis points or more.” In addition to statewide
trends observed from bond sales from 2001 to 2016, I will also examine individual-level
bond data and administrator demographics to better understand the characteristics of
Idaho school district bond issues and the administrators who initiate them. Towards that
end, we first look at the individual bond data from the test sample.
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a. Unit of Analysis
Every known Idaho school district bond issue from 2001 to 2016 found on the
www.msrb.emma website was retrieved and analyzed.14 Then each bond year and its
corresponding interest rates15 were cataloged. This data was compared with a market
benchmark, the Municipal Market Data AAA Curve (MMD), and the variance was
calculated. Then each bond year variance from the MMD was analyzed using a Statistical
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) independent samples T-Test to determine if bonds
sold competitively resulted in lower interest rates, and consequently if negotiated sales
resulted in higher interest rates. This allows for a comprehensive analysis of every
individual Idaho school district bond either sold through competitive or negotiated sale to
be compared to the MMD benchmark.
It is important to remember that not all bonds are created equal. They are issued
for different dollar amounts, on different dates, with different credit ratings and bank
qualification16 status. These unique characteristics make them very different in the eyes

14

Four notes were removed from the analysis. This is because they are short term securities and
are rated using a different rating methodology - Municipal Investment Grade (MIG). A few bonds were
removed due to their stand-alone credit rating not being Aaa or Aa1, they were unrate, uninsured, and/or
they were not guaranteed through the State Treasurer’s School Bond Guarantee and Credit Enhancement
programs. See footnote 18. There were also a number of taxable and federally subsidized bonds such as
Build America Bonds (BABs), Qualified School Construction Bonds (QSCBs) and Qualified Zone
Academy Bonds (QZABs) that were excluded from the analysis. The intent of their removal from the
sample was to identify a pool of homogeneous bonds that adhere to the general premise of a uniform credit
rated in the Aaa or Aa1 categories. This was done in an effort to address endogeneity questions.
15
Interest rate refers to each yield rate on each individual bond year of bonds. This is identified
via the unique Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures (CUSIP) number associates with
each bond. A CUSIP number is a unique identification number assigned to all registered bonds in the
United States and Canada, and is used to create a concrete distinction between securities that are traded on
public markets (Investopedia, 2018).
16
With the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and section 265(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, banks may not deduct the carrying cost of tax-exempt municipal bonds. For banks, this
provision has the effect of eliminating the tax-exempt benefit of municipal bonds. An exception is included
in the Code that allows banks to deduct 80% of the carrying cost of a "qualified tax-exempt obligation." In
order to be “bank qualified” the bonds must be (i) issued by a "qualified small issuer," (ii) issued for public
purposes, and (iii) designated as qualified tax-exempt obligations. A "qualified small issuer" is an issuer
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of the market. In order to create a comparative sample where the method of sale is the
only distinguishing factor between bonds, bonds included in this analysis are a pool of
homogeneous Idaho school district General Obligation (GO) bonds17 that adhere to the
general premise of a uniform credit rated in the Aaa or Aa1 categories.18 This means the
bonds carry an underlying credit rating of Aaa or Aa1, are enhanced by the state of Idaho
State Treasurer’s School Bond Guarantee and/or Credit Enhancement Programs19, or are
secured by Aaa rated bond insurance. I acknowledge that there are several factors that
make bonds unique. But it is important to note that all the bonds included in this research
share the same approximate credit rating and it is reasonable to compare them.
b. Comparing Bonds to a Market Benchmark
It is also noteworthy that because the bonds are issued on different dates, they are
issued in truly different markets and under different market conditions. For that reason,
instead of comparing one entire bond issue directly to another bond issue, each individual

that issues no more than $10 million of tax-exempt bonds during the calendar year (Muni Bond Advisor,
2018).
17
A general obligation bond (GO) is a municipal bond backed by the credit and taxing power of
the issuing jurisdiction rather than the revenue from a given project. General obligation bonds are issued
with the belief that a municipality will be able to repay its debt obligation through taxation or revenue from
projects. No assets are used as collateral (Investopedia, 2018).
18
Though very similar in actual ratings, Aaa bonds have been known to have a “haloed” or “goldplated” effect in the market. In other words, portfolio managers who purchase bonds for customers or funds
can quickly make bond quality and credit decisions based on the Aaa rating. Note there were only two Aa1
bonds included in the sample, both from the West Ada SD 2. These bonds were both sizable and both
achieved very close results to the MMD benchmark.
19
The Idaho School Bond Guaranty (ISBG) Act was created for the purpose of establishing a
default avoidance program for voter-approved school bonds issued by Idaho public school districts. In 2009
the Idaho legislature modified the program to allow two tiers of enhancement which include (1)
enhancement by the State, and (2) enhancement by the State and Endowment Fund Investment Board
(EFIB). Each option provides a different credit enhanced rating to the issuer of the bonds. The State
enhancement may enable school district's to receive a Aa1 Moody's rating and/or AA S&P rating, while the
additional enhancement by the EFIB may enable school district's to receive a Aaa Moody's rating and/or
AAA S&P rating. The enhancement provided by the EFIB has been capped at $40 million per district
(ISBG, 2018). A number of bonds in the sample were issued in multiple series due to exceeding this cap
resulting in one series being enhanced by both programs and the other being enhanced by just the ISBG.
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bond year of bonds is compared to a market standard benchmark, in this case the MMD.
This allows each bond issue to be what it will be in all of its unique glory, but compare
the entire data set of individual bonds to a recognized market industry standard
benchmark. This allows us to compare all the bonds to the standard and keeps us from
comparing apples and oranges.
c. The History of the MMD
Munifacts was the original creator of the MMD. It was a private newswire
communication service for municipal bonds which provided information on new
municipal bond issues in the primary market and secondary market. It was renamed
Thomson Municipal News in 1996, then later folded into The Municipal Market Monitor
(TM3), a subscription service available from Thomson Reuters (Investopedia, 2018).
Though Munifacts no longer exists, its replacement service TM3 continues to be
of keen interest to municipal bond traders. This reporting service allows traders to
analyze bond issues, including the terms included in the bond’s indenture and financial
information used to assess the quality of an issue. This information source continues to be
viewed as the standard for the municipal finance industry (Investopedia, 2018).
Thomson Municipal News, The Bond Buyer top stories, useful tools including an
analyst directory and glossary, guide on bond identification procedures, search functions
and a bond calculator can be found on the site. A dashboard showing the Top 5
Competitive Issues, Top 5 Negotiated issues, and 5 Most Active Trades at Volume
provides a quick snapshot of the municipal bond market on any given day. Other services
available from the dashboard are links to MuniStatements, the Securities Industry and

68
Financial Markets Association, Swap Index, and Exchange Traded Funds Index
(Investopedia, 2018).
The main features of The Municipal Market Monitor are:


News



Municipal market data (MMD)



Primary & secondary markets



Muni/data analysis



Variable Rate Demand Notice network
Tables on the dashboard include MIG1 and MMD Scales. MIG is a Moody’s

rating scale to measure municipal bond risk and issuer creditworthiness. The Moody's
ratings are one through four, with a one (MIG 1) representing the highest quality and a
four (MIG 4) representing the lowest quality (Investopedia, 2018). MIG ratings, though
important for short-term note issues, are not used in this analysis as all of the issues in the
data set are bonds and longer-term in nature.
MMD is a proprietary yield curve. The MMD AAA Curve provides the offer-side
of AAA-rated general obligation bonds. The MMD analyst team determines the inclusion
of bonds. The MMD AAA Curve represents the MMD analyst team’s opinion of AAA
valuation, based on an institutional block size of $2 million-plus market activity in both
the primary and secondary municipal bond market. The AAA scale is published by
Municipal Market Data every day at 3:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time with earlier
indications of market movement provided throughout the trading day. In the interest of
transparency, MMD publishes extensive yield curve assumptions relating to various
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structural criteria, which are used in filtering market information for the purpose of
benchmark yield curve creation (Investopedia, 2018).
d. Individual Bonds and a Higher Degree of Accuracy
When each bond year of bonds is compared to its corresponding MMD
benchmark for that same day, it is reasonable to compare that bond to the benchmark and
the difference between the two. This allows us to understand the variance away from the
benchmark and how each individual bond’s interest rate compares to the MMD
benchmark. Individual bonds can be both positive (over) or negative (through) the MMD.
Through the MMD indicates that the interest rate on an individual bond is less than the
MMD benchmark or is cheaper than the benchmark. This indicates that there was higher
demand for this particular bond and therefore, investors were willing to accept a lower
interest rate for them. Bonds that are priced over the MMD benchmark were less in
demand and therefore investors were able to get higher interest rates for them. This
makes them more expensive for the school district issuing them.
e. Dependent Variable
The dependent variables (DVs) are the two types of bond sales, negotiated bond
sale (DV0) and competitive bond sale (DV1).
f. Structural Independent Variables
The independent variables (IVs) include the differences of the bond yield
compared to the MMD benchmark yield on the date of sale. The number of individual
bond years (IV1) is 2197. The operationalization of each variable is as follows:
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Table 3.1:

Bond Yield Variables, Measures, and Sources of Data

Variables
Method of sale

Measures
Dichotomous indicator. If a negotiated sale is used, 0 is assigned. If a
competitive sale is used, 1.

Difference of
bond yields
compared to the
MMD AAA
benchmark yield

Continuous indicator. The difference between the individual bond yields of
all 194 bond issues compared to the MMD AAA benchmark yield on the
dated date of the bond sale, n = 2197.

Source: EMMA, 2018
The dependent variable is shown first, followed by the independent variables.
g. Levels of Measurement
The levels of measurement of each variable are as follows: DV1-2 = nominal; IV1
= interval.
h. Research Hypotheses
The following hypothesis gets at the heart of H1 restated below:
H1: Idaho school district competitive bond sales achieve lower interest rates and
are therefore, less expensive than negotiated bond sales.
Though not a perfect analysis comparing exactly similar bonds issued on the same
dates into the same market, comparing each individual bond’s yield to its corresponding
MMD yield is a reasonable representation of how bonds compare to a recognized and
well accepted market standard benchmark. From this we are able to determine how bonds
sold competitively compare with bonds sold through negotiation. This directly tests H1.
i. Structural Hypothesis H1
X1a → Y1:

Individual bond yields sold competitively achieve lower interest rates
compared to the MMD AAA Curve than individual bond yields sold
through negotiation compared to the MMD AAA Curve.
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j. Data Collection and Security
The primary sources of data are the 194 Idaho school district bonds issued from
2001 to 2016. These data were found in the bond official statements located on the
Electronic Municipal Market Access website (EMMA, 2014). EMMA is an ideal data
source because it houses all of the disclosure documents for every publicly marketed
bond issuance. It is managed by the MSRB, which is enforced by the SEC. Similar to
publicly traded stocks, where companies are required to report certain information to
market investors, governments who have issued bonds must report certain information to
their investors (EMMA, 2014). The data is public information and accessible on the
Internet. My analysis and calculations will be managed via SPSS on my person computer,
stored using a GoogleDrive and backed-up as well on my personal computer.
k. Research Design and Methods
A quantitative cross-section comparison of the bond issuances will be analyzed
(Weiss, 1998, p. 82-84). This design shows Idaho finance policy trends without
interfering with them (Field, 2013, p. 13). Also, because Idaho school districts do not
issue bonds collectively at once, but issue individually over time as needed, there is no
opportunity for pre-test or post-test experimentation. Since actual bond results are used
and the 194 official statements have many variables and data points to consider, this
direct source of data is optimal. The follow-up of the finance policy survey will enhance
the empirical research of the past bond sales by providing current thought processes and
demographics to the analysis. This design works well because each district has its own
finance policy and is in its own phase of the finance process.
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l. Statistical Procedures
The primary statistical model will use cross tabs with chi-square to compare the
difference between competitively sold bond yields and the MMD benchmark with the
difference between bond yields sold through negotiation and the MMD benchmark. A
one sample t-test is used to determine statistical significance. SPSS is the statistic
software that will be used and will also produce frequency tables and descriptive
statistics.
The DVs are dichotomous variable where the outcome can only be a competitive
sale (1) or a negotiated sale (0). This is an observable model based on the data that
confirms whether or not competitive sales are less expensive than negotiated sales. The
methods described later in this chapter take the next step and seek to understand why
administrators make the method of sale decisions that they do.
This research design conforms with the main assumptions of science because it
(1) adheres to the determinism school of thought that school administrators make
decisions for specific reasons, 2) the design can be tested empirically using real-world
results and administrators’ demographics and opinions, (3) the design is generally
objective, and (4) the design can be replicated by other researchers.
Disadvantages of this research design are two-fold: (1) the potential for sample
error, and (2) the difficulty of constructing objective measures to evaluate different bonds
sold on different days sold into different markets.
m. Potential Threats to Validity and Reliability
Because the evaluation is being conducted after the bonds have been sold, it is
difficult to address threats to internal validity. That said, given there is no limitation on
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which financings were analyzed, and all 194 bond issues were considered, there is no
threat of selection bias, attrition, outside effects, or maturation. Testing and
instrumentation are also limited to the quality of this analysis (Weiss 1998, p. 183-184).
With the MMD AAA Curve as our market benchmark, we can understand the
difference between each bond’s yield in relation to the MMD benchmark. Once the
difference between each bond’s yield and the benchmark is determined we can then look
at those same differences comparing competitively sold bonds and bonds sold through
negotiation.
III. Bond Characteristics Introduction
From the previous analysis of Idaho school district competitive versus negotiated
bond sales from 2001 to 2016, hypothesis H1 is the focus seeking to understand whether
competitive sales achieve lower interest rates compared to MMD benchmark than do
negotiated sales interest rates compared to the MMD benchmark. For the bond
characteristics analysis, we turn to exploring hypothesis H2 that reads again as follows:
H2: When administrators use best practices bond sales are less expensive.
This analysis seeks to explore H2 by the use of a detailed analysis of various
structural characteristics of the 194 bonds issued from when S. 1158 was enacted in 2001
to 2016. Through various statistical means, this analysis considers the identified bond
characteristics to understand their impact on the bond sale methods and ultimately the
results of those bond sales. This analysis follows similar studies using known bond
characteristics (Robbins & Simonsen, 2007; Simonsen & Hill, 1998).
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IV. Bond Characteristics Methodology
The 194 Idaho school district bonds from 2001 to 2016 serve as the primary data
set and provide the most exact means of evaluating bond sale characteristics. Later in this
chapter I will analyze administrator demographics and administrator preferences by
means of an administrator survey. Towards that end, this chapter will look at the effect
that various bond characteristics have on the selection of a method of sale.
a. Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis for this is the 194 Idaho school district bond issues from 2001
to 201620. As with the bond yield analysis, all bond issues were found on the
www.msrb.emma website. Identified bond characteristics were then mined from each
bond issue and cataloged to form the data set.
b. Dependent Variable
The dependent variables (DVs) are the two types of bond sales, negotiated bond
sale (DV0) and competitive bond sale (DV1).
c. Structural Independent Variables
The six bond independent variables (IVs) include financial data categories derived
from the actual official statement documents from the various school district’s bond
issues. These characteristics include: presence of a municipal advisor (IV1), underwriter

20

Notes, taxable and federally subsidized bonds were excluded from the analysis. The intent of
this was to identify a pool of homogeneous bonds that adhere to the general premise of a uniform credit
rated in the Aaa or Aa1 categories. This was done to address endogeneity questions. See footnote 2 and 18.
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frequency21 (IV2), bank qualification (IV3), underlying rating22 (IV4), enrollment23 (IV5),
and bond size (IV6). The operationalization of each variable is as follows:

21

See Figure 5: Underwriter Frequency from 2001 to 2016.
All bonds in the sample were Aa1 or higher. See footnote 18. All ratings were converted to the
Moody’s rating scale for analysis purposes. This conversion was only necessary for three bonds as
Moody’s was the overwhelmingly used rating scale.
23
Enrollment is the total district enrollment for the year in which the bonds were issued.
22
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Table 3.2:

Bond Characteristics Variables, Measures, and Sources of Data

Variables
Method of sale

Measures
Dichotomous indicator. If a negotiated sale is used, 0 is assigned. If a
competitive sale is used, 1.

Presence of
Municipal
Advisor

Dichotomous indicator. If no municipal advisor is present, 0 is assigned. If a
municipal advisor is present, 1.

Underwriter
frequency

Continuous indicator. The underwriter is assigned a number based on the
number of bonds it has underwritten from 0-19.

Bank qualified

Dichotomous indicator. If the bond is non-bank qualified, 0 is assigned. If the
bond is bank qualified, 1.

Underlying
rating

Dichotomous indicator. If the bond is rated Baa1/BBB+ or lower, 0 is assigned;
if A3/A- or higher, 1.

District
enrollment

Dichotomous indicator. If student enrollment at the time of bond issue is 4,999
or less, 0 is assigned; if 5,000 or more, 1.

Bond size

Dichotomous indicator. If par amount ($) of bond issue is $9,999,999 or less, 0
is assigned; if $10,000,000, 1.

Source: EMMA, 2018
The dependent variable is shown first, followed by the independent variables.
d. Levels of Measurement
The levels of measurement of each variable are as follows: DV0-1 = dichotomous;
IV1 = dichotomous; IV2 = ordinal; IV3, 4, 5 = interval. IV3,4,5 were then transformed into
dichotomous nominal variables for hypothesis testing purposes.
e. Research Hypotheses
The following hypotheses are specific to each bond issue, are structural in nature,
and refer to identifying elements of the bond issue itself. Individual hypotheses are
explored more in the administrator survey section of this chapter and refer to the
demographics, influences, and decision-making processes of each individual
administrator who participated in the administrator survey.
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f. Structural Hypotheses H2
X1a → Y1:

The presence of a municipal advisor (IV1,1) increases the likelihood the
school administrator will choose a competitive sale (DV1,1).

→ Y2:

The presence of a less frequent used underwriter (IV2,1) increases the
likelihood the school administrator will choose a competitive sale (DV1,1).

→ Y3:

The presence of a bank-qualified bond (IV3,1) increases the likelihood the
school administrator will choose a competitive sale (DV1,1).

→ Y4:

The presence of an underlying rating of A3/A- or higher (IV4,1) increases
the likelihood the school administrator will choose a competitive sale
(DV1,1).

→ Y5:

Student enrollment of 5,000 or more (IV5,1) increases the likelihood the
school administrator will choose a competitive sale (DV1,1).

→ Y6:

Bond size of $10,000,000 or more (IV6,1) increases the likelihood the
school administrator will choose a competitive sale (DV1,1).

g. Data Collection and Security
Like with the bond yield dataset previously described, the primary sources of data
for the bond characteristics dataset are the 194 Idaho school district bonds issued from
2001 to 2016. These data were also found in the bond official statements located on the
Electronic Municipal Market Access website as previously described (EMMA, 2014).
This analysis will also be managed via SPSS on my person computer, stored using a
GoogleDrive and backed-up as well on my personal computer.
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h. Research Design and Methods
The bond characteristics variables will also be analyzed using a quantitative
cross-section comparison of the bond issuances (Weiss, 1998, p. 82-84). This is because
Idaho school districts do not issue bonds collectively at once, but issue individually over
time as needed, there is no opportunity for pre-test or post-test experimentation. Since
actual bond results are used and the 194 official statements have many variables and data
points to consider, this direct source of data is optimal. The follow-up of the
administrator survey will enhance the exploration of the question why administrators
choose the method of sale they do to issue their bonds.
i. Statistical Procedures
The primary statistical model will use cross tabs with chi-square and LOGIT
regression. SPSS will be used to run the cross tabs with chi-square analysis and to
produce frequency tables and descriptive statistics. The DVs continue to be the
dichotomous variables of competitive sale (1) and a negotiated sale (0). The IV1-6 fit a
LOGIT probability model well. It provides insight into conditions that may cause Idaho
school district administrators to choose the method of sale they do and describe potential
correlations between the DV and IV variables.
This research design also conforms to the main assumptions of science mentioned
earlier.
Disadvantages of this research design are two-fold: (1) the potential for sample
error, and (2) the difficulty of constructing objective measures to evaluate all the
conditions that could impact administrator choice of method of sale.
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j. Potential Threats to Validity and Reliability
Like the bond yield model, because the evaluation is being conducted after the
policy has been implemented (the bonds have been sold), it is difficult to address threats
to internal validity. That said, given there is no limitation on which financings were
analyzed, and all 194 bond issues were considered, there is no threat of selection bias,
attrition, outside effects, or maturation. Testing and instrumentation are also limited to
the quality of this analysis (Weiss 1998, p. 183-184). Because the entire population is the
sample, threats to external and internal validity and reliability will be limited.
V. Administrator Survey Introduction
Now that the bond yield and bond characteristics methods have been described,
this leads us to going directly to Idaho school district administrators and asking them why
they choose the method of sale they and a battery of other related questions, in order to
more fully understand their individual decision-making processes. This final analysis of
this dissertation also explores and tests the various theories described in Chapter 2.
VI. Administrator Survey Methodology
This analysis uses a complete sample of Idaho school district administrators as
defined as superintendents and business officers, hereafter referred to as the
“administrator survey.” The contact lists used for this survey were derived using two
sources. The first is the current IASA online directory, which lists all Idaho school
district superintendents by their name, agency, office location city, phone number, fax
number, and email address. This list was sent to me by IASA Executive Director Rob
Winslow. The second is the current IASBO directory that was sent to me by IASBO
Executive Director Tom Taggart. It lists all Idaho school district business officers by their
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name, agency, office location city, phone number, fax number, and email address. Using
these lists (as of December 1st, 2015), a single consolidated directory was. Note also that
the survey size is representative of the entire population of Idaho school district finance
administrators.24
This administrator survey was then cross-referenced with individual administrator
information found on each school district’s websites. The region of the state that each of
the districts resides was then recorded using the ISBA listing. This regional element was
also used to further identify the region of the state each administrator was from.
In instances where the information was incomplete, inaccurate, missing or could
not be identified, the administrator was dropped from the dataset. This resulted in
dropping 8 individuals from the sample, leaving 334 individuals in the administrator
survey. Of these, 117 (35.03%) were superintendents and 217 (64.97%) were business
officers or their equivalents. It bears noting that it is not uncommon for districts to have
multiple business officers that are trained in finance and/or are members of the IASBO,
especially in larger districts. This would explain the higher number of business officers
than the number of school districts.
The timespan for the administrator survey was limited to 2015. The reason for this
is this was the current body of school district administrators at the time the study for this
dissertation began. Certainly, there is more current information available on the body of
Idaho school district administrators, but I believe that the survey studied for this

24

Finance administrators are those school district administrators who have decision-making
authority over method of sale. It is possible that these lists are not perfectly comprehensive and accurate,
but they do represent a reasonable approximation of the total population of Idaho school district finance
administrators.
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dissertation was representative of the administrative body at the time of the study and
therefore, is accurate and valid for purposes of this study.
a. Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis for this research is Idaho’s 334 school district finance
administrators as of December 1st, 2015, which is comprised of 117 (35.03%)
superintendents and 217 business officers or their equivalents (64.97%). Note also that
the sample size is representative of the entire population of Idaho school district finance
administrators. The total number of respondents was 141 (n = 141).
b. Dependent Variable
The dependent variables (DVs) are the two types of bond sales, competitive bond
sale (DV1) and negotiated bond sale (DV2).
c. Individual Independent Variables
The 16 individual administrator independent variables (IVs) include individual
administrator response data categories derived from the administrator survey such as:
administrative role – superintendent or business officer (IV11), region of the state 1-6
(IV2), finance knowledge and preferences (IV3), municipal finance training (IV4),
municipal finance competency (IV5), regulatory knowledge (IV6), cost motivation (IV7),
underwriter use and selection process (IV8), municipal advisor use, selection process,
influence of GFOA best practice, influence of academic studies (IV9), negotiated sale use
and selection process (IV10), competitive sale use, selection process, influence of GFOA
best practice, influence of academic studies (IV11), influence of the lowering of the
supermajority voter approval threshold for school district bonds (IV12), gender (IV13),
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year of school district experience (IV14) number of school bonds administered (IV15)
educational attainment (IV16). The operationalization of each variable is as follows:
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Table 3.3:

Administrator Survey Variables, Measures, and Sources of Data

Variables
Method of sale

Measures
Dichotomous indicator. If a negotiated sale is used, 0 is assigned. If a
competitive sale is used, 1.

Administrator

Dichotomous screening indicator. If a superintendent, 0 is assigned. If a
business officer, 1. S1

Region

Continuous screening indicator. If the administrator is from Region 1, 1 is
assigned, if Region 2, 2; if Region 3, 3; if Region 4, 4; if Region 5, 5; if Region
6, 6. S2

Finance
Knowledge and
Preferences

Dichotomous and continuous indicator. Battery of questions gaging the basic
finance knowledge and preferences of the administrator. Q1-3.

Municipal
Finance
Training

Dichotomous and continuous indicator. Battery of questions gaging the impact
of municipal financial training on administrator decision-making. Q4-10.

Municipal
Finance
Competency

Continuous indicator. Battery of questions gaging the impact of competency in
municipal finance on administrator decision-making. Q11-12.

Regulatory
Knowledge

Continuous indicator. Question gaging the impact of the administrator’s
regulatory knowledge on their decision-making. Q13.

Cost Motivation

Continuous indicator. A question gaging the impact of cost motivation on
administrator decision-making. Q14.

Underwriter

Dichotomous indicators. Battery of questions gaging the use and selection
process of an underwriter. Q15-16.

Municipal
Advisor

Dichotomous indicators. Battery of questions gaging the use, selection process,
influence of best practice and academic studies on administrator decisionmaking of a municipal advisor. Q17-20.

Negotiated Sale

Continuous indicator. Battery of questions gaging the use and selection process
of a negotiated sale. Q21-22.

Competitive
Sale

Continuous indicator. Battery of questions gaging the use, selection process,
influence of best practice and academic studies on administrator decisionmaking of a competitive sale. Q23-26.

Supermajority

Continuous indicator. Question gaging the impact of the supermajority
threshold on administrator decision-making. Q27.

Gender

Dichotomous demographic indicator. Question asking the gender of the
administrator. D1.

# Years in
School Admin

Continuous demographic indicator. Question asking the number of years in
school district administration of the administrator. D2.

# of Bond
Issues

Continuous demographic indicator. Question asking the number of bond issues
the administrator has administered. D3.

Educational
Attainment

Categorical demographic indicator. Question gaging the educational attainment
of the administrator. D4.

Source: Administrator survey responses
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The dependent variable is shown first, followed by the independent variables. IVs
are derived from the administrator survey that was sent to each member of the
superintendent and business officer list. These IVs included two screening variables:
superintendent/business officer and region of state. The IVs also include a battery of
detailed variables including: financial knowledge and preferences, training, competency,
regulatory knowledge, cost motivation, underwriter usage and selection process,
municipal advisor usage/selection process/influence of best practice/influence of
academic research, negotiated sale usage and selection process, and competitive sale
usage/selection process/influence of best practice/influence of academic research. The
IVs conclude with demographic variables including: gender, number of years in public
administration, number of bonds experienced, and educational attainment level. Detailed
questions designed to ascertain the individual finance administrator’s financial
knowledge, experience, preferences and decision-making process for choosing a specific
method of sale will include: who the administrator relies on for financial advice, do they
participate in their respective state-wide/national trade associations, what is their
preferred method of selling bonds, do they use a municipal advisor, and if they are
familiar with current regulatory changes, GFOA public finance best practices, and
academic research related to public finance.
A knowledge index score was developed in order to rank an administrator’s
municipal finance knowledge for testing purposes. The purpose of the knowledge index
score is to measure the administrator’s overall understanding of municipal finance,
municipal finance preferences, training, competency, regulatory knowledge, and number
of school bonds administered. The knowledge index score is generated from the sum

85
scores of survey questions 1-13, and demographic question 3. A score of 29 or lower
indicates a low municipal finance knowledge index score. A score of 30 or greater
indicates a high municipal finance knowledge index score. Table 3.4 below shows the
questions that were used to create this index.
Table 3.4:
Q1)
Q2)
Q3)
Q4)
Q5)
Q6)
Q7)
Q8)
Q9)
Q10)
Q11)
Q12)
Q13)

D3)

Knowledge Index
How would you rate your knowledge of bonds and levies?
Where do you rank bonds and levies of all your work responsibilities?
How often do you seek outside assistance with finance related needs?
Have you ever been formally trained in school bonds and levies?
If yes, how long ago did you receive the training?
If yes, how often do you receive training?
If yes, from whom did you receive the training?
Does your District allocate funds for financial training?
Do you agree that Idaho school districts are able to adequately fund their
facility needs.
Do you agree that your district is financially well managed.
What degree of competency when it comes to school finance.
What degree of competency when it comes to the bond issuance process?
How aware are you of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
and Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board's (MSRB) new municipal
advisor rules?
How many bond financings have you participated in?

A best practice index score was developed in order to rank an administrator’s
knowledge, preference and use of a municipal advisor and competitive sale. The purpose
of the best practice index score is to measure the administrator’s overall understanding of
GFOA best practice and academic research related to the use of a municipal advisor and
competitive sale. The best practice index score is generated from the sum scores of
survey questions 17-20 (municipal advisor questions) and questions 23-26 (competitive
sale questions). A score of 11 or lower indicates a low municipal finance knowledge
index score. A score of 12 or greater indicates a high municipal finance knowledge index
score. Table 3.5 below shows the questions that were used to create this index.
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Table 3.5:

Best Practice Index

Q17) Does your district use the services of a municipal advisor when issuing its
bonds?
Q18) If yes, has your district ever used a competitive RFP process to select your
municipal advisor?
Q19) If you knew that the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA)
recommended the use of an independent municipal advisor, how likely are
you to use a municipal advisor for your next bond issue?
Q20) If you knew that academic studies have found that the use of a municipal
advisor are likely to reduce the cost of your bonds substantially, how
likely are you to use a municipal advisor for your next bond issue?
Q23) Does your district use a competitive bond sale to issue its bonds?
Q24) If yes, what decision-making process is used to select a competitive bond
sale?
Q25) If you knew that the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA)
recommended the use of a competitive sale, how likely would you be to
use a competitive bond sale for your next bond issue?
Q26) If you knew that academic studies have found that the use of a competitive
bond sale are likely to reduce the cost of your bonds substantially, how
likely are you to use a competitive bond sale for your next bond issue?
d. Levels of Measurement
The levels of measurement of the DV is nominal; DV1-2 = nominal. The IVs
contain nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio level data. IVs were then transformed into
dichotomous nominal variables for hypothesis testing purposes.
e. Research Hypotheses
The following hypotheses are the Individual level hypotheses mentioned in
Chapter 3. Individual hypotheses refer to the individual administrator responses to the
administrator survey and seek to understand the demographics, influences, and thought
processes of the individual administrator and how those variables impact their selection
of agents and method of sale.
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f. Individual Hypotheses H2
X1a → Y1:

A superintendent administrator (IV1) increases the likelihood the school
administrator will choose a competitive sale (DV1).

→ Y2:

An administrator with a high knowledge index score (Sum of Q1-13, D3
resulting in a score > or = 30) (IV3-6 & 15, 1) increases the likelihood the
school administrator will choose a competitive sale (DV1).

→ Y3:

An administrator with a high best practice index score (Sum of municipal
advisor questions Q17-20 and competitive sale Q23-26 resulting in a score
of) (IV9 &11, 1) increases the likelihood the school administrator will choose
a competitive sale (DV1).

g. Data Collection and Security
The primary sources of data were collected from the 141 superintendent and
business officer responses to the administrator survey.
h. Administrator Survey
Using membership lists from the Idaho Association of School Administrators
(IASA) and the Idaho Association of School Business Officers (IASBO), I have been
able to identify the entire population of Idaho school district superintendents and business
officers. The executive directors of these two organizations have endorsed the survey and
provided letters recommending their memberships participate in the survey.
The survey consists of three sections. The first section has two screening
questions to determine whether the participant is a superintendent or business officer and
which of the 6 geographic regions of the state the participant is from. The screening
questions separate the participants into superintendent and business officer categories and
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into geographical areas. This is to insure the proper participants are taking the survey, and
to better identify the population for later use in the cross-tabulation analysis. Second,
twenty-seven questions are used to probe the decision-making process of the participants
regarding their motivations and understanding of bond financing. Third, four
demographic questions are used to determine gender, years of school district
administration experience, number of bond transactions participated in, and educational
attainment. The entire Idaho School District Administrator Financial Choice Survey is
included in Appendix B. The frequency tables and illustrative graphs are included in
Appendix C.
The survey was emailed to the entire population of 334 Idaho superintendents and
business officers using the survey software Qualtrics. Qualtrics was also used to collect
the surveys and to do some basic analysis. The results were completely anonymous and
stored on the Boise State University Qualtrics website, which is password secured and
requires principal investigator login. A sample of the letter that was emailed with the link
to the survey is included in Appendix A.
i. Research Design and Methods
This analysis also uses a quantitative cross-section comparison of method of sale
and a battery of responses from individual school administrators (Weiss, 1998, p. 82-84).
This design shows Idaho administrator method of sale preferences without interfering
with them (Field, 2013, p. 13). The administrator survey enhanced the empirical research
of the past bond sale yield research and bond characteristics analyses by layering on
current decision-making processes and demographic data to the analysis.
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j. Statistical Procedures
The primary statistical model will use cross tabs with chi-square and LOGIT
regression. SPSS will be used to run the LOGIT, cross tabs with chi-square analysis, and
to produce frequency tables and descriptive statistics. The DVs continue to be the
dichotomous variables of competitive sale (1) or a negotiated sale (0). The IV1-16 fit a
LOGIT probability model well. It provides insight into conditions that may cause Idaho
school district administrators to choose the method of sale they do and describe potential
correlations between the DV and IV variables.
This research design also conforms to the main assumptions of science mentioned
earlier.
Disadvantages of this research design are two-fold: (1) the potential for sample
error, and (2) the difficulty of constructing objective measures to evaluate the
administrator survey.
k. Potential Threats to Validity and Reliability
Because the evaluation is being conducted after the survey was administered, it is
difficult to address threats to internal validity. Testing and instrumentation are also
limited to the quality of this analysis (Weiss 1998, p. 183-184). To assure an adequate
sample size or response rate (n > 30), multiple surveys were sent with increasing urgency
verbiage. Because the entire population is the sample, threats to external and internal
validity and reliability will be limited.
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CHAPTER 4: BOND YIELD COMPARED TO MMD, BOND CHARACTERISTICS,
AND ADMINISTRATOR SURVERY RESULTS
I. Introduction
The sale of municipal bonds is a complex process that requires extensive
involvement of private sector organizations. There is an outstanding public interest in
efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the issuance of public debt. Much of the public
discourse and political rhetoric centers on whether debt is a good or not. This study
assumes that public debt is necessary for the proper functioning of a community and is a
basic function of government. The focus of this study is to understand how best to issue
that debt at the least cost possible. It also explores whether principal-agent theory applied
to the municipal bond sale process helps our understanding of that process.
As described in Chapter 2, because Idaho school district administrators operate
from a position of information asymmetry (Arrow, 1985; Dees, 1992 and Bendor, 1990),
they often rely solely on the advice of underwriters, and issue bonds through negotiation;
they are increasingly required to defend their bond process decision-making. Given the
GFOA recommended best practices, SEC regulatory environment, and the evident costs
and benefits of both hiring a municipal advisor and using a competitive bond sale are
abundant and somewhat self-evident; the field of public finance research contains
numerous opportunities for further research. This Chapter focuses on the outcomes of this
research and seeks to provide insight into what is happening at the individual
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administrator level. The described literature review in Chapter 2 provides the theoretical
basis for testing of these hypotheses.
Evidence presented earlier in this dissertation would suggest that many Idaho
school districts are not following best practices. This study provides context to the
impacts of the 2000 Idaho legislative change and McCall-Donnelly School District hiring
of a MA through a RFP process and use of a competitive sale. It also provides insight on
the impacts of the SEC and MSRB municipal advisor rules on method of sale decisions.
Further, it also provides insight into the cost implications of using a competitive sale or
negotiated sale. This, in a sense, tests the arguments made by the proponents of S. 1158
in 2000, whether negotiated sales save 100 basis points (1.00%). It also tests the
satisficing mentality, anchoring, and principal-agent effects found in the bonding process.
Now with context, theory, and methods squarely in place, an analysis of Idahospecific data follows. This chapter includes the bond yield compared to the MMD
analysis results, bond characteristics results, as well as the administrator survey results.
a. High-Level Observations of Structural Variables and Bond Data
We begin with high-level observations from the bond yield and bond
characteristic dataset that provides useful context into what is happening with Idaho
school district bond finance generally. We also consider descriptive statistics and
frequencies from the administrator survey that begin to explore the decision-making
processes of the individual administrators. From the bond yield and bond characteristics
dataset we can observe many insightful points that follow our theoretical framework as
well as the policy analysis from Chapter 2.
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As Figure 4.1 below indicates, there were 194 distinct Idaho school district GO
bond issuances from 2001 to 2016. Nampa School District 131 issued the most bonds
with 9, Boise School District 1 and West Ada School District 2 both had 8 issuances. It is
also noteworthy that the 6 top issuers of bonds all used negotiated sales. There were 38
districts that issued one bond during the test period. Figure 11 also shows which districts
used a competitive sale, negotiated sale, or a combination of the two. It is noteworthy that
no district during the test period started with competitive sales and then switched to
negotiated sale. All were either negotiated only, competitive only, or moved from
negotiated to competitive. This is evidence of the diffusionary effects observed in
Chapter 2 from the McCall-Donnelly competitive sale and SEC municipal advisor rules.

93

Figure 4.1:

Idaho School District Issuance Frequency from 2001 to 2016

Source: EMMA, 2018
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Figure 4.2 below shows the percentages of Idaho issuers who used a competitive
sale and a negotiated sale from 2001 to 2016. There were 38 competitive sales or (19.6%)
and 156 negotiated sales or (80.6%).

Figure 4.2:

Competitive & Negotiated Sale Frequency from 2001 to 2016

Source: Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg
As was noted previously, all bonds sold into the market need an underwriter. Of
the 194 bonds in the data set we learn that Seattle Northwest25, the firm that lobbied for
the passage of S. 1158 in 2000 was underwriter on 109 of the 194 (56.2%) Idaho school
district bonds issued from 2001 to 2016. This is indicative of punctuated equilibrium

25

Seattle Northwest merged with Piper Jaffray in 2013. Piper Jaffray–SNW is a combined firm for
purposes of this analysis.
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theory (Baumgartner and Jones, p. xxv & 5, 2009) where competitive sales shifted in
2001 after the legislative change to all negotiated sales until 2006. Kingdon’s multiple
streams theory (2011) is also observable where Seattle Northwest could be viewed as a
“policy entrepreneur” who benefited from identifying and taking advantage of the policy
change. Figure 4.3 shows this graphically and includes all of the underwriting firms that
were used by Idaho school districts during the test period.

Figure 4.3:
Source: Thomson Reuters

Underwriter Frequency from 2001 to 2016
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Figure 4.4 below shows the firms that are acting as municipal advisor and the
number of issues they advise on per year from 2001 to 2016. It was observed that only 50
of the 194 bonds (25.8%) had a municipal advisor.

Figure 4.4:

Municipal Advisor Frequency from 2001 to 2016

Source: Thomson Reuters
Figure 4.5 below shows the percentages of Idaho issuers who had a municipal
advisor and used a negotiated sale from 2001 to 2016. Use of a municipal advisor is
trending upward which is indicative of Berry and Berry’s (2014) policy diffusion theory.
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Figure 4.5:

Use of Municipal advisor and Negotiated Sale from 2001 to 2016

Source: Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg
Figure 4.6 below shows the percentages of Idaho issuers who had a municipal
advisor and used a competitive sale from 2001 to 2016.
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Figure 4.6:

Use of Municipal advisor and Competitive Sale from 2001 to 2016

Source: Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg
It is noteworthy that few negotiated sales also have a municipal advisor present.
Contrast this with competitive sales, where 100% of competitive sales also had a
municipal advisor present.
The analysis of the Idaho issuances from 2001 to 2016 indicates that only 6 or
3.8% of negotiated sales also had a municipal advisor. 155 or 96.2% of Idaho issues
during this time had no municipal advisor. Therefore, 96.2% of Idaho administrators who
chose to use a negotiated sale had no municipal advisor, were not following GFOA best
practice, and would have been in violation of the SEC municipal advisor rules if they
issued bonds after July 1, 2014. It is also important to mention that 100% of Idaho
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administrators who chose to use a competitive sale also used a municipal advisor, were
following GFOA best practice, and would have followed the SEC municipal advisor rules
if they issued bonds after July 1, 2014.
b. High-Level Observations of Administrator Survey
The administrator survey revealed several powerful insights into the decisionmaking process of individual administrators.26 There were 52 responses that just
answered the Screener Questions (SQ). Because these responses were not substantially
complete, they were removed from the dataset. It is noteworthy, that there are a number
of IASBO members who are book keepers, clerks, etc. who are not business officers or
superintendents. The elimination of these responses shows that the inclusion of the SQ
made for a more focused dataset of just superintendents and business officers, the target
audience.
Beyond this, all other partial responses were kept. There are four sets of questions
that have yes/no questions that lead to “If Yes” questions. If the participants responded
“No” they would not have continued through the following “If Yes” questions, leaving
gaps in the participants responses. This was known and expected and was the main
reason for these types of partial responses. This left 141 total participants (N = 141). This
is a good number of participants given there are 115 school districts in Idaho and is the
total composition of the response group.

26

Dr. Hill and Dr. Witt pre-tested the survey to make sure it read well and was working properly
before it was distributed to the sample. Their responses were deleted from dataset.

100
c. Screening Questions (S1 & S2)
From S1 we learn that 82 respondents were superintendents and 59 were business
officers. The superintendents are overrepresented and I am unsure why. It may be that
they consider the research value of this survey higher than do the business officers, but it
is hard to say.
For S2, the survey was structured around the 6 regions of the state. It was not
created to identify participants individually or by districts, but to see if there was any
geographic insight that could be gained from the responses. Region 6, which is the
northeast corner of Idaho, may have been over represented with 30 responses compared
to Region 3, which is the southwest corner of Idaho and is the most populous region of
the state, with 41 responses. Otherwise, there was a normal distribution of responses
between regions based on population.
d. Assessment Questions (Q1, Q2, Q3)
For Q1, there is a normal expected bell curve distribution of 16 participants that
rated themselves as having excellent knowledge of bonds and levies, 59 good, 54 Fair, 12
poor. A cross tabulation with S2 revealed that 18 respondents in Region 6 identified as
having good knowledge of bonds and levies. From a cross tabulation of Q1 and D1 we
learn that males rank their knowledge of bonds and levies higher than females.
Please indicate your gender?
Male

How would you rate your
knowledge of bonds and
levies?

Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor

14
42
25
5

Female
2
13
26
6

Prefer
not to
answer

Total

0
3
2
1

16
58
53
12
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Total

86

47

6

139

From Q2, there is a normal expected bell curve distribution of 20 very high, 54
high, 38 moderate, 20 low, 7 very low of participants who ranked bonds and levies of all
their work responsibilities. From a cross tabulation with S1 we learn that superintendents
rank bonds and levies as a higher responsibility than do business officers.
Are you a superintendent
or a business officer?

Where do you
rank bonds and
levies of all of
your work
responsibilities?
Total

Very
High
High
Moderate
Low
Very
Low

Total

Superintendent

Business
Officer

15

5

20

36
21
8

18
17
12

54
38
20

2

5

7

82

57
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For Q3, there is a normal expected bell curve distribution of 10 never, 80 less than
1 a month, 25 once a month, 19 2-3 times a month, 2 once a week, 2 2-3 times a week, 1
daily of participants who sought outside assistance with finance related needs. A cross
tabulation with S1 reveals that business officers are less likely to seek assistance
compared to superintendents.
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Are you a superintendent
or a business officer?

Never
< Once
a Month

How often do you
seek outside
assistance with
finance related
needs?

Once a
Month
2-3
Times a
Month
Once a
Week
2-3
Times a
Week
Daily

Total

Total

Superintendent

Business
Officer

0

10

10

47

33

80

16

9

25

14

5

19

2

0

2

2

0

2

0

1

1

81

58

139

e. Training Question Q4, Q5, Q6, Q7, Q8
From Q4, it is interesting that 88 of the participants identified themselves as
having not been formally trained in school bonds and levies, where only 50 responded
that they had been formally trained. It is noteworthy that training on bonds and levies
seems to be a basic component that may be lacking in school district administrator’s
skills that could be fairly easy to address. A cross tabulation with S1 reveals that this was
particularly true of business officers as 43 of the 57 business officer participants (75.4%)
said they have received no formal training in bonds and levies. 45 of 81 superintendents
(55.6%) said they have never received formal training as well. It could be a helpful focus
to train business officers and superintendents on bonds and levies and the issuance
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process. A cross tabulation with S2 reveals that Region 2 received the lowest formal
training with 12 of 14 (85.7%). Region 6 was second lowest with 19 of 30 (63.3%).
Region 3 was third lowest with 25 of 41 (61.0%).
What region of Idaho are you in?

Have you ever been
formally trained in
school bonds and
levies?

Region
1

Region
2

Region
3

Region
4

Region
5

Region
6

Total

Yes

6

2

16

7

7

11

49

No

9

12

25

12

10

19

87

15

14

41

19

17

30

136

Total

A cross tabulation with D1 reveals that 43 of 84 male participants (51.2%)
compared to 37 of 46 female participants (80.4%) have never been formally trained in
bonds and levies. It could be a helpful to understand why 80.4% of female administrators
have received no formal training on bonds and levies.
Please indicate your
gender?
Male

Have you ever been
formally trained in school
bonds and levies?
Total

Female

Prefer
not to
answer

Total

Yes

41

9

0

50

No

43

37

6

86

84

46

6

136

A cross tabulation with D2 reveals that the more years an administrator has been
working in school district administration the more likely they are to receive formal
training on bonds and levies. That said, it is unexpected that even those in the expert
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level27 of experience 48 of 80 expert participants (60.0)%) still received no formal
training on bonds and levies.
How many years have you been working
in school district administration?
New

Novice

Total

Intermediate Expert

Yes
Have you ever been
formally trained in
school bonds and levies? No

4

6

8

32

50

5

13

21

48

87

Total

9

19

29

80

137

A cross tabulation with D3 was as expected with administrators who have
participated in fewer bonds receiving less formal training. It is interesting that 68 of 93
new participants (73.1%) have never been trained in bonds and levies. This seems to be
the most vulnerable population that also stands to benefit the most from formal training.
It would be interesting if a training program could be developed to assist first time bond
participants.
How many bond financings have you
participated in?
New
Have you ever been
formally trained in school
bonds and levies?
Total

27

Novice

Total

Intermediate Expert

Yes

25

17

7

1

50

No

68

13

3

2

86

93

30

10

3

136

The categories of years of service are as follows: New (0-1 years), Novice (2-4 years),
Intermediate (5-9 years), and Expert (10 and above).
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A cross tabulation with D4 reveals that 12 of 12 participants that only have a high
school education (100%) have received no formal training in bonds and levies. The other
education levels are also low.
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
High
school
graduate
Have you ever
been formally
trained in school
bonds and levies?
Total

Total

Prefer
Associate Bachelor's Graduate not to
answer

Yes

0

2

8

40

0

50

No

12

8

19

44

4

87

12

10

27

84

4

137

For Q5, there are a total of 71 participants that responded “Yes”. This is 52.2% of
the total that respond to Q4. This drop in response is interesting and worth exploring
more.
A cross tabulation with S1 reveals there is a normal expected distribution of both
superintendents and business officers. However, it is interesting that 17 of the 48
superintendents (35.4%) and 12 of the 23 business officers (52.1%) responded “Other”.
This is somewhat surprising and would lead me to think that they received their training
longer than 5 years ago, especially business officers. Not only a lack of training, but a
lack of current training seems to be an issue.
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Are you a superintendent
or a business officer?

If yes,
how long
ago did
you
receive
the
training?

Total

Total

Superintendent

Business
Officer

This
year

8

2

10

1 year
ago

7

4

11

2 years
ago

3

1

4

3 years
ago

4

1

5

4 years
ago

2

1

3

5 years
ago

7

2

9

Other

17

12

29

48

23

71

A cross tabulation with D3 reveals that the overwhelming distribution is
concentrated in the in the New (43) and Novice (17) categories (84.5%) with only 10
Intermediate and 1 Expert respondents. This would indicate that as administrators
participate in more bonds, they are less likely to receive training and even less likely to
receive current training. This would indicate that some of Idaho’s most experienced
administrators in bonds and levies are without current training and may be missing
market and regulatory updates that could benefit their districts.
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How many bond financings have you
participated in?
New
This
year

If yes, how
long ago did
you receive
the training?

Total

1 year
ago
2
years
ago
3
years
ago
4
years
ago
5
years
ago
Other

Total

Novice Intermediate Expert
5

3

1

1

10

6

3

2

0

11

2

1

1

0

4

2

2

1

0

5

3

0

0

0

3

5

3

1

0

9

20
43

5
17

4
10

0
1

29
71

A cross tabulation with D4 reveals that the overwhelming distribution is
concentrated in the Bachelor’s degree (16) and Graduate or professional degree (51)
categories. This is 67 of the 71 respondents (94.3%) who have received the most current
training. This lends to the idea that if an administrator values education; they will
continue to seek out training and continuing education opportunities.
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What is the highest level of education you
have completed?
High
school

If yes, how long
ago did you
receive the
training?

Associate Bachelor's Graduate

This
year

0

0

1

9

10

1 year
ago

0

0

3

8

11

2 years
ago

0

0

1

3

4

3 years
ago

0

1

0

4

5

4 years
ago

0

0

0

3

3

5 years
ago

0

0

2

7

9

2
2

1
2

9
16

17
51

29
71

Other
Total

Total

For Q6, there are a total of 45 participants that responded “Yes”. This is 32.8% of
the total that respond to Q4 and is a further drop in response from Q5.
A cross tabulation with D2 indicates a normal expected distribution with more
training increasing in tandem with the length of time an administrator has been working
in school district administration. However, it is interesting that 15 of 30 respondents
identifying themselves as “Expert” said that they receive training Twice a Year (2) or
Once a Year (13). This seems disproportionately high and is counter to the findings of
previous questions.
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How many years have you been working
in school district administration?
New

If yes, how
often do you
receive
training?

Total

Novice

Total

Intermediate Expert

Twice
a year

1

0

1

2

4

Once a
year

2

4

3

13

22

Every
2 years

0

0

1

5

6

Every
3 years

0

0

0

2

2

Every
4 years

1

0

0

1

2

Every
5 years

0

0

2

7

9

4

4

7

30

45

A cross tabulation with D3 reveals that the overwhelming distribution is
concentrated in the in the New (22) and Novice (15) categories (82.2%) with only 7
Intermediate and 1 Expert respondents. This would indicate that as administrators
participate in more bonds, they are less likely to receive more frequent training. These are
similar findings to Q5. This would indicate that some of Idaho’s most experienced
administrators in bonds and levies are without current training and may be missing
market and regulatory updates that could benefit their districts.
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How many years have you been working
in school district administration?
New

If yes, how
often do you
receive
training?

Total

Novice

Total

Intermediate Expert

Twice
a year

1

1

1

1

4

Once a
year

14

7

1

0

22

Every
2 years

0

3

3

0

6

Every
3 years

0

1

1

0

2

Every
4 years

1

1

0

0

2

Every
5 years

6

2

1

0

9

22

15

7

1

45

It is also noteworthy that 18 or 28.6% of respondents turn to their bond counsel
for training. Another 16 or 25.4% rely on their peers for bond related advice. This is
concerning as this would be in direct violation of the SEC Municipal Advisor rules and
gives further evidence of principal-agent dilemmas identified in the literature review.
For Q6, there are a total of 45 participants that responded “Yes”. This is 32.8% of
the total that respond to Q4 and is a further drop in response from Q5.
A cross tabulation with D2 indicates a normal expected distribution with more
training increasing in tandem with the length of time an administrator has been working
in school district administration. However, it is interesting that 15 of 30 respondents
identifying themselves as “Expert” said that they receive training Twice a Year (2) or
Once a Year (13). This seems disproportionately high and is counter to the findings of
previous questions.
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How many years have you been working
in school district administration?
New

If yes, how
often do you
receive
training?

Total

Novice

Total

Intermediate Expert

Twice
a year

1

0

1

2

4

Once a
year

2

4

3

13

22

Every
2 years

0

0

1

5

6

Every
3 years

0

0

0

2

2

Every
4 years

1

0

0

1

2

Every
5 years

0

0

2

7

9

4

4

7

30

45

A cross tabulation with D3 reveals that the overwhelming distribution is
concentrated in the in the New (22) and Novice (15) categories (82.2%) with only 7
Intermediate and 1 Expert respondents. This would indicate that as administrators
participate in more bonds, they are less likely to receive more frequent training. These are
similar findings to Q5. This would indicate that some of Idaho’s most experienced
administrators in bonds and levies are without current training and may be missing
market and regulatory updates that could benefit their districts.
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How many years have you been working
in school district administration?
New

If yes, how
often do you
receive
training?

Total

Novice

Total

Intermediate Expert

Twice
a year

1

1

1

1

4

Once a
year

14

7

1

0

22

Every
2 years

0

3

3

0

6

Every
3 years

0

1

1

0

2

Every
4 years

1

1

0

0

2

Every
5 years

6

2

1

0

9

22

15

7

1

45

It is also noteworthy that 18 or 28.6% of respondents turn to their bond counsel
for training. Another 16 or 25.4% rely on their peers for bond related advice. This is
concerning as this would be in direct violation of the SEC Municipal Advisor rules and
gives further evidence of principal-agent dilemmas identified in the literature review.
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f. Competency Questions (Q11, Q12):
For Q11, there is a normal expected bell curve distribution of participants that
rated their degree of competency of school finance (20-VH, 77-H, 40-M, 2-L, 2-VL).
For Q12, there is a normal expected bell curve distribution of participants that
rated their degree of competency of the bond issuance process (2-VH, 23-H, 63-M, 35-L,
17-VL, 1-DK). It is noteworthy that participants ranked this lower in terms of finance in
general with most in the M, L, and VL categories.
g. SEC Municipal Advisor Rule Question (Q13):
For Q13, there is a normal expected ascending distribution of participants that
rated their awareness of the SEC’s and MSRB’s municipal advisor rule, concentrated in
the somewhat unaware and very unaware categories (4-VA, 26-SA, 19-A, 28-SU, 59-VU,
5-DK). This would be interesting to track this overtime as it would be anticipated that this
would increase with more exposure to the rule, the bonding process, etc.
h. Lowest Cost of Borrowing Question (Q14):
For Q14 there is a normal expected ascending distribution of participants that
rated achieving the lowest cost possible for their district’s bonds, concentrated in the 8, 9,
and 10 ranges. (0-3, 1-0, 2-2, 3-1, 4-1, 5-6, 6-3, 7-7, 8-16, 9-23, 10-76, 3-M).
i. Underwriter Questions (Q15, Q16):
For Q15, there are approximately half of the participants that said they used just
an underwriter when issuing bonds (45-Y, 49-N; 47-M). This is somewhat surprising
given that when looking at the actual bond data approximately ¾ of districts just use an
underwriter when issuing bonds. Because there are 47 missing responses it may be that
the question was unclear or that participants still did not understand what an UW is or
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their role. Also, it may be that some participants had never issued bonds and therefore
have never used the services of an UW, MA or anyone for that matter.
For Q16, only 19 participants answered “Yes” that they had used an RFP to hire
their UW and 40 said they had not used an RFP and 82 did not respond. Because this is
an “if yes” question, it is not surprising that there was less response to this question with
82 missing responses. Regardless, it is concerning that only 19 participants had used a
RFP process to select their UW. This would indicate that no process or some other
process is used to select their UW.
j. Municipal Advisor Questions (Q17, Q18, Q19, Q20):
For Q17, 65 participants indicated that they use a MA and 37 indicated that they
did not, with 39 missing responses. This is interesting given this is the inverse of the
actual bond results, where approximately ¾ of the bonds were issued without the services
of a MA. This would indicate some misunderstanding of the role of a MA. This again
would indicate the need for additional education and training in this regard. This also
gives some evidence of information asymmetries as described in the literature review.
Because there are 39 missing responses it may be that the question was unclear or that
participants still did not understand the role of an MA. Also, it may be that some
participants have never issued bonds and therefore have never used the services of an
MA.
For Q18, 17 or 33.3% of participants answered “Yes” that they had used an RFP
to hire their MA and 51 or 76.7% said they had not used an RFP. 73 did not respond.
Because this was an “if yes” question, it is not surprising that there was less response to
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this question with 73 missing responses. Regardless, it is concerning that only 17 of the
participants use a RFP process to select their MA.
For Q19, there is a normal expected descending distribution of participants that
rated their awareness of the GFOA MA recommendations, concentrated in the very
likely, likely, and undecided categories (46-VL, 52-L, 26-U, 1-UL, 1-VU, 11-DK). It
would be interesting to track this overtime and create a longitudinal time series dataset. I
would anticipate these responses would increase with more exposure to the rule, the
bonding process, and related municipal finance training.
For Q20, there is a normal expected descending distribution of participants that
rated their awareness of the academic research regarding MA use reducing costs,
concentrated in the very likely, likely, and undecided categories (66-VL, 47-L, 15-U, 1UL, 0-VU, 7-DK). This would be interesting to track overtime as well and I would
anticipate this would increase with more exposure to the rule, the bonding process, and
related municipal finance training. Also, when compared to GFOA MA
recommendations, academic research seems to have a larger influence on participant’s
interest in using a MA. This indicates somewhat the importance of this research and a
trust factor that education administrators have with academic research.
k. Negotiated Sale Questions (Q21, Q22)
For Q21, 38 participants indicated they use a NS and 42 indicated that they did
not, with 61 missing responses. This is interesting given that this is the inverse from the
actual bond results, where approximately ¾ of the bonds were issued with the use of a
NS. This would indicate some misunderstanding of what a NS is and further evidence of
the information asymmetries discussed in the literature review. Because there are 61
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missing responses it may be that the question was unclear or that participants still did not
understand what a NS is. Also, it may be that some participants have never issued bonds.
This again would indicate the need for additional education in this regard.
For Q22, this was a surprising result given most participants indicated they would
rely on the recommendation of financial professionals, which previous questions would
indicate it is their UW and not an independent MA (32-RFP, 9-USP, 1-RP, 4-FBP, 3-O,
92-M). It is also noteworthy that 9 participants indicated that they would simply use the
same process they used in the past, indicating a satisficing technique is at play. This is
also evidence of the anchoring theory discussed in the literature review.
l. Competitive Sale Questions (Q23, Q24, Q25, Q26)
For Q23, 42 participants indicated they use a CS and 39 indicated that they did
not, with 60 missing responses. This is interesting given that this is the inverse from the
actual bond results, where approximately 1/4 of the bonds were issued with the use of a
CS. This would indicate some misunderstanding of what a CS is and/or the issuance
process in general. Because there are 60 missing responses, it may be that this question
was unclear or that participants still did not understand what a CS is. Also, it may be that
some participants have never issued bonds. All of this supports the theoretical basis for
this dissertation and provides further evidence that information asymmetries exist. This
again would indicate the need for additional education and training in this regard.
For Q24, this was a surprising result given that most participants indicated that
they would rely on the recommendation of financial professionals (32-RFP, 9-USP, 1-RP,
3-FBP, 2-O, 94-M). Who those professionals are, as Q6c indicates, is the real question.
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For Q25, there is a normal expected descending distribution of participants that
rated their awareness of the GFOA CS recommendations, concentrated in the very likely,
likely, and undecided categories (47-VL, 50-L, 23-U, 1-UL, 0-VU, 20-M). This would be
interesting to track this overtime as it would be anticipated that this would increase with
more exposure to the rule, the bonding process, etc.
For Q26, there is a normal expected descending distribution of participants that
rated their awareness of the academic research regarding CS use reducing costs,
concentrated in the very likely, likely, and undecided categories (55-VL, 51-L, 16-U, 1UL, 0-VU, 18-M). This would be interesting to track this overtime as it would be
anticipated that this would increase with more exposure to the rule, the bonding process,
etc. Also, when compared to GFOA CS recommendations, academic studies seem to
have a larger influence on participant’s interest in using a CS. This indicates somewhat
the importance of this research.
m. Super Majority Question (27)
For Q27, there is a normal expected descending distribution of participants that
rated their agreement that the supermajority voter threshold should be reduced in Idaho
with most responses concentrated in the strongly agree, agree, and undecided categories
(78-SA, 35-A, 11-U, 5-DA, 6-SD, 6-M). This indicates strong support from participants
to reduce the threshold (80% in agreement). This may be useful for policy makers to
consider as Idaho and Kentucky are the only two states in the union that still require a
supermajority to pass GO bonds.
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n. Demographic Questions (D1, D2, D3, D4)
For D1, there are 86 male respondents, 47 female, 6 preferring not to answer, and
2 missing. This is interesting given that 61% of participants are male.
For D2, as this was a question where participants could respond with any number
of years, I grouped the responses into 4 categories, New (0-1 years), Novice (2-4 years),
Intermediate (5-9 years), and Expert (10 and above). This produced an anticipated
distribution of 9 New, 20 Novice, 29 Intermediate, and 82 Expert with 1 missing.
For D3, this was a question where participants could respond with any number of
bond they participated in, I grouped the responses into 4 categories, New (0-1 bonds),
Novice (2-4 bonds), Intermediate (5-9 bonds), and Expert (10 and above). This produced
an anticipated distribution of 95 New, 31 Novice, 10 Intermediate, 3 Expert, and 2
missing. It is interesting that 126 of the 141 participants have done 4 bond issues or less
(0-54; 1-41; 2-17; 3-9; 4-5). This was discovered through cross-tabulation.
Also via cross tabulation of D2 & D3, a clear inverse relationship is observable.
In other words, you would think that if you had more years of administrative experience,
you would also have participated in more bond issues. This is not the case. In fact, the
more administrative experience an administrator has, the more likely they are to have
participated in no bond sales at all. Also, regardless of years of administrative experience,
participant responses were concentrated in the lower numbers of bonds participated in.
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How many bond financings have you
participated in?
New
How many
years have you
been working
in school
district?
Total

New
Novice
Inter
Expert

8
19
22
46
95

Total

Novice Intermediate Expert
1
1
7
22
31

0
0
0
10
10

0
0
0
3
3

9
20
29
81
139

For D4, it is interesting given that 113 of the 141 participants have a bachelor’s
degree (28) or higher (85).
o. Method of Sale Questions (MS)
The method of sale distribution of 35 participants identifying as using a
competitive sale and 71 participants identifying as using a negotiated sale somewhat
matches the actual bond sale results. The noteworthy observation here is that 35 of the
participants did not respond to the method of sale question. In fairness, it may be that
they may not know what method of sale they use or they have never issued bonds. This
would further support the information asymmetry discussion found in the literature
review.
II. Bond Yield Compared to MMD Results
The high level descriptive statistics and cross tabulations provided additional
context that can now be built upon with further statistical analyses. Idaho had 194 bonds
issued from 2001 to 2016 totaling $2,073,225,000 in total bonds. That is a lot of money!
a. Idaho Competitive Bond Yields
Of the 194 bond sales 38 were issued using a competitive bond sale. In those
competitive bond sales there were 422 individual bond years of bonds with varying
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interest rates totaling $360,755,000 of total bond proceeds. This represents 19.3% of the
total number of bonds issued.

Figure 5.1:

Competitive Bond Concentration Compared to the Benchmark

As Figure 5.1 shows, the independent samples t-test results indicate that the mean
of these individual bond years is .10 and the standard deviation is .253. The visual
indicates that the concentration of individual bonds cluster closely around the mid-point.
This would indicate that bonds sold competitively are generally sold at interest rates28
that are 10 basis points or .10% more than the MMD on any given day. Also, that when

28

Interest rates indicate the True Interest Cost (TIC) or the yields that each individual bond year
bares compared to the daily AAA MMD scale on which the bonds were sold. This compares the actual
yields on the bonds compared to the market benchmark on the day in which they are sold.
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compared to the benchmark these bonds are .253 standard deviations away from the
benchmark.
b. Idaho Negotiated Bond Yields
Idaho had 156 of negotiated bond sales from 2001 to 2016. In those bond sales
there were 1770 individual bond years with varying interest rates totaling $1,712,470,000
of total bond proceeds. This is approximately 4.2x the number of competitively sold
individual bonds. This represents approximately 80.7% of the total number of bonds
issued from 2001 to 2016.

Figure 5.2:

Negotiated Bond Concentration Compared to the Benchmark

As Figure 5.2 shows, the independent samples t-test results indicate that the mean
of these individual bond years is .29 and the standard deviation is .54. The visual above
shows that the concentration of individual negotiated bonds is a broader distribution from

122
the mid-point or MMD benchmark when compared to the individual competitive bonds.
Granted, most of the bonds are concentrated around the mid-point, but in some instances,
the bonds are 200+ basis points greater than the mean. This would indicate that bonds
sold through negotiation are generally sold at interest rates29 that are 29 basis points or
.29% more than the MMD benchmark. Also, that when compared to the benchmark these
bonds are .54 standard deviations away from the MMD benchmark.
c. Comparing Idaho Competitive Bonds to Negotiated Bonds
As Table 4.1 below indicates when comparing competitively sold bonds to bonds
sold through negotiation there is a higher concentration of competitive bonds around the
MMD benchmark when compared to the wider and positive concentration of negotiated
bonds away from the MMD benchmark. From this, it is observable that Idaho school
district bonds sold competitively are more likely to result in interest rates that more
closely match the daily MMD benchmark or have lower interest rates when compared to
Idaho school district bonds sold through negotiation that result in interest rates that are
further away from the daily MMD benchmark and therefore have higher interest rates
compared to the MMD benchmark.

29

Same comment as in footnote 12. Interest rates indicate the True Interest Cost (TIC) or the
yields that each individual bond year bares compared to the daily AAA MMD scale the day on which the
bonds were sold. This compares the actual yields on the bonds compared to the market benchmark on the
day in which they are sold.
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Table 4.1:
One-sample t-test of Competitive yields compared to the MMD vs
negotiated yields compared to the MMD
Levene's Test for
Equality of

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Interval of the

Difference

Equal variances assumed
Equal variances not assumed

F
42.242

Sig.
0.000

t
7.230
10.965

Sig.
Mean
Std. Error
(2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower
Upper
2190
0.000 0.19482 0.02695 0.14198 0.24767
1432.142
0.000 0.19482 0.01777 0.15997 0.22968
df

These results directly address H1 restated below as it shows that in fact there is a
statistically significant difference that competitive sales result in lower interest rates
compared to the MMD benchmark than negotiated sales interest rates when compared to
the MMD benchmark.
H1: Idaho school district competitive bond sales achieve lower interest rates and
are therefore, less expensive than negotiated bond sales.
To illustrate the impact of this 19 basis points (.19%) difference between bonds
sold competitively compared to the MMD benchmark and the difference between bonds
sold through negotiated compared to the MMD benchmark, I have compared a
hypothetical average $15,000,000 30 year Aaa rated Idaho school district GO bond that
has an average 3.80% yield, compared to that same bond with a 3.99% yield. The 3.8%
bond produces a total debt service of approximately $25,550,000. The 3.99% bond
produces a total debt service of $26,350,000. The additional 19 basis points (.19%)
equates to $800,000 in an additional cost. On $2BB worth of bonds that Idaho school
districts issued from 2001 to 2016 that is approximately $160,000,000 in additional
expense.30

30

For illustrative purposes only. Not actual results. Determining exact costs is difficult at best.
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III. Bond Characteristics Results
From the bond yield analysis we gain specific insight that the competitive bonds
compared to the MMD benchmark have lower interest rates than do negotiated bonds
compared to the MMD benchmark. This difference has substantial cost implications and
leads us to exploring why administrators choose the methods of sale they do. This portion
of the analysis begins with an analysis of the structural bond characteristic variables in
the bond dataset. This analysis follows similar studies using known bond characteristics
(Robbins & Simonsen, 2007; Simonsen & Hill, 1998).
a. Observations of Bond Characteristics Results
To provide foundational context, the analysis begins with high-level observations
of the data. It is noteworthy that 134 of the 194 bonds issued during the study period or
69% have a student population of 4,999 or less. The smallest district has 144 students
enrollment and the largest district had 36,111 students enrollment.
This is also true of the Idaho district’s frequency of issuance as 38 of the 194
bonds or 18.5% of districts only issued one bond during the study period.
The average bond size was $12,291,546. The smallest bond issued was $450,000
and the largest bond issued was $84,830,000.
Of the 194 issues, 63 were non-bank qualified (Non BQ) and the remaining 131
were all bank qualified (BQ).
Only 50 of the bonds had a MA. Zions Bank was MA to 34 issuances or 68% and
Seattle Northwest was MA on 16 issuances or 32%.
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Of course, every issue had an UW. Seattle Northwest31 was UW on 109 issues,
Wellso Fargo and Piper Jaffray both issued 18, and Zions Bank underwrote 17 issues.
The remaining UWs are largely a smattering of on-off UWs who underwrote 2 or fewer
bonds.
As for the underlying ratings on the bonds, 96 were in the A range (A1 = 37, A2 =
35, A3 = 24) and 61 were not rated. Only 4 on their own were rated Aa1 and there are no
Aaa rated bonds in the dataset. This means that 190 were enhanced by the State’s IBGP
or Aaa bond insurance.
b. LOGIT Regression Results of Structural Bond Characteristics H2
The results of the logistic regression indicate that only two predictors have a
statistically significant effect on the probability on an administrator’s choice of method of
sale: “presence of a municipal advisor” and “the underwriter that a district selects sales
less bonds” variables. The remaining variables (bank qualification, underlying rating,
enrollment, and bond size) were not statistically significant and cannot be interpreted, as I
cannot be confident that these results were not arrived at due to chance.
The odds ratio of a variable allows us to calculate the percent change in the
probability of a bureaucrat affiliating with a political party over not affiliating.32
It was discovered that when the “municipal advisor is present” predictor increases
by 1, the odds that an administrator selects a competitive sale also increases 33.6 times.
Said another way, when a municipal advisor is present there is a high probability that an
administrator will select a competitive sale to issue its district’s bonds. This provides

31

Seattle Northwest merged with Piper Jaffray in 2013. Piper Jaffray–SNW is a combined firm for
purposes of this analysis and issuances are not double counted.
32
Percent change = (Odds Ratio – 1) * 100
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strong support for H2 and indicates that the presence of a municipal advisor is a strong
indicator that an administrator will choose a competitive sale.
This was also true of the “underwriter that a district selects sales less bonds”
predictor, where this predictor increases by 1, the odds an administrator selects a
competitive sale increases by 1.24 times. Said another way, when the underwriter the
administrator selects to issue its district’s bonds has sold fewer bonds there is a higher
probability that an administrator has selected a competitive sale. This is somewhat
intuitive as Seattle Northwest sold the most bonds at 109 and the 103 of them were
through negotiation. The smatterings of one-off underwriters were largely selected via
competitive sale. This also provides strong support for H2 and indicates that the selection
of a less prominent underwriter is a strong indicator that an administrator will choose a
competitive sale.
Table 4.2:
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Structural Bond
Characteristic Variables Predicting Administrator Choice of Method of Sale
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IV. Administrator Survey Results
Now that there has been a review of the structural variables and predictors that
may impact an administrator’s choice of method of sale, this analysis turns to the actual
results of the administrator survey to explore this questions. This analysis looks to test the
various theories and dilemmas as outlined in the literature review, namely: decisiontheory, information asymmetry, anchoring, and principal agent dilemmas.
a. LOGIT Regression Results of Individual Administrative Survey H2
The results of the logistic regression indicate that only three predictors have a
statistically significant effect on the probability on an administrator’s choice of method of
sale: knowledge of bonds (Q1), seek assistance with bonds (Q3), and number of bond
financings (D3). The remaining variables (priority of bonds, formal training, training
freshness, training frequency, training source, district funding for training, state funding
adequacy, district financial management, school financial competency, and municipal
advisor rule awareness) were not statistically significant and cannot be interpreted, as I
cannot be confident that these results were not arrived at due to chance.
The analysis suggests that when the “knowledge about bonds and levies” of an
administrator increases by 1, the odds an administrator selects a competitive sale
increases by 101.4 times. Said another way, when the knowledge of bonds and levies
increases the probability that an administrator will select a competitive sale increases by
101.4 times. This provides strong support for H2 and indicates that an administrator that
has a self-proclaimed knowledge of bonds and levies is a very strong indicator that an
administrator will choose a competitive sale. This also tracks with the information
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asymmetry literature as the more information an administrator has the less of an
asymmetry exists.
This was also true of the “frequency that an administrator seeks financial
assistance” predictor, where if this predictor increases by 1, the odds an administrator
selects a competitive sale increases by 1.2 times. In other words, the more often an
administrator seeks financial assistance, the probability that an administrator selects a
competitive sale goes up 1.2 times. This provides additional support for H2 as well and
indicates that an administrator that seeks financial assistance more frequently is an
indicator that an administrator will choose a competitive sale.
This was also true when the “number of bonds an administrator has participated
in” increases by 1, the odds an administrator selects a competitive sale increases by 6.9
times. This provides additional support for H2 and indicates that an administrator that has
experiences progressively more bond financings is a strong indicator that an
administrator will choose a competitive sale. This is somewhat intuitive because the more
bonds an administrator participates in, the more likely they will learn about the process in
general. This is also somewhat contrary to the anchoring literature that suggests the more
frequently an administrator uses a certain process the more likely they would be to use it
again.
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Table 4.3:
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Individual Knowledge
Variables Predicting Administrator Choice of Method of Sale

130
Table 4.4:
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Individual Best Practice
Variables Predicting Administrator Choice of Method of Sale

While none of the variables for the Best Practices model were significant at the
.05 level, the “municipal advisor RFP” (Q18) and the “competitive sale use” (Q23)
variables were both significant at the .10 level. The competitive sale use variable suggests
that those who have used it in the past are much more likely to use it in the future, while
The MA RFP variable suggests a small positive impact as well. Again, both of these
relationships were significant and in the predicted direction, but the relationship was not
as strong as hypothesized. The rest of the variables were not statistically significant.
These include: municipal advisor usage (Q17), GFOA MA best practice (Q19),
knowledge of MA academic studies (Q20), competitive sale selection decision-making
(Q24), GFOA competitive sale best practices (Q25), knowledge of competitive sale
academic studies (Q26).
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V. Discussion
As a whole, the results of the t-test of bond yield compared to the MMD
benchmark provided, indeed, evidence that competitive sales compared to the MMD
benchmark have lower interest rates when compared to negotiated sales compared to the
MMD benchmark (H1). Also, logistic regressions result of the structural bond
characteristic predictors, and the individual administrator predictors of knowledge and
best practice provided additional insight into 5 predictors that support reasons why
administrators would choose a competitive sale. Those include: municipal advisor is
present, underwriter that a district selects sales less bonds, knowledge of bonds (Q1),
seek assistance with bonds (Q3), and number of bond financings (D3). While the end
results do provide some insights into why administrators choose the methods of sale they
do, the results do not capture all the reasons why. That said, results also indicate that the
presence of a municipal advisor and knowledge of bonds and levies are very strong
predictors of an administrator selecting a competitive sale.
In the end, there is support for both H1 and H2 overall, even though there were
numerous theoretical indicators that did not end up being statistically significant. This
research does establish a foundation for further study by providing a basis for competitive
versus negotiated sales and its financial impacts on bond rates and the “why” behind
administrator choice of method of sale. With this holistic approach to what is happening
within school district bond finance the true effects can be discovered. In this way this
research will prove valuable both the administrators themselves, their associations, but
also academia at large as it starts to look at an age old problem in a new and directly
correlated way and then seeks to get at the heart of why it is happening in the first place.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
I. Introduction
It is an Idaho constitutional mandate for Idaho school districts to provide
educational opportunities to Idaho’s children. Each district therefore must adequately
fund needed facilities in order to accomplish this mandate. Each district is unique in its
demographic make-up, decision-making processes, and methods they employ to fund
their needed facilities. Each district and the administrators they employ to carry-out the
district’s bonding needs are free to choose the agents and methods that will best meet the
needs of their districts.
That said, the methods administrators use always include an underwriter,
sometimes a municipal advisor is present, and ultimately result in either a competitive
sale or negotiated sale. When just an underwriter was present, 100% of the time a
negotiated sale was used. Almost exclusively, when a municipal advisor is present, a
competitive sale is used.33 Much research has been focused on the effect of method of
sale and the resulting costs. Overwhelmingly, the body of research has found that
competitive sales do in fact result in lower bond yields (Forbes & Peterson, 1979;
Guzman & Moldogaziev, 2012; Justice & Miller, 2011; Leigland & Lamb, 1986; Liu,
2018; Luby & Moldogaziev, 2013; Miller, 1993; Marlowe, 2009; Robbins & Simonsen,
2007; Robbins & Simonsen, 2008; Simonsen, Robbins & Helgerson, 2001; Vijayakumar

33

During the test period, there were 6 bond issues that were sold through a negotiate sale and also
had a municipal advisor.
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& Daniels, 2006). A few researchers find that this is not necessarily the case, though they
conclude there was no significant difference between negotiated and competitive sales
(Johnson & Kriz, 2005; Kriz, 2003; Leonard, 1996). Others correlate the use of a
municipal advisor to similar results. Thus, I proposed the following hypothesis:
H1: Idaho school district competitive bond sales achieve lower interest rates and
are therefore, less expensive than negotiated bond sales.
While the effects of method of sale and the use of third party agents have been the
focus of some academic research, little attention has been given to the actual decisionmaking process of the individual administrators and why they make the finance decisions
they do. That said, the beginning of this dissertation in Chapter 1 I sought to provide the
context of school district bond finance choice in Idaho by exploring the legislative history
of Idaho state finance policy from a policy analysis perspective and then to identify
subsequent impacts of that policy on individual school districts bond issues. This led to
the fundamental question of H1. I argued that there were sound theoretical reasons to
expect the answer to be “yes,” competitive sales result in lower interest rates in Chapter 2
and I believe the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 has borne this out.
In addition to this, Chapter 2 built a robust and comprehensive historical and
theoretical framework by which to explore the logical and progressive question of “Why
do administrators choose the agents and methods they do?
Principal-agent literature suggests that administrators will be more likely to listen
to agents they know agree with them ideologically, while they will be more likely to
ignore those they disagree with (Downs, 1967; Wood & Waterman, 1994). That said,
administrators possess few proxies they can use to discern whether their selected agent’s
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advice is in their best interest, making their decision-making purely subjective. The
selection of a method of sale that is decided upon by the use of a third party municipal
advisor that has a fiduciary duty to the district and administrators they serve and is hired
directly by them is a more objective measure that has the potential to alter the
relationship between administrators and underwriters substantially and ultimately the
chosen method of issuing their district’s bonds. Administrator principals are now able to
use the advice and information of their municipal advisor to reduce information
asymmetry and adjust not only how much credence to give to an underwriter’s advice,
but how much discretion administrators should afford them when selecting a method of
sale. With the aid of a municipal advisor, administrators are now armed with a counter
balance that is just as informed in the bond issuance process as their underwriter.
A thorough policy analysis was also conducted using Baumgartner and Jones’
punctuated equilibrium theory (2009), innovation and diffusion theory as described by
Berry and Berry (2014), and Kingdon’s multiple streams theory (2011) to provide
additional context and framework.
With this historical and theoretical context in place, it led me to the following
hypothesis concerning school district administrator choice in the context of what was
happening historically in Idaho:
H2: When administrators use best practices bond sales are less expensive.
In order to properly test H2, it became necessary to define what exactly choices
could be made, the decision to use a municipal advisor or not and whether to use a
competitive sale or negotiated sale. Once defined, this led to the exploration of the
variables that would potentially impact the administrator’s decision making. By this, I
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refer to the structural characteristics of the bonds issued such as: presence of a municipal
advisor (IV1), underwriter frequency (IV2), bank qualification (IV3), underlying rating
(IV4), enrollment (IV5), and bond size (IV6). Then in order to truly understand the
decision-making of each administrator the administrator survey was used to gather
individual administrator level data on their bond issuance preferences, knowledge, and
experience. More specifically, these variables included: administrative role –
superintendent or business officer (IV1), region of the state 1-6 (IV2), finance knowledge
and preferences (IV3), municipal finance training (IV4), municipal finance competency
(IV5), regulatory knowledge (IV6), cost motivation (IV7), underwriter use and selection
process (IV8), municipal advisor use, selection process, influence of GFOA best practice,
influence of academic studies (IV9), negotiated sale use and selection process (IV10),
competitive sale use, selection process, influence of GFOA best practice, influence of
academic studies (IV11), influence of the lowering of the supermajority voter approval
threshold for school district bonds (IV12), gender (IV13), year of school district
experience (IV14) number of school bonds administered (IV15) educational attainment
(IV16).
Using Idaho’s 2001 Senate bill S. 1158 as a test case where competitive sales
were statutorily mandated prior, then after the bill’s passage school districts were granted
the ability to use both a competitive and negotiated sale. At the time it was argued by the
proponents of the bill that this would save Idaho school districts “100 basis points or
more” (1.00%) on their bond interest rates. This dissertation sought to more closely
examine this period of policy change to note what effect, if any, this shift has brought
about. The preceding hypotheses were tested using unique and original data: (1) bond
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yield data from 194 school district bond issues during the time period, (2) individual
bond characteristic from the same 194 bond issues, and (3) a unique survey of Idaho’s
school district administrators, specifically superintendents and business officers. These
sources were used to identify the effect that Idaho’s shift to adding negotiated sales as a
permissible method of issuing school bonds has had on actual bond rates. I then seek to
understand why administrators choose the agents and methods they do.
II. Findings
a. Bond Yields Compared to Benchmark Findings
In Chapter 3, I noted Idaho school district bonds sold competitively are more
likely to result in interest rates that more closely match the daily MMD benchmark than
bonds sold through negotiation whose interest rates were further away from the daily
MMD benchmark. I also noted that competitively sold bonds on average had bond yields
10 basis points (.10%) above the daily MMD benchmark compared to bonds sold through
negotiated sales that had on average yields 29 basis points (.29%) above the daily MMD
benchmark. This 19 basis point (.19%) difference was found to be statistically significant
at the .001 confidence interval.
This gives evidence that is contrary to the 100 basis point advantage negotiated
sales were purported to bring as indicated by the supporters of S.1158 back in 2000 when
negotiated sales were introduced into Idaho.
In order to illustrate the practical impact of this 19 basis points (.19%) difference
between bonds sold competitively compared to the MMD benchmark and the difference
between bonds sold through negotiated compared to the MMD benchmark, I compared
two hypothetical average $15,000,000 30 year Aaa rated Idaho school district GO bonds;
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one with an average 3.80% yield and the other with an average yield of 3.99%. The 19
basis points (.19%) difference between the two bonds equated to $800,000 in an
additional cost. When this illustrative analysis was considered on the approximate $2BB
worth of bonds that Idaho school districts issued from 2001 to 2016 it equates to
$160,000,000 in additional expense.
b. Bond Characteristic Findings
The results of the logistic regression indicate that only two predictors have a
statistically significant effect on the probability on an administrator’s choice of method of
sale: presence of a municipal advisor and the underwriter that a district selects sales less
bonds. The remaining variables (bank qualification, underlying rating, enrollment, and
bond size) were not statistically significant.
The analysis suggests that when the “municipal advisor is present” variable
increases by 1, the odds that an administrator selects a competitive sale also increase 33.6
times. Said another way, when a municipal advisor is present there is a high probability
that an administrator will select a competitive sale to issue its district’s bonds. This
provides strong support for H2 and indicates that the presence of a municipal advisor is a
strong indicator that an administrator will choose a competitive sale.
This was also true of the “underwriter that a district selects sales less bonds”
variable, where this variable increases by 1, the odds an administrator selects a
competitive sale increases by 1.24 times. Said another way, when the underwriter the
administrator selects to issue its district’s bonds has sold less bonds there is a higher
probability that an administrator has selected a competitive sale. This is somewhat
intuitive as Seattle Northwest sold the most bonds at 109 and the 103 of them were
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through negotiation. The smatterings of one-off underwriters were largely selected via
competitive sale. This also provides strong support for H2 and indicates that the selection
of a less prominent underwriter is a strong indicator that an administrator will choose a
competitive sale.
c. Administrator Survey Findings
The results of the logistic regression indicate that only three predictors have a
statistically significant effect on the probability on an administrator’s choice of method of
sale: knowledge of bonds (Q1), seek assistance with bonds (Q3), and number of bond
financings (D3). The remaining variables (priority of bonds, formal training, training
freshness, training frequency, training source, district funding for training, state funding
adequacy, district financial management, school financial competency, and municipal
advisor rule awareness) were not statistically significant.
It was discovered that when the “knowledge about bonds and levies” of an
administrator increases by 1, the odds an administrator selects a competitive sale
increases by 101.4 times. Said another way, when the knowledge of bonds and levies
increases the probability that an administrator will select a competitive sale increases by
101.4 times. This provides strong support for H2 and indicates that an administrator that
has a self-proclaimed knowledge of bonds and levies is a very strong indicator that an
administrator will choose a competitive sale. This also tracks with the information
asymmetry literature as the more information an administrator has the less of an
asymmetry exists.
This was also true of the “frequency that an administrator seeks financial
assistance” predictor, where if this predictor increases by 1, the odds an administrator
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selects a competitive sale increases by 1.2 times. Said another way, the more often an
administrator seeks financial assistance, the probability that an administrator selects a
competitive sale goes up 1.2 times. This provides additional support for H2 as well and
indicates that an administrator that seeks financial assistance more frequently is an
indicator that an administrator will choose a competitive sale.
This was also true when the “number of bonds an administrator has participated
in” increases by 1, the odds an administrator selects a competitive sale increases by 6.9
times. This provides additional support for H2 and indicates that an administrator that has
experiences progressively more bond financings is a strong indicator that an
administrator will choose a competitive sale. This is somewhat intuitive because the more
bonds an administrator participates in, the more likely they will learn about the process in
general. This is also somewhat contrary to the anchoring literature that suggests the more
frequently an administrator uses a certain process the more likely they would be to use it
again.
The results of the logistic regression indicate that none of the best practice
predictors have a statistically significant effect at the .05 level on the probability on an
administrator’s choice of method of sale. These include: municipal advisor usage,
municipal advisor RFP, GFOA MA best practice, knowledge of MA academic studies,
competitive sale use, competitive sale selection decision-making, GFOA competitive sale
best practices, knowledge of competitive sale academic studies. That said, both municipal
advisor RFP and competitive sale use variables were significant at the .10 level,
suggesting a significant, but somewhat weak relationship. It was surprising that variables
such as “municipal advisor usage” did not show statistical significance. This may have
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been because there was confusion around what best practices were and the implications
thereof.
III. Future Research
From the outset, this dissertation has attempted to bridge psychology, sociology,
public administration, and municipal finance literatures to expand the study of
administrator choice to include the effect on administrators and their relationship with
markets and third party agents. The preceding chapters constitute the first step of that
endeavor, providing a foundation from which future research can build. The question
remains, however, what that future research should entail. Obviously, gathering
additional data with each subsequent bond issues will be critical. As repeatedly noted, I
currently lack enough post-treatment data points to properly assess causal relationships
between administrator choice and bond outcomes. Updating this data with annual
administrator survey updates and adding the additional bond issues for the year will be
important.
The analysis in Chapter 3 serves as an ideal starting point. It tested the
fundamental question of whether competitive sales result in lower bond yield by using
the MMD scale as a way to compare similarly rated bonds. This unique comparison to a
benchmark approach could easily be replicated for other issuer types in other states to
broaden the research. From this analysis, there is evidence in the data that the concern is
real and does have a statistically significant effect on bond interest rates and overall costs.
This method of comparing similarly rated bonds to the MMD benchmark could be easily
applied to other issuer and bond types and broaden the historical and current method of
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inquiry, which is largely based on multi-variate regression testing. This would be an
excited development in the contemporary field of research.
This method could also be applied to punctuating equilibrium theory testing in the
bond market. For example, in the case of this study, bonds issued prior to the S. 1158
legislative change could be compared to bonds issued post the legislative change in order
to determine the impacts of the policy change. This pre and post test method of
comparing punctuation points could be applied to regulatory changes, like the SEC MA
rules, and significant geopolitical events like Brexit and their impact on bond yields.
From Chapter 4, the structural bond characteristics of the presence of a MA and
the frequency at which an underwriter sales bonds are important confirmations and
reasons why administrators choose a competitive sale. These findings should be tested
further in additional context to see if they continue to hold true.
As for the administrator survey findings in Chapter 4, found that knowledge
predictors had a statistically significant and probability multiplier on whether an
administrator chose a competitive sale. These findings, though helpful and foundational
to the study, are less-than-ideal and indicate that a better model is needed. Specifying that
model is a good place to start, as it would provide the opportunity to control for
additional factors like socioeconomic status, education level, and other demographic
factors to better isolate the effect of administrator choice factors influencing the method
of sale and municipal advisor selection decisions. It bears mentioning that two of the
significant effects were found in training and education on the bonding process and
municipal finance best practices. This low hanging fruit seems to be a logical and straight
forward way to improve administrator decision-making.
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A mixed methods approach to the survey could bring additional clarity to the
“why” question of administrator choice of method of sale and financial professionals. A
qualitative question could be asked that simply says, “why do you select the method of
sale you do to issue your district’s bonds?” and “Why do you select the financial
professionals you do to aide you in the bonding process?”
It was also noted that some of the administrators with the highest-ranking
knowledge and best practices index scores, chose negotiated sales without the use of a
municipal advisor. This was also true of some of the most frequent issuing districts as
well as some of the most urban districts. This seemingly ironic observation is worth
further exploration. There seems to be a gap in the quality of education and knowledge
and the actual choices administrators make.
It was also noted that administrators lean on their bond council and peers for
municipal finance advice, where best practice would suggest that this advice is best
coming from a municipal advisor. There was also some indication that many use their
underwriter for method of sale advice. This is most concerning as 100% of the time this
occurred; the district’s bonds were issued using a negotiated sale.
While this dissertation has focused exclusively on Idaho school district bonds and
the administrators whose responsibility it is to issue them, expanding research to other
levels of government could be illuminating. In Idaho, cities, counties, universities, other
local special districts, state agencies, and the State of Idaho itself could benefit from
further exploration of these methods and research. As a result, the same theoretical
concerns identified here could be applied to these governments.
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With the consistent and rapid innovations that are happening with technology, the
impacts of these innovations on the bond market is worth consideration. One of those
areas is technology’s impact on investor relations and the ability to market bonds much
more broadly and easily. This would lend credence to competitive sale arguments that
increased competition and wider distribution increases demand for bonds; and therefore,
lower bond yields.
Another interesting research question related to this would be to explore whether
there is an equity and inclusion dilemma at play. In other words, do competitive sales
increase equity and inclusion of bond investors by virtue of broader distribution and
marketing compared to negotiated sales that may be marketed more narrowly and locally.
Somewhat contrary to this line of research, this idea of distribution and marketing
could also lead to research into the economic benefit of marketing bonds locally. Said
another way, economic impact analyses could give support for negotiated sale arguments
that there is a benefit for marketing bonds to local investors.
In an ethics vain, this research provided evidence of information asymmetries and
some evidence of potential conflicts of interest. Some consideration of principal agent
dilemmas and ethics could add another interesting element to the research agenda.
A core component of the theoretical argument for why administrators would
choose methods and financial professionals contrary to best practice and academic
research is the concept of administrator discretion and the host of concerns surrounding
it, particularly information asymmetry and the moral hazards present in principal-agent
relationships. Necessarily, this matter concerns two sets of actors: administrators and
financial professionals. This dissertation has approached the matter from the
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administrative perspective, but it is also incumbent upon us to look at it from the financial
professional’s view. Their motivations are only hinted at here and are left primarily to
free-market capitalism arguments and not given much consideration. This invites the
study of more tangible measures of bureaucratic discretion as well as agent motivation.
IV. Conclusion
This dissertation contributes to the literature of public administration and finance
in numerous ways. Along more traditional lines of inquiry, its examination of bond sales
in Idaho following its shift to exclusively negotiated bond sales from 2001 to 2006 and
mixed sales thereafter, adds an additional test of the claims in the literature that
competitive sales result in lower interest cost. While this can help address come of the
contradictions found in the literature, it comes with an important caveat, there is mixed
and some contrary literature that argues there is no significant difference between
competitive and negotiated sales.
More uniquely, this dissertation demonstrates that changing the current paradigm
of method of sales and use of municipal advisor would benefit school districts and the tax
payers they serve. In fact, the implementation and utilization of these recommendations
has the potential to directly save Idaho school districts substantial funds, though the exact
amount is difficult to determine empirically. By establishing that these effects are real,
this dissertation has begun to provide a deeper understanding of administrator choice and
its impact on bond issuance outcomes.
Examination of original data in this dissertation establishes that a statistically
significant difference exists between competitive and negotiated sales. Perhaps more
importantly, it reaches deeper to explore “why” administrators often choose methods and
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professionals contrary to best practice and the academic research. All this serves as a
solid foundation to begin examining the effects of administrator choice more fully, which
should help guide future research.
A critical contribution of this dissertation is that method of sale matters—
competitive sale results are different from negotiated sales. That is simply a starting
point, however, and it invites exploration into whether this is true across municipality
types and across different markets other than Idaho.
In Chapter 1, I noted that one of the goals of this dissertation was to expand
research on why administrators choose the methods and professionals they do into areas
heretofore unstudied. The effect that municipal advisors have on the method of sale
selection and the resulting outcomes is one such area. It is only by exploring the full
breadth of the effect of this that we can truly assess the strengths and weaknesses of it.
More importantly, it is only then administrators can make a truly informed decision about
which methods are best for their districts. I believe this dissertation substantially
contributes to that understanding.
a. Recommendations
1. Conduct this survey annually and create a longitudinal data set that could be
tested over time.
2. School district Association’s train their superintendent and finance officers on a
more frequent basis.
3. School districts fund membership in their state associations as well as national
associations.
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4. School districts hire a municipal advisor when considering bond financing for
their facility needs. This is because 100% of comparative sales also had a
municipal advisor involved.
5. The State Treasurer’s Office require the use of a competitive sale when using the
state’s School Bond Guarantee and Credit Enhancement programs.
6. School district finance officers have at least a bachelor’s degree or higher
education.
7. It is not recommended that school districts do a negotiated sell without the aid of
a municipal advisor.
8. School districts use a competitive RFP process to select their municipal advisor.
9. If an Idaho school district wishes to use a negotiated sale, they use a competitive
RFP process to select their underwriter. This is best done with the aid of a
municipal advisor.
10. Idaho school districts look outside their very narrow Idaho market of municipal
advisors and underwriters for bond issuance assistance and advice. The use of a
nationally distributed RFP for these services is recommended. This is because
only 2 municipal advisors were used during the test period and only 19
underwriters with 1 predominately brokering the issues through negotiated sales.
11. Idaho school districts use a competitive bond sale when issuing their bonds. This
will have the results of reducing cost, increase transparency, and provide
increased accountability to their citizenry. A noteworthy secondary benefit is
more underwriters will pay attention to the Idaho market. This increase in
competition will only further compound the benefits of a competitive cell.
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12. The true cost of bonding is currently difficult to determine. Not only is it difficult
to compare bonds as they have differing credit quality and are sold on different
days into different markets, municipal advisor, underwriter and other costs of
issuance are opaque and not listed in bond documents. This study provides
methods to analyze credit and differing markets, but does not explore methods of
determining other related costs. It is recommended that the SEC and MSRB
mandate a clear detailing of costs associated to bond transactions so that a true all
inclusive cost of issuance can be determine.
In principle agent dilemmas, validation strategies are critical to reducing
information asymmetry. In the case of school district administrator principles and
underwriter agents, municipal advisors can play a critical role in validating the
transaction and ensuring that information asymmetries do not lead to suboptimal
outcomes.
Where the stakes are high and outcomes matter, superintendents and business
officers would do well to acknowledge these information asymmetries and actively seek
advice from agnostic third-parties such as municipal advisers. It is somewhat obvious that
in order for this to be adequately addressed, reoccurring training opportunities from
statewide and national associations be required and frequent.
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Administrator Survey Recruitment Letter

Hello Idaho School District Administrator Thank you for taking this brief Boise State University survey in partnership with the
IASA regarding Idaho school district finance practices. This survey will assist a Ph.D.
candidate with their dissertation and potentially impact Idaho finance policy. If you are
interested in the results, they will be shared through the IASA upon request. The survey
takes 3-5 minutes to complete. Please click the link below to begin and thank you in
advance for your participation.
Follow this link to the Survey:
Take the survey
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser:
https://boisestate.az1.qualtrics.com/SE?Q_DL=6KWscHcPvX3hfaR_ehTb5RyzI9erI1f_
MLRP_6otaeRTAxC6fB1H&Q_CHL=email
Follow the link to opt out of future emails:
Click here to unsubscribe
Thanks again,
Cameron Arial
BSU Ph.D. Candidate

Rob Windslow
IASA Executive Director
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Administrator Survey Questionnaire
Screening questions:
S1)

Are you a superintendent or a business officer?



S2)

Superintendent
Business Officer

What region of Idaho are you in?







Region 1
Region 2
Region 3
Region 4
Region 5
Region 6

Survey Questions:
Q1)

How would you rate your knowledge of bonds and levies?






Q2)

Where do you rank bonds and levies of all your work responsibilities?







Q3)

Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor
Don’t know

Very High
High
Moderate
Low
Very Low
Don’t know

How often do you seek outside assistance with finance related needs?







Never
Less Than Once a Month
Once a Month
2-3 Times a Month
Once a Week
2-3 Times a Week
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Q4)

Have you ever been formally trained in school bonds and levies?




Q5)

Twice a year
Once a year
Every 2 years
Every 3 years
Every 4 years
Every 5 years
Don’t Know

If yes, from whom did you receive the training?










Q8)

This year
1 year ago
2 year ago
3 year ago
4 year ago
5 year ago
Other
Don’t Know

If yes, how often do you receive training?








Q7)

Yes
No
Don’t Know

If yes, how long ago did you receive the training?









Q6)

Daily
Don’t know

Peer
Trade Association
Municipal Advisor
Underwriter
Department of Education
Bond Counsel
Auditors
Online sources
Don’t Know

Does your District allocate funds for financial training?


Yes
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No
Don’t Know

Q9) Do you agree that Idaho school districts are able to adequately fund their
facility needs.







Strongly Agree
Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Don’t Know

Q10) Do you agree that your district is financially well managed.







Strongly Agree
Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Don’t Know

Q11) What degree of competency when it comes to school finance.







Very High
High
Moderate
Low
Very Low
Don’t Know

Q12) What degree of competency when it comes to the bond issuance process?







Very High
High
Moderate
Low
Very Low
Don’t Know

Q13) How aware are you of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
and Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board's (MSRB) new municipal advisor rules?



Very Aware
Somewhat Aware
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Aware
Somewhat Unaware
Very Unaware
Don’t Know

Q14) On a scale from 0 - 10 with 0 being extremely unimportant and 10 being
extremely important, how important is it to you to achieve the lowest cost possible for
your district's bonds?
Extremely Unimportant
0
1
2
3

4

5

6

7

Extremely Important
8
9
10

DEFINITION: Underwriter - "A municipal securities firm that purchases all of
the bonds and resales them to investors at a profit."
Q15) To assist with the bond election and issuance process, does your district
use the services of only an underwriter when issuing its bonds?
 Yes
 No
 Don’t know
Q16) If yes, has your district ever used a competitive request for proposal (RFP)
process to select your underwriter?




Yes
No
Don’t know

DEFINITION: Municipal Advisor (i.e. financial advisor) - "A person that (i)
provides advice to or on behalf of a municipal entity, including advice with respect to the
structure, timing, terms, and other similar matters concerning such financial products or
issues, or (ii) undertakes a solicitation of a municipal entity."
Q17) Does your district use the services of a municipal advisor when issuing its
bonds?




Yes
No
Don’t know

Q18) If yes, has your district ever used a competitive RFP process to select your
municipal advisor?



Yes
No
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Don’t know

Q19) If you knew that the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA)
recommended the use of an independent municipal advisor, how likely are you to use a
municipal advisor for your next bond issue?







Very Likely
Likely
Undecided
Unlikely
Very unlikely
Don’t Know

Q20) If you knew that academic studies have found that the use of a municipal
advisor are likely to reduce the cost of your bonds substantially, how likely are you to use
a municipal advisor for your next bond issue?







Very Likely
Likely
Undecided
Unlikely
Very Unlikely
Don’t Know

DEFINITION: Negotiated bond sale - "A bond sale in which the underwriter is
selected upfront allowing them to take advantage of market conditions as well as develop
a structure that suits market conditions. Complicated and/or lower rated bonds are
typically sold through a negotiated sale."
Q21) Does your district use a negotiated bond sale to issue its bonds?




Yes
No
Don’t know

Q22) If yes, what decision-making process is used to select a negotiated bond
sale??








Recommendation of Financial Professionals
Use the Same Process the District Used in the Past
Recommendation of Peers
Recommendation of Trade Association
Follow Best Practice
Other
Don’t Know
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DEFINITION: Competitive bond sale - "A bond sale in which the underwriter is
selected through a competitive bidding process. Less complicated and/or higher rated
bonds, particularly GO bonds, are typically sold through a competitive sale."
Q23) Does your district use a competitive bond sale to issue its bonds?




Yes
No
Don’t know

Q24) If yes, what decision-making process is used to select a competitive bond
sale?








Recommendation of Financial Professionals
Use the Same Process the District Used in the Past
Recommendation of Peers
Recommendation of Trade Association
Follow Best Practice
Other
Don’t Know

Q25) If you knew that the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA)
recommended the use of a competitive sale, how likely would you be to use a competitive
bond sale for your next bond issue?






Very Likely
Likely
Undecided
Unlikely
Very Unlikely

Q26) If you knew that academic studies have found that the use of a competitive
bond sale are likely to reduce the cost of your bonds substantially, how likely are you to
use a competitive bond sale for your next bond issue?







Very Likely
Likely
Undecided
Unlikely
Very Unlikely
Don’t Know

Q27) Do you agree that the supermajority (66.6%) voter threshold should be
reduced in Idaho?
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Strongly Agree
Agree
Undecided
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Don’t Know

Demographic Questions:
D1)

Please indicate your gender?




Male
Female
Prefer not to answer

D2)

How many years have you been working in school district administration?

D3)

How many bond financings have you participated in?

D4)

What is the highest level of education you have completed?







Less than high school
High school graduate (includes equivalency)
Associate or Technical degree
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate or professional degree
Prefer not to answer
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Administrator Survey Results Frequency Table
S1- Are you a superintendent or a business officer?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Superintendent

82

58.2

58.2

58.2

Business Officer

59

41.8

41.8

100.0

Total

141

100.0

100.0
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S2- What region of Idaho are you in?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Region 1

16

11.3

11.5

11.5

Region 2

14

9.9

10.1

21.6

Region 3

41

29.1

29.5

51.1

Region 4

21

14.9

15.1

66.2

Region 5

17

12.1

12.2

78.4

Region 6

30

21.3

21.6

100.0

Total

139

98.6

100.0

2

1.4

141

100.0

System
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Q1- How would you rate your knowledge of bonds and levies?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Excellent

16

11.3

11.3

11.3

Good

59

41.8

41.8

53.2

Fair

54

38.3

38.3

91.5

Poor

12

8.5

8.5

100.0

Total

141

100.0

100.0
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Q2- Where do you rank bonds and levies of all of your work responsibilities?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Very High

20

14.2

14.4

14.4

High

54

38.3

38.8

53.2

Moderate

38

27.0

27.3

80.6

Low

20

14.2

14.4

95.0

Very Low

7

5.0

5.0

100.0

139

98.6

100.0

2

1.4

141

100.0

Total
Missing
Total

System
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Q3- How often do you seek outside assistance with finance related needs?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Never

10

7.1

7.2

7.2

Less than Once a Month

80

56.7

57.6

64.7

Once a Month

25

17.7

18.0

82.7

2-3 Times a Month

19

13.5

13.7

96.4

Once a Week

2

1.4

1.4

97.8

2-3 Times a Week

2

1.4

1.4

99.3

Daily

1

.7

.7

100.0

Total

139

98.6

100.0

2

1.4

141

100.0

System
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Q4- Have you ever been formally trained in school bonds and levies?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Yes

50

35.5

36.2

36.2

No

88

62.4

63.8

100.0

Total

138

97.9

100.0

3

2.1

141

100.0

System
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Q5- If yes, how long ago did you receive the training?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

This year

10

7.1

14.1

14.1

1 year ago

11

7.8

15.5

29.6

2 years ago

4

2.8

5.6

35.2

3 years ago

5

3.5

7.0

42.3

4 years ago

3

2.1

4.2

46.5

5 years ago

9

6.4

12.7

59.2

Other

29

20.6

40.8

100.0

Total

71

50.4

100.0

System

70

49.6

141

100.0
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Q6- If yes, how often do you receive training?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Twice a year

4

2.8

8.9

8.9

Once a year

22

15.6

48.9

57.8

Every 2 years

6

4.3

13.3

71.1

Every 3 years

2

1.4

4.4

75.6

Every 4 years

2

1.4

4.4

80.0

Every 5 years

9

6.4

20.0

100.0

Total

45

31.9

100.0

System

96

68.1

141

100.0
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Q7- If yes, from whom did you receive the training?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Peer

16

11.3

25.4

25.4

Trade Association

7

5.0

11.1

36.5

Municipal Advisor

6

4.3

9.5

46.0

Underwriter

6

4.3

9.5

55.6

Department of Education

4

2.8

6.3

61.9

Bond Counsel

18

12.8

28.6

90.5

Auditor

5

3.5

7.9

98.4

Online Sources

1

.7

1.6

100.0

Total

63

44.7

100.0

System

78

55.3

141

100.0
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Q8- Does your District allocate funds for financial training?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Yes

60

42.6

43.2

43.2

No

73

51.8

52.5

95.7

Don't Know

6

4.3

4.3

100.0

139

98.6

100.0

2

1.4

141

100.0

Total

Missing
Total

System

177

Q9 Do you agree that Idaho school districts are able to adequately fund their facility needs?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Agree

6

4.3

4.3

4.3

Neither Agree nor Disagree

8

5.7

5.8

10.1

Disagree

43

30.5

30.9

41.0

Strongly Disagree

82

58.2

59.0

100.0

Total

139

98.6

100.0

2

1.4

141

100.0

System
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Q10- Do you agree that your district is financially well managed?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Strongly Agree

55

39.0

39.0

39.0

Agree

67

47.5

47.5

86.5

Neither Agree nor Disagree

14

9.9

9.9

96.5

Disagree

4

2.8

2.8

99.3

Strongly Disagree

1

.7

.7

100.0

141

100.0

100.0

Total
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Q11- What degree of competency do you have when it comes to school finance?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Very High

20

14.2

14.2

14.2

High

77

54.6

54.6

68.8

Moderate

40

28.4

28.4

97.2

Low

2

1.4

1.4

98.6

Very Low

2

1.4

1.4

100.0

141

100.0

100.0

Total

180

Q12- What degree of competency do you have when it comes to the bond issuance process?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Very High

2

1.4

1.4

1.4

High

23

16.3

16.3

17.7

Moderate

63

44.7

44.7

62.4

Low

35

24.8

24.8

87.2

Very Low

17

12.1

12.1

99.3

Don't Know

1

.7

.7

100.0

141

100.0

100.0

Total
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Q13- How aware are you of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) and Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board's (MSRB) new municipal advisor rules?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Very Aware

4

2.8

2.8

2.8

Somewhat Aware

26

18.4

18.4

21.3

Aware

19

13.5

13.5

34.8

Somewhat Unaware

28

19.9

19.9

54.6

Very Unaware

59

41.8

41.8

96.5

Don't Know

5

3.5

3.5

100.0

141

100.0

100.0

Total
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Q14- On a scale from 0 - 10 with 0 being extremely unimportant and 10 being extremely important, how important is it to
you to achieve the lowest cost possible for your district's bonds?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

0

3

2.1

2.2

2.2

2

2

1.4

1.4

3.6

3

1

.7

.7

4.3

4

1

.7

.7

5.1

5

6

4.3

4.3

9.4

6

3

2.1

2.2

11.6

7

7

5.0

5.1

16.7

8

16

11.3

11.6

28.3

9

23

16.3

16.7

44.9

10

76

53.9

55.1

100.0

Total

138

97.9

100.0

3

2.1

141

100.0

System

183
DEFINITION: Underwriter - "A municipal securities firm that purchases all of the bonds and resales them to investors at a profit."
Q15- To assist with the bond election and issuance process, does your district use the services of only an underwriter when
issuing its bonds?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Yes

45

31.9

47.9

47.9

No

49

34.8

52.1

100.0

Total

94

66.7

100.0

System

47

33.3

141

100.0
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Q16- If yes, has your district ever used a competitive request for proposal (RFP) process to select your underwriter?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Yes

19

13.5

32.2

32.2

No

40

28.4

67.8

100.0

Total

59

41.8

100.0

System

82

58.2

141

100.0
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DEFINITION: Municipal Advisor (i.e. financial advisor) - "A person that (i) provides advice to or on behalf of a municipal entity,
including advice with respect to the structure, timing, terms, and other similar matters concerning such financial products or
issues, or (ii) undertakes a solicitation of a municipal entity."
Q17- Does your district use the services of a municipal advisor when issuing its bonds?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Yes

65

46.1

63.7

63.7

No

37

26.2

36.3

100.0

Total

102

72.3

100.0

System

39

27.7

141

100.0
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Q18- If yes, has your district ever used a competitive RFP process to select your municipal advisor?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Yes

17

12.1

25.0

25.0

No

51

36.2

75.0

100.0

Total

68

48.2

100.0

System

73

51.8

141

100.0
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Q19- If you knew that the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) recommended the use of an independent
municipal advisor, how likely are you to use a municipal advisor for your next bond issue?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Very Likely

46

32.6

33.6

33.6

Likely

52

36.9

38.0

71.5

Undecided

26

18.4

19.0

90.5

Unlikely

1

.7

.7

91.2

Very Unlikely

1

.7

.7

92.0

Don't Know

11

7.8

8.0

100.0

Total

137

97.2

100.0

4

2.8

141

100.0

System
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Q20- If you knew that academic studies have found that the use of a municipal advisor are likely to reduce the cost of
bonds substantially, how likely are you to use a municipal advisor for your next bond issue?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Very Likely

66

46.8

48.5

48.5

Likely

47

33.3

34.6

83.1

Undecided

15

10.6

11.0

94.1

Unlikely

1

.7

.7

94.9

Don't Know

7

5.0

5.1

100.0

136

96.5

100.0

5

3.5

141

100.0

Total
Missing
Total

System
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DEFINITION: Negotiated bond sale - "A bond sale in which the underwriter is selected upfront allowing them to take advantage
of market conditions as well as develop a structure that suits market conditions. Complicated and/or lower rated bonds are
typically sold through a negotiated sale."
Q21- Does your district use a negotiated bond sale to issue its bonds?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Yes

38

27.0

47.5

47.5

No

42

29.8

52.5

100.0

Total

80

56.7

100.0

System

61

43.3

141

100.0
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Q22- If yes, what decision-making process is used to select a negotiated bond sale?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Recommendation of Financial Professionals

32

22.7

65.3

65.3

Use the Same Process the District Used in the

9

6.4

18.4

83.7

Recommendation of Peers

1

.7

2.0

85.7

Follow Best Practice

4

2.8

8.2

93.9

Other

3

2.1

6.1

100.0

Total

49

34.8

100.0

System

92

65.2

141

100.0

Past

Missing
Total
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DEFINITION: Competitive bond sale - "A bond sale in which the underwriter is selected through a competitive
bidding process. Less complicated and/or higher rated bonds, particularly GO bonds, are typically sold through a competitive sale."
Q23- Does your district use a competitive bond sale to issue its bonds?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Yes

42

29.8

51.9

51.9

No

39

27.7

48.1

100.0

Total

81

57.4

100.0

System

60

42.6

141

100.0
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Q24- If yes, what decision-making process is used to select a competitive bond sale?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

32

22.7

68.1

68.1

9

6.4

19.1

87.2

Recommendation of Peers

1

.7

2.1

89.4

Follow Best Practice

3

2.1

6.4

95.7

Other

2

1.4

4.3

100.0

Total

47

33.3

100.0

System

94

66.7

141

100.0

Recommendation of Financial
Professionals
Use the Same Process the District
Used in the Past

Missing
Total
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Q25- If you knew that the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) recommended the use of a competitive sale,
how likely would you be to use a competitive bond sale for your next bond issue?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Very Likely

47

33.3

38.8

38.8

Likely

50

35.5

41.3

80.2

Undecided

23

16.3

19.0

99.2

Unlikely

1

.7

.8

100.0

Total

121

85.8

100.0

System

20

14.2

141

100.0
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Q26- If you knew that academic studies have found that the use of a competitive bond sale are likely to
reduce the cost of your bonds substantially, how likely are you to use a competitive bond sale for your next bond issue?

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Very Likely

55

39.0

44.7

44.7

Likely

51

36.2

41.5

86.2

Undecided

16

11.3

13.0

99.2

Unlikely

1

.7

.8

100.0

Total

123

87.2

100.0

System

18

12.8

141

100.0
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Q27- Do you agree that the supermajority (66.6%) voter threshold should be reduced in Idaho?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Strongly Agree

78

55.3

57.8

57.8

Agree

35

24.8

25.9

83.7

Undecided

11

7.8

8.1

91.9

Disagree

5

3.5

3.7

95.6

Strongly Disagree

6

4.3

4.4

100.0

135

95.7

100.0

6

4.3

141

100.0

Total
Missing
Total

System
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D1- Please indicate your gender?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Male

86

61.0

61.9

61.9

Female

47

33.3

33.8

95.7

Prefer not to answer

6

4.3

4.3

100.0

139

98.6

100.0

2

1.4

141

100.0

Total
Missing
Total

System

197

D2- How many years have you been working in school district administration?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

0

1

.7

.7

.7

1

8

5.7

5.7

6.4

2

7

5.0

5.0

11.4

3

9

6.4

6.4

17.9

4

4

2.8

2.9

20.7

5

12

8.5

8.6

29.3

6

4

2.8

2.9

32.1

7

6

4.3

4.3

36.4

8

3

2.1

2.1

38.6

9

4

2.8

2.9

41.4

10

5

3.5

3.6

45.0

12

3

2.1

2.1

47.1

13

10

7.1

7.1

54.3

14

3

2.1

2.1

56.4

15

9

6.4

6.4

62.9

16

3

2.1

2.1

65.0

17

4

2.8

2.9

67.9

18

7

5.0

5.0

72.9

19

2

1.4

1.4

74.3

20

7

5.0

5.0

79.3

21

3

2.1

2.1

81.4

22

5

3.5

3.6

85.0

23

1

.7

.7

85.7

24

4

2.8

2.9

88.6

25

5

3.5

3.6

92.1

26

2

1.4

1.4

93.6

27

1

.7

.7

94.3

28

1

.7

.7

95.0

29

1

.7

.7

95.7

30

3

2.1

2.1

97.9

31

1

.7

.7

98.6

34

1

.7

.7

99.3

49

1

.7

.7

100.0

140

99.3

100.0

1

.7

141

100.0

Total
Missing
Total

System

198
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D3- How many bond financings have you participated in?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

0

54

38.3

38.8

38.8

1

41

29.1

29.5

68.3

2

17

12.1

12.2

80.6

3

9

6.4

6.5

87.1

4

5

3.5

3.6

90.6

5

6

4.3

4.3

95.0

6

3

2.1

2.2

97.1

7

1

.7

.7

97.8

11

1

.7

.7

98.6

12

1

.7

.7

99.3

25

1

.7

.7

100.0

139

98.6

100.0

2

1.4

141

100.0

Total
Missing
Total

System
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D4- What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

12

8.5

8.6

8.6

Associate or Technical degree

11

7.8

7.9

16.4

Bachelor's degree

28

19.9

20.0

36.4

Graduate or professional degree

85

60.3

60.7

97.1

Prefer not to answer

4

2.8

2.9

100.0

140

99.3

100.0

1

.7

141

100.0

High school graduate (includes
equivalency)

Total
Missing
Total

System

